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1.1 Introduction 
Fiscal policy along side with monetary policy is one of the main tools available to 
public authorities to intervene and influence the real economy. The recent financial crisis 
(started in 2008) has shown the importance of government intervention to stabilize and 
alleviate any threat on the economy. Indeed fiscal activism, after more than two decades 
of neo-classical and the “no fiscal dominance” paradigm, has come back on the top of 
government agendas in recent years. In both developing and advanced economies, IMF 
has called for fiscal stimulus combined with easing monetary policies in response to the 
global downturn. In a Staff Policy Notes (IMF, 2009), the IMF research department from 
a multi-country structural model finds that with the right policies, both emerging and 
advanced countries could support aggregate demand and restore economic growth. Such 
worldwide fiscal stimulus policy is believed to end the global crisis through the large 
multiplicative effects1. However the come-back of Keynesian ideas poses some challenges 
on which I will be back later in this section. Despite the renewal of interest on fiscal 
policy, its effects on economic activity still remain not well known.  
As it is usually defined fiscal policy is the use of public spending and taxes to influence 
economic activity toward more expansion or contraction depending on the situation. All 
along history of economics, views and theories on the efficiency of fiscal policies have 
been most of the time contradictory.  
The recourse to public finances as a tool to influence economic activity formally started 
during the great depression in 1929. Before that date, the budget had no economic role it 
was only dedicated to current spending of the central administration. Indeed during 
1930s‟ depression some governments have started considering the budget as an economic 
policy tool. The analysis from the British economist John Maynard Keynes has given a 
theoretical foundation for such policies, showing that public spending and tax revenues 
                                                          
1 In the same note, for countries with financing constraints (highly indebted countries or low fiscal 
resource endowed countries) the IMF has advised at least to keep unchanged public expenditures 
especially social ones.  
Chap1 : General Introduction & Overview 
9 
 
are efficient tool to regulate economic cycles. In 1929 the recession was very severe, for 
instance in 1933 one American worker in every four was unemployed. Additional to that 
25% unemployment rate, 20% of New York City school children were under weight and  
malnourished. In this context public intervention was quasi-compulsory and necessary. 
The US government announced a wide economic plan, the New Deal, to address these 
issues. In the first years the plan was concerned with relief (food and shelter for millions 
of indigents and unemployed). Then the policy shifted toward recovery (creation of state 
agencies such as National Recovery Act in 1933, and National Industrial Recovery Act).  
Several arguments have been advanced to justify the use of fiscal policy as an economic 
policy tool. The first of these arguments has been the direct Keynesians ideas and their 
extensions. 
J. M. Keynes, in his General Theory (1935), has identified two channels through which 
government budget could be considered as an economic policy tool. The first role for 
fiscal authorities is to ensure a better distribution of income. Greater income equality puts 
more money into hand of people with higher marginal propensity to consume (MPC) 
leading to increased consumption (Pressman, 1997). The second aspect of this theory 
argues that public spending was the principal mean available to protect the economy 
against fluctuations through the multiplicative effect. During the great depression and 
even after, the two Keynesian principles guided major public policies in the developed 
world and in new countries as well. For instance in the UK public spending jumped from 
25% of GNP during pre-war period to more than 50% during mid-1970s. On the same 
vein, developing countries‟ public finances have also been characterized by high level of 
spending (weak fiscal revenues) and deficits since 1960s but unfortunately the expected 
results have not been always obtained.  
On straight line with traditional Keynesian ideas, other authors developed arguments that 
are related to the important short-term social waste associated to business cycles.  For 
such authors (e.g. Galí, 2005) business cycles induces important costs in terms of 
Chap1 : General Introduction & Overview 
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economic efficiency2 and output volatility. Going even further, it has been shown that the 
effects on the real economy of crises are not only limited to the short-term but there exist 
negative impacts even on the medium term prospects (IMF, 2009). Basically an empirical 
investigation from past major (financial and economic) crises demonstrated that after a 
downturn, there is little chance for the economy to retrieve its pre-crisis growth trend (in 
WEO Chapter4, IMF 2009). The changes in factors of production (capital and labor) and 
changes in their use (total factor productivity) explain largely the shift in medium-term 
output dynamics. Therefore to allow the economy to quickly recover from recession and 
mitigate mid-term loss in output dynamic, short-run demand management policies are to 
be implemented at the early stages of the downturn. To answer such inefficiencies and 
loss of mid-term output strong discretionary fiscal measures accompanied with 
accommodative monetary policies are advised.  
Finally our last argument in favor of fiscal policy especially applies to developing 
countries where households cannot smooth their consumption due to liquidity 
constraints. In such situation business cycles reinforce the already high volatility of private 
final expenditures (Ozbilgin, 2010).  
However (and despite all these arguments above) after almost forty years where public 
spending was considered as one of the most important tool for growth enhancement and 
against unemployment a new paradigm was born during late 1970s. Indeed in the 1970s, 
arose a depression in developed economies characterized by the cohabitation of high level 
of unemployment and inflation. From that date and until recently neo-classical ideas were 
dominant. The coming sections will continue this discussion and give details on the 
rationales and some of the mechanisms of fiscal policy for both Keynesian and neo-
classical. 
Fiscal policy in developing countries is especially important in terms of macroeconomic 
management. Despite this importance, fiscal policy in developing economies has been 
                                                          
2 Chapter 4 will come back into more details on the inefficiencies related to business cycles. Especially 
Galí (2005) developed an indicator (this indicator is named “GAP” and chapter 4 will still provide details) 
that clearly give a measure of business cycles could keep the economy far from its potential level. 
Chap1 : General Introduction & Overview 
11 
 
mainly discussed through the tax collection and “simple” accounting side. Therefore the 
coming chapters will cover this issue in a broader perspective.  
The rational of this dissertation is at the end to be able to define some stylized facts for 
fiscal policies in developing countries (what has not been done). This would fill an 
important gap in the literature and afford us with a better knowledge on how fiscal policy 
could be more efficiently used.  
This introductory chapter aims at giving an overview of the fiscal policy stance in 
developing countries. The first section provides definition and explanations on basic 
concepts and theories. The second section presents the objectives assigned to government 
budget, see whether these goals are reached and, if not, what could explain such situation. 
One finishes by presenting the relevance of this dissertation and a summary of its main 
contributing chapters.  
 
1.2 Key Concepts and Measurement for Fiscal Policy 
1.2.1 Definition of public sector: General government versus 
Central Government 
 
As a measure for the public sector, the concept of “General government” instead of 
“central government” will be preferred. For developing countries a broad measure should 
be preferred since in developing countries several public entities might play an active 
fiscal role. Also a broad measure is necessary to capture the overall impact of fiscal 
variables on macroeconomic performance. Indeed state and local authorities and non-
financial public enterprises owned by government are to be considered since they have an 
impact on government fiscal position. Additional to that, this category includes (when 
required) the quasi-fiscal operations of central banks and other financial institutions. 
These operations sometimes can serve same role as taxes or subsidies (for instance the 
central bank in some countries plays the role of banker to the government: interest rate 
subsidies etc.) and they can have a significant budgetary impact.  
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Therefore fiscal variables used all along this dissertation cover as wide as possible the 
public sector. The next step will be to identify ways to assess position and sustainability  
 
1.2.2 Measuring and assessing fiscal sustainability 
1.2.2.1 Fiscal balance indicators 
Assessment of fiscal policy starts with the definition of right indicators on budget 
balance. Several measures of fiscal balance are used, each one of these giving a special 
picture and describing a particular situation of public finances. Therefore a single 
indicator gauging the public sector‟s net resource use does not exist.  
 
The overall fiscal balance 
It is the most commonly used indicator to assess the stance of fiscal policy (Khan 
& al. 2002). The overall budget balance is computed as the difference between revenue 
and grants, on one side, and expenditure and net lending on the other usually during 365-
day period. The overall balance provides the advantage to gather information on the 
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR hereafter). The PSBR variable is essential for 
developing countries since it helps to design financial support required from bilateral or 
multilateral partners for development. Moreover when stated in percent of GDP, overall 
balance give the exact impact of fiscal policy on the economy. For instance a declining 
balance (overall balance in percent of GDP) or growing deficit means that public 
authorities are running expansionary fiscal policy. Inversely declining deficit (or growing 
surplus) indicates that the fiscal stance is contractionary. However the overall deficit is not 
enough to measure the true effect of the fiscal stance on economic activity. This indicator 
presents some limits. Those shortcomings are threefold: overall deficit considers that 
impact on demand of all taxes and expenditures are identical, its endogeneity and finally 
the difference of impact depending on the source of financing (Khan & al. 2002). 
Alternative measures will be suggested hereafters.  
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Current & Domestic Balance 
As said above one of the limit of overall balance is that all fiscal items have the 
same weight. In other words it considers that these different fiscal variables have an 
identical influence on global demand. However it is imaginable that different categories of 
taxes and expenditures could influence real economy in several different ways (Haavelmo 
1954). Current deficit helps to overcome this issue, by allowing the assignment of weights 
for each fiscal items (spending or revenues) depending on their relevance to domestic 
economy. On the same vein, the domestic balance consists in assigning non zero weights 
to only those elements that directly and only affect the domestic economy. The idea 
behind that measure is that in a small open economy some fiscal transaction might not be 
fully felt on domestic economy.  
These concepts still do not address the issue of endogeneity of the overall budget balance.  
 
The cyclically adjusted balance 
For analyst it is important to be able to define clearly the fiscal stance whether 
government is running expansionary or restrictive fiscal policy. This could be the result of 
a certain endogeneity since some expenditure might rise (such as social transfers) 
automatically in period of recession without any public intervention. Same situation in 
periods of economic boom tax revenues usually increase due to favourable economic 
environment. Therefore the overall balance does not reflect only the effect of fiscal policy 
on the economy but also the influence of business cycle on fiscal variables. The main 
issue becomes how to separate discretionary from automatic responses of fiscal policy? 
Calculating the cyclically adjusted balance for developing countries is especially 
challenging3. The main difficulty while computing this balance is that in developing 
countries automatic stabilizers are tough to determine: they are weak and not well known 
(Abdih & al., 2010). As in the forth chapter in this dissertation, this challenge is addressed 
                                                          
3 Chapter 4 details the formula for cyclically adjusted balance and shows the solution preferred to 
calculated it.  
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through the direct estimation of potential values of public spending and government 
revenues and the cyclically balance just derives from these values.   
 
Primary balance 
The cyclically adjusted balance resolved only partially the issue of identifying 
discretionary fiscal measures. Simply because interest payment on government debt, that 
are an important non-discretionary item, is included in that balance indicators. Therefore 
when interest payments are removed from public expenditures this yields the primary 
balance (or cyclically adjusted primary balance).  
 
Operational balance 
In countries where inflation is high, this can negatively influence the accuracy of 
the overall balance. Indeed rising inflation can increase the overall deficit (as a percent of 
GDP) since it usually reduces real revenue: the so called Tanzi effect4. The operational 
deficit addresses this problem by excluding inflationary component of interest payments 
from the calculation (Landais 1998). Therefore operational balance gives the true stance 
that would prevail without high level of inflation. Hence this fiscal balance measure is 
mainly relevant for public authorities locally indebted in national currency.  
 
These measures provide important indications on the fiscal policy stance and are 
necessary to assess the response chosen by authorities to influence economic activity. 
However these are only flow variables and one cannot assess the sustainability of the 
fiscal policy. Therefore one has to recourse to stock variables that will give a better sight 
on whether the current fiscal policy is not a threat for government solvency.  
                                                          
4 The Tanzi effect is just the consequence of time lags in revenue collection. Additional to that effect, 
rising level of inflation causes changes in government liabilities by increasing interest payments and this 
induces higher overall deficit.   
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Fiscal Policy Stance: Solvency & Sustainability in developing countries.  
 As some authors underline (e.g. Horne 1991) it, fiscal sustainability involves 
determining whether the government can continue to pursue indefinitely its set of 
budgetary policies. The intuitive continuation from that is whenever the pursuance of the 
current policy will cause in the mid-term crisis or restructuration then that policy is not 
sustainable and needs to be amended. Another view would consist to argue that 
government are not as liquidity constrained as private agents therefore there is not an 
important hazard for public authorities to finance current expenditures by borrowing 
from future generations. However the debt crisis in 1980s in many developing countries 
and even the recent public finance crisis in peripherals European countries have 
demonstrated that there is a clear limit on the quantity public sector can borrow 
depending on present discounted value of future revenues (and estimated future growth 
performance).  
As this section will show, the concepts of solvency and sustainability while very close 
define two different situations. The solvency concept simply requires that the present 
value of debt to be null at period t+N. The sustainability itself is a “reasonable” level for 
ratio between (usually) the level of debt and a flow of relevant resources (for example it 
can be tax revenues or export proceeds). For these ratios, a threshold of sustainability or a 
dynamic analysis can be considered to assess its sustainability (see infra).  
Among the main macroeconomic concepts to assess fiscal solvency is the solvency 
condition. The solvency condition consists for the government to keep the present value 
of its spending program equal to its comprehensive net worth5 (Bean & Buiter 1987). 
More formally a public sector is solvent when the private discounted value of future 
primary surpluses is at least equal to the value of its outstanding stock of debt (Khan & al. 
2002). The following equations demonstrate this identity: 
                                                          
5 The comprehensive net worth includes seigniorage, net privatization proceeds and taxes. However in the 
solvency condition equation some simplicity reasons, it is usually assumed that net privatization proceeds 
and seigniorage financing are null.  
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 1 1t t t t tPS D i D D       (1) 
From equation (1), one can read that the end of period stock of debt  1t tD D   
increases if the primary surplus ( tPS ) is smaller than interest payments during the period 
( 1t tD i ).  
On the same vain (as Landais 1998 and Khan & al. 2002) if one transforms equation (1) it 
gives6: 
 
1 2
1 2 ...
N N
t t t t N t Nd ps ps ps d   
   
          (2) 
From (2): the public sector is solvent only if the present discounted value of future 
primary surpluses is at least equal to the value of its outstanding stock of debt 
(Landais1998 and Khan 2002). In other words the amount of debt should be null at the 
end of the period meaning that government cannot recourse to Ponzi (or Madoff) game.  
The direct consequence for any government would be as soon as this condition is not 
satisfied to make any efforts necessary to reduce its primary deficit. But as long as the 
interest rate on government debt is lower than the country‟s output growth public sector 
does not have to worry (that much) about fiscal solvency, and even it can run large 
primary deficit.  
                                                          
6 From equation (1) after dividing both side by the nominal GDP one obtains the following expression: 
  1 11 ( / )t t t t t td i d Y Y ps     : Y= nominal GPD, tps  is PS/Y and d refers to D/Y. Knowing that 
nominal interest rate is real interest rate times inflation rate ( t )one has:   (1 ) 1 1t t ti r     . Also 
GDP growth ( 1/t tY Y  ) is defined (Khan& al., 2002) as  
^
1 1t ty 
 
  
 
 and 
with  1 / 1t r y
 
   
 
, the law of motion for td  will be: 1t t td d ps   . After solving the 
previous equation one obtains equation (2).   
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As Buiter (1985) argues, the main issue with the solvency condition as a measure for fiscal 
solvency is the endogeneity of key variables (output growth, interest rates, investment 
behavior etc…), so that output growth can affect public expenditures and revenues as 
well as interest rates (while solvency condition assumes that future primary balances, 
interest rates and growth rate are independent). Therefore in order to provide a “relevant” 
assessment for the current fiscal stance sustainability, Buiter (1985) proposed the 
constant-net-worth deficit (CNW). The CNW deficit concept considers that current 
government spending path is sustainable if it keeps the government‟s net worth constant 
on ex ante basis Buiter (1985). Olivier Blanchard has also proposed several measure of 
fiscal sustainability but they are still under the criticism made by Buiter since any of them 
addresses the issue of endogeneity. For instance the primary gap indicator (Blanchard 
1990) which he defined as the primary surplus required to stabilize the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, given the projected paths of the primary balance, the real interest rate, and output 
growth. Hence and according to such indicator whenever there is a gap between the 
present value of future primary deficits required to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio and 
the current balance a fiscal adjustment is necessary7.  
When it comes to measure fiscal policy stance sustainability in developing countries, 
despite such interesting theoretical indicators, the lack of knowledge about countries‟ debt 
and genuine financial capacities arise. Some authors (e.g. De-Piniés 1989) argued that due 
to that fact (weak knowledge on the primary deficit, growth and interest rates paths) debt-
to-exports ratio have been much more preferred to assess debt sustainability and 
creditworthiness. Hence since early 1990s total debt-to-exports ratio has been increasingly 
used as a debt sustainability indicator by country‟s financial partners. However it raises the 
question of what should be the right level for such ratio that would ensure fiscal 
sustainability and creditworthiness. A first threshold of 2 (200%) has been cited as the 
minimum in order to restore creditors confidence and ensure fiscal sustainability. In 1996 
                                                          
7 In the same paper Blanchard (Blanchard 1990) also submits the idea of a tax gap indicator. As previously 
this indicator consists in the tax-to-GDP ratio necessary to stabilize the ratio of outstanding debt-to-GDP. 
And as the primary gap the endogeneity of growth rate, real interest rates and public expenditure path 
remains unsolved.  
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following the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries8 (HIPC) initiative 200 to 250% 
(debt/export) was identified as the threshold for debt sustainability. Above these levels 
analysts believe that developing countries could not repay their debt without major 
internal social consequences. As some authors underline it, the choice for a sustainability 
threshold is very often a subjective matter, since a ratio less than 2 does not guarantee 
that government is always able to repay its debt and that creditors are confident on that 
country. Even tools like Debt Sustainability Assessment9 (DSA) jointly developed by 
world bank and IMF to assess debt sustainability in low and middle income countries 
does not appear that rigorous since depending on the forecasting assumptions a country‟s 
debt can be either or not sustainable (Moisseron & Raffinot 1999)10. From that point, De-
Piniés 1989 suggested that, since no single number can convey much information about a 
country‟s capacity to repay its debt, the dynamic of debt-to-exports ratio should be 
preferred. Indeed a ratio increasing without limit might be the “right” signal for both an 
unsustainable debt and balance of payments.  
Since the ultimate objective of fiscal policy stance sustainability analysis is to see whether 
there is no threat on its future payment capabilities the path of debt-to-GDP over time 
might be more relevant. Even with a ratio superior to 250% a country can be still solvent 
if its balance of payment and its debt level diminish over time.  
The brief analysis on fiscal sustainability (and solvency) has shown that the response to 
such question remains not clear cut. However after shedding light on these different 
concepts, one can formulate policy recommendation. The first thing for a country is that 
                                                          
8 The HIPC is an international initiative launched in 1996 by International organizations (IMF & World 
Bank and expanded to other development partners) aiming at reducing the debt burden for poor 
countries. To be eligible and see the unsustainable part of its debt forgiven a country has to meet some 
conditions. Among other conditions the “candidate‟s” debt must have reached an unsustainable debt 
burden. Also the country should have started to implement sound macroeconomic policies and developed 
a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.  
9 The DSA is a framework aimed at continuously monitoring the low income countries‟ debt and assesses 
its sustainability. The DSA ensures that poor countries make the necessary effort to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals without creating future debt problems.  
10 For instance Burkina Faso despite a relative low level of debt, the DSA concludes that its debt was 
unsustainable.  
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even if it has an growth rate higher than real interest rates (on debt), this should not be 
considered as a signal for increasing debt without limit. A direct consequence could be 
that increasing debt might push up interest rates very leading to difficult fiscal situations. 
Also the analysis developed earlier (lead by De-Piniés 1989) arguing that the more 
important is the dynamic for debt ratios (debt-to-GDP or debt-to-export) should be 
interpreted carefully by deciders. A high ratio may affect the private sector‟s perception of 
the government‟s ability to meet its budget constraint consistently. This may push interest 
rates and risk premiums upwards.  
Next, the theoretical foundation for fiscal activism will be discussed and the issue of the 
role for fiscal policy in developing countries will be addressed.  
 
1.3  Fiscal Policy in developing countries: Objectives, 
theoretical foundations and limits to its efficiency. 
 
The common situation in many developing countries is the huge needs in terms of 
poverty alleviation, output growth, investments and more generally macroeconomic 
stabilization. In this context, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) rationale is to 
provide with a strategic framework that aims at reducing poverty in developing countries. 
Some key sectors such as education, health, environment and public finance have been 
identified as vectors for sustained development in least developed countries. To reach the 
MDG‟s objectives fiscal policy plays an essential role. Indeed better knowledge of fiscal 
policies mechanisms will enhance public spending (by telling authorities which type of 
spending should concentrate their efforts) efficiency and sound budgetary policies will 
avoid returning two or three decades backward if debt is kept at sustainable levels. 
A good knowledge of developing countries‟ structural characteristics of their 
economy will make it easier to understand the importance (and the challenges) that public 
finances face in developing countries.  
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1.3.1 Objectives 
Many developing countries face the problem of a weak level of national savings. In 
such situation, the scarcity of savings usually causes a drought in terms of funds necessary 
to ensure investment and sustainable growth in the economy. For instance for developing 
African countries (Fig1.1, except South Africa) savings (in percent of GDP) have been 
progressing in a very erratic way and since 1960s remained under 20% of GDP for most 
countries11. Therefore the public sector remains the main viable investor agent in such 
economies.  
Additional to that structural fact that remained all along the past decades, there was a 
theoretical argument defending the idea that fiscal policy has to be the most important 
engine for private saving. Considering that economic growth is the direct result of capital 
accumulation, some analysts (influenced by growth models of Harrod & Domar types) 
argued that the main role for fiscal policy was to encourage private savings and 
“mobilize” and add to these savings its own “mobilization” (Tanzi, 1976). To achieve 
such objective in line with these theories, the unique tool available to developing 
countries‟ governments was their budget and tax policies.  
Another structural aspect of developing countries‟ economies challenging their public 
finances is the poverty and the private sector weakness.  
                                                          
11 These figures are to compare with the 37% saving rates in China, 37%, Singapore, and 34% for other 
non OECD high income countries.  
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Fig1.1: National Savings in a sample of developing countries 
 
Source: WDI. 
For instance a country like Burkina Faso is among the poorest in the world with GDP per 
capita at around 400USD, with almost 50% of the population living with less than one 
dollar per day, 77% of adult are illiterated and the country is ranked at 173th (over 177) 
on the HDI scale. In such economy, the role of public finances (and support from 
international aid) becomes vital to alleviate poverty.  
 
1.3.2 Theoretical foundations 
Several and sometimes contradictory arguments and theories have been developed to 
justify or criticize the use of public finances as a tool to achieve development objectives in 
both developing and advanced countries. Depending on the time period a school of 
thinking pro or against fiscal activism dominated the debates.  
Both Keynesian and Classical view on fiscal policy have been developed earlier, therefore 
will start by presenting here the “third” view on fiscal policy effects.  
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The “third” theory, the Ricardian equivalence (Barro 1974)12 states that fiscal policy has 
no influence on the real economy. Basically in a “Ricardian world” any reduction of 
current taxes immediately induces a (exactly) same size increase of private saving. 
Therefore private consumption remains unchanged and the fiscal stimulation remaining 
without any significant positive result. However this theory relies on a certain number of 
assumptions that are not always true. The main assumptions are presented and discussed 
below:  
 infinite horizon: individuals anticipating future tax increase and adjusting their 
savings straightaway, following a lowering of current taxes, supposes that these 
individuals have an infinite horizon. As Diamond (1965) underlines it, individuals 
usually live only two periods and their utility depends only on their consumption. 
In such situation reducing taxes through debt will solely profit to current active 
generations since the burden of the debt will be supported by future generation. 
To that criticism, Robert Barro responded arguing that the motive for current 
generation increase their savings after a tax cut is rather for altruism: parents taking 
advantage from the tax cut to leave more heritage to their offspring (toward future 
generations). Even that response does not alleviate the criticism since heritage can 
have many other motives than altruism. Among the motives for heritage on can 
cite two: insurance for current generation (insurance for parents to oblige their 
children to be more attentive toward them), avoid a loss of consumption due to 
potential longer life length.  
 lump sum taxation: this assumption does not seem to hold since there might exist 
a gap between tax rates with distortive effects. If that today‟s tax cut is financed by 
issuance of debt, then on can considers that at maturity public authorities will need 
to increase the tax rate to face their obligations. This rearrangement of the timing 
of marginal taxation induces intertemporal substitution effects, alters behavior, and 
so seems to violate Ricardian equivalence (Seater, 1993).   
                                                          
12 Since the Ricardian Equivalence theory was launched, any empirical evidence has been provided. This 
could be explained by the weakness of the assumptions underlying this view (Seater 1993).  
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 Risk-free environment: the Ricardian equivalence considers that individuals are 
insensible toward risk. But since future income is uncertain, current generations 
cannot know exactly the amount of heritage they will bequeath to their children. 
Therefore as soon as households are not indifferent between supplementary 
income received today after a tax cut and the income they will bequeath offspring, 
Ricardian equivalence does not hold anymore. 
 No liquidity constraints: finally if there is a gap (even minor) between the rate at 
which government borrow and the one that private agents face, the Ricardian 
equivalence becomes irrelevant. Indeed if the States borrow at a lower rate 
(compare to household) any tax cut, financed by public debt, is perceived as a 
subsidy in favor of households. 
The review of the most important assumptions underlying Ricardian Equivalence 
demonstrates how difficult it can be to prove its relevance for both developing and 
advanced countries. Especially the risk-free environment and the perfect credit market 
assumptions do not hold at all in developing countries. As said earlier credit constraint is 
so important in low income countries that smoothing consumption is very difficult.  
Alongside these three theories, a fourth one has arisen: the so called anti-Keynesian fiscal 
effects. Giavazzi & al. (1996) first underline the existence of anti-Keynesian and non-
linear effects of fiscal policy on private agents‟ behavior. In other words fiscal policy 
could induce anti-Keynesian effects. For instance a fiscal contraction (instead of inducing 
economic recession as predicted by Keynesians) might positively impact real economy 
through higher private consumption. On the other hand a fiscal expansion might have 
recessive impact on the economy through a decline in private consumption. These effects 
were first observed in some North European countries. Indeed during early 1980s, 
Denmark, Sweden and Ireland were experiencing weak economic performances and 
surprisingly they decided to implement fiscal adjustment in response to such situation. 
The outcome was as astonishing as the measure itself since it had an expansive effect on 
the economic activity. Given that this situation does not correspond to any predication of 
any known theory (Keynesian, neo-classical, Ricardian etc.), therefore this lead to the 
birth of a new theory arguing that there exists some non-linearities in the behavior of 
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agents depending on the situation of public finances. The channels have been identified as 
justifying such “counter-intuitive” effects of restrictive fiscal policies: 
 Channel of supply: the composition of the fiscal adjustment influences the 
formation of agents‟ expectation on the supply side. For instance a fiscal 
contraction policy that consists in reducing payment arrears will be more effective 
in terms of growth enhancing. Also a fiscal restrictive policy reducing social 
spending will more growth enhancing than a cut in investment budget (Baldacci et 
al., 2005).  
 
 Psychological threshold: the private agents‟ perception on fiscal sustainability is an 
important explanation of their own behavior. Indeed whenever tax payers consider 
that public debt has reached an unsustainable level, they consider that an 
adjustment (with higher tax rates) is very close and will be supported by their own 
generation (Sutherland, 1995).  
 Channel of demand: through such channel, consumers consider fiscal contraction 
measures as future lower taxes. Consequently, they can reduce their savings and 
increase their expenditures, these facts ending with a stimulated economic activity 
(Giavazzi & Pagano, 1990).  
However few studies have tested the non-linear effects of fiscal policies in developing 
countries. Among these Tanimoune & al. 2008, give evidences on the existence of “non-
conventional” fiscal effects for Western African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) countries. Relying on exogenous identification method of thresholds (Hansen 
1999), they found that above a ratio of debt-to-GDP above 83% public interventions 
become anti-Keynesian (expansive fiscal adjustments). Their data show that the supply 
channel was the main explanation for that since for such economies fiscal adjustment very 
often means reduction of payment arrears. On the same vein, Patillo & al. 2002 also 
confirmed such non-linear effects of external debt in developing countries. Their first 
explanation is consistent with the supply channel, higher debt discouraging for investment 
(see supra). The second channel argue that in developing countries when level of debt is 
very high, government has less motivated to run policy reforms (trade liberalization, 
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privatizations etc.) that would enhance growth and efficiency. The reason being that 
public authorities might perceive that future benefits could be accrued by foreign lenders. 
Their estimations show that when debt-to-exports ratio is above 160 – 170 percent (or for 
debt-to-GDP ratio this becomes 35 – 40 percent). In terms of policy implication, 
reducing debt for developing countries for example in the HIPC framework could 
enhance output growth by half to 1%.    
 
1.3.3 Limits to fiscal policy efficiency: political economy of 
budget deficit 
 
Unfortunately, and very often it happens that theoretical predications to be different 
from the situation in the field in developing countries. Indeed for many developing 
countries fiscal budget deficits failed to enhance output growth and these deficits by the 
end of 1970s ended up with severe debts problems. For instance from Fig1.2, a simple 
scatter diagram, one can see that high fiscal deficit does not guarantee output growth for 
many countries (Bolivia, Nicaragua, Jamaica etc.). Fig1.3 shows a clear bias in favor of 
procyclical fiscal policies for a group of developing countries: higher output gap 
associated with increasing deficits (especially for Nicaragua, Malawi and Egypt (among 
others) where the situation is worst since relative important fiscal deficits coexist with 
weak growth performance). These observations demonstrate that fiscal policy is not that 
efficient in developing countries in terms of economic stimulation. Several arguments in 
the literature tried to explain such low efficiency of fiscal policies in developing countries, 
in what follows two ideas are presented. 
 Structural Economic explanations: an important part of the literature on fiscal 
issues in low income countries considers the economic structure itself as the main 
limit against more efficient fiscal policies. To achieve its usual duties (provide 
public goods and services) and be able to have a significant influence on the 
economy, public sector needs resources. Unfortunately mobilizing both internal 
and external resources is a big challenge for developing countries. Among the 
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main three resources available to developing countries tax revenue is the best way 
to cover public spending (Brun & al. 2006)13. However government revenues in 
developing countries suffer from two limits: its instability and weakness. The 
instability of fiscal resources lowers the ability of authorities to keep sustained level 
of public (Chambas 2005). Additional to that, the instability of fiscal resources is a 
source of risk and higher vulnerability toward internal and external shocks. Recent 
studies (Combes & Saadi-Sedik 2006 and Collier & Gunning 1999) demonstrate 
the detrimental effects on fiscal budget balance and long-run growth of unstable 
budgetary revenues. Among the developing world and for the period 1970-2003, 
fiscal revenues instability is far more important for Sub-Saharan  
 
Fig 1.2: Budget Deficit and Output Growth in Developing Countries: 1970-
1995 
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13 Brun & al. 2006 argue that given the constraints and uncertainties on seigniorage (inflation hazard) and 
grants, and the necessity to have to rely on future public revenues to be able to obtain loans, tax revenues 
are the most reliable resources.   
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Fig 1.3: Budget deficit and output gap in Developing countries: 1970-1995 
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African countries especially for the Least Developed Countries group (Brun & al. 
2006). Now regarding the second characteristic of public revenues in the 
developing world, Brun & al. 2006 developed a new framework to assess its 
weakness. They define the fiscal effort as the difference between resources actually 
mobilized and the potential fiscal revenues. The potential fiscal revenue is an indicator 
representing public resources that depend on structural characteristic of the 
economy. The fiscal effort captures the extent to which the public sector feats its 
potential revenues (positive values of fiscal effort show up the fact that potential 
resources are fully used). Their results (Brun & al. 2006) shows that for developing 
countries, except for North-African and Middle East countries, fiscal effort is very 
low especially for Least Developed countries where it is negative. The dependence 
toward trade on primary commodities and international development aid are 
among the main causes of government revenues instability (Brun & al. 1999). The 
important share of the unregistered sector in developing countries (despite its 
important economic role: for instance in a county like Niger up to 50% of jobs 
created are in the unregistered sector, Chambas 2010) also contribute to weaken 
the revenues the public sector can raise. Therefore is becomes easily 
understandable why fiscal policy cannot play its role (of providing with public 
goods, stabilize macroeconomic fluctuations and alleviate poverty) in low income 
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countries. Fiscal decentralization, an area in public economics still growing up, has 
been considered as a credible answer to the limits that prevent fiscal policy from 
being more efficient. A closer fiscal management could help to raise more tax 
revenues and also encourage the delivery of timely and better public goods that 
population need.  
 Political Economy of fiscal budget balance: inefficiencies of fiscal policies have 
been assigned to institutional weaknesses. Indeed due to agency problems, public 
authorities might try to influence citizens‟ perception and let them believe that the 
current government is highly competent. Pioneered by Nordhaus (1975), the 
political business cycle theory states that the renewal of public authorities might 
have an impact on the real economy. Indeed in countries where elections take 
place the incumbent in order to remain in power might increase its delivery of 
public goods. For developing countries it has been proved that political budget 
cycles do exist since during elections budget deficit worsens (Brender & Drazen 
2005, Schuknecht 1996). Shi & Svensson (2006) found that on average budget 
deficit increase by 1% of GDP in election periods. Despite this evidence of 
political budget cycles presence in developing countries, some criticisms have 
raised two limits against that theory. The first one underlines the fact that these 
budget cycle models are not suitable to all developing countries and the situation is 
completely different according to the “deepness of the democracy”. In countries 
where democracy is well established fiscal manipulations are punished by voters; in 
such countries citizens have a better sight on political economy instruments 
(Brender & Drazen, 2005 found a clear difference in the magnitude of political 
budget cycles between countries when one separates new democracies and 
established ones). The second limit is in straight line with our main concern: do 
political budget cycles undermine the efficiency of fiscal policy? One could 
reasonably imagine that, even if deficits increase sharply during a given period of 
time (this is referred here as elections), fiscal authorities might use these extra-
spending for efficient and productive investments that would enhance future 
growth. Therefore one needs to go even further in the analysis to see the 
composition of public spending in election‟s period. Theoretically, Rogoff (1990) 
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developed a signaling model where political budget cycles are caused by 
information asymmetries. Since spending on public goods is a signal of the 
incumbent‟s competence (just before elections), the government will prefer to run 
current spending that are quickly visible to voters (usually for capital spending one 
gets the returns during the next period). These current spending mainly covers 
salaries, subsidies on final consumption goods etc. Block (2002) will confirm these 
theoretical predications from a panel of 69 developing countries that during 
election periods (a year before the race), incumbents increase current expenditures 
and usually capital ones are neglected or lowered. Finally it comes out that 
politico-economic cycle is another important limitation to fiscal policy efficiency in 
developing countries.  
The upper analyses shed light on the causes (at least some of them) that explain the 
reason why fiscal policy in developing countries could not achieve its goals (see supra), or 
even be a counter-productive political economy tool.  
This dissertation aims at contributing to the literature of fiscal policies in developing 
countries though focusing mainly on its effects and from there to be able to deliver policy 
recommendations in order to improve the matter. Before coming into details to the 
content of this dissertation, some other key uses and features of fiscal policy will be 
reminded.  
 
1.4 Overview on the Rationale of  the importance of  
Fiscal Policies in developing countries.  
 
The previous sections help to understand some of the main characteristics and 
limitations of fiscal efficiency in developing economies. Even if it comes out from upper 
analysis that there exist several economic to political factors that refrain budget policies to 
reach their objective, one still need to further shed light on which specific areas fiscal 
policy might be helpful in the economic development process. To do so, a short review 
on theories on the linkages between public budget and specific economic aggregate will 
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be developed. Additional to that, it would be interesting for our purposes to investigate 
new policies being implemented in many low income countries and (both national and 
those accompanied by international development partners) aimed at improving public 
finances‟ efficiency.  
 
1.4.1 Fiscal theory for price level 
The fiscal theory of price level (FTPL) initiated by Leeper (1991) Sims (1994) and 
Woodford (1994), states that the quantity theory of money (QTM) is not enough to 
explain the dynamics of price level in a country. The main contribution for this theory is 
to argue that price level is determined by the level of public debt. For instance Turkey had 
experienced severe episodes of hyperinflation during early 1980s and late 1990 despite a 
relative monetary policy discipline (the seigniorage to GDP ratio have remained very low 
and were even declining)14. In countries were fiscal policy is non-Ricardian (namely public 
debt is not neutral) and if fiscal policy is dominant15 then anti-inflationary monetary 
policies will be inefficient or worse they can be inflationary (Benhabib & al. 2001). Fiscal 
policy impacts on price level mainly through the wealth effects related to the issuance of 
domestic debt. As Woodford (2001) underlines it, in economies where fiscal policy is 
dominant primary deficit directly causes the level of public debt and the borrowing 
requirement to increase. If government mainly recourses to domestic borrowing it is most 
than likely cost of borrowings will go up (interest rates and risk premiums). Therefore a 
strong wealth effect can lead to inflation since domestic creditors feels wealthier. For the 
Turkish case additional to these channels detailed, the maturity rate on domestic debt 
keeps getting shorter and shorter during the mid-1980 and late 1990s, worsening the 
inflation pressure. Hence monetary policies especially inflation targeting to be effective 
absolutely needs to be accompanied by accommodating fiscal behavior (Favero & 
                                                          
14 In 1984 and 1996 the inflation rate in Turkey was 140% and 130%.  
15 Fiscal policy is dominant when monetary policy accommodates fiscal decisions. In such situation 
monetary policy will consider fiscal policy as a constraint in the political decision process (Woodford 
1994). 
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Giavazzi 2002). For developing countries this theory is an important matter directly 
related to their macroeconomic stability. Indeed governments as well as international 
development partners and academics are advocating for a deeper development of the 
financial sector for developing economies. The argument underlying such views is that 
external financing possibilities are getting scarcer for low (and middle) income countries 
therefore it becomes essential to be able to raise domestic finds. Any policy in favor of 
financial sector development should consider first the necessity for fiscal authorities to 
run prudential policies. In other words any pro-financial sector development policy might 
be destabilizing for poor countries if it ends up with government borrowing domestically 
at unreasonable level leading to higher level of inflation (that is harmful especially to the 
poorest agents).  
 
1.4.2 Current account targeting  
This theory is an extension of the twin deficit debate. A large section of academic 
studies have been interested in the relationship between external and budget deficits. 
Most empirical studies state the positive correlation and the comovement between 
external and budget deficits for developing countries (Chinn & Prasad 2003, Calderon & 
al. 2002). This positive comovement has been firstly explained by the relation between 
current account, private saving and budget balance16. Beyond this arithmetic relationship 
between external (current account) deficit and budget imbalance, shock associated with 
internal conditions (especially domestic resources net of public absorption) are the most 
important factor that explain the comovement between the two deficits (Chichi & 
Normandin 2008). Therefore if this relation becomes well established fiscal policy can be 
used by developing countries to sort out part of their economies‟ intertemporal budget 
constraint. In other words as developing countries mainly rely on external debt; they 
cannot afford to run indefinitely current account deficit since this debt needs to be repaid 
                                                          
16    G p pCA S I CA S S I CA T G S I           , with CA the current 
account balance, pS  private saving, GS public saving, I investment, T government revenues, G public 
spending.  
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one day or another. Therefore in case current account threatens intertemporal solvency 
condition, the government is likely to use its budget (by increasing public savings) to 
adjust the external balance. Hence international debt relief initiatives and also 
concessionary should bear in mind that helping countries to overcome their balance of 
payments turmoil should not encourage fiscal authorities to run loose policies. Removing 
such constraint (external imbalance) for developing economies‟ government, should not 
encourage moral hazard behavior that could end up with (once again) inefficient fiscal 
policies. The only bottom line is that this issue has not been widely covered in the 
empirical literature, further investigations might allow seeing whether (some) developing 
countries really use budget variables to target current account balance. In order to capture 
the potential current account targeting and avoid bias in our estimations, the external 
sector (current account balance) will be considered in our empirical strategies all along 
this dissertation.  
Recent international initiatives initiated by Bretton-Woods institutions have been focusing 
on ways and means to implement deep reforms in the budget area in low income 
countries.  
 
1.4.3 The Medium Term Expenditure Framework: a new tool 
for better budget practices 
 
Developing countries especially low incomes ones suffers from inefficient use of 
budgetary items. In the context where international development aid and proceeds from 
potential exportations are scarce and volatile, to achieve economic development and 
alleviate poverty public revenues and expenditures have to be efficient. In this context, 
several developing countries in partnership with multilateral development agencies (World 
Bank, IMF and, joined later by bilateral partners) have launched reforms on the public 
finance management (PFM). The PFM is a wide initiative (launched by World Bank) 
aimed at improving institutional arrangement and management practices that would create 
an environment favorable to better resource allocation, resource use and disciplined 
financial management. The departure point of this initiative has been the argument that 
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poor institutional arrangements are the main cause of undisciplined fiscal policy with 
adverse consequence on most vulnerable in the economy. Additional to that, recent 
analysis directly links ineffective budgeting systems and inappropriate, unsustainable 
policy choices and sector allocations on one hand and links also poor budgeting systems 
and weak policy implementation and inadequate service delivery (Le-Houerou & Taliercio 
2002). In the PFM framework to be successful public finances reforms require to build up 
bridges between three levels of budgetary outcomes aggregate fiscal discipline, allocation 
of resources in accordance with strategic priorities and finally efficient and effective use of 
resources in the implementation of strategic priorities (World Bank 2002). Once the 
overall outcomes expected from these reforms, public expenditure reviews (PER) in 
developing countries ended up suggesting the adoption of medium-term expenditure 
frameworks (MTEF). The MTEF consists of a top-down resource envelope, a bottom-up 
estimation of the current and medium-term costs of existing policy and, ultimately, the 
matching of these costs with available resources in the context of the annual budget 
process (World Bank 1998). In other words under MTEF expenditures are solely driven 
by policy priorities. In the context of developing countries one first develops a 
macroeconomic and fiscal model that will provide with forecast of revenues and 
expenditures.  Then development strategies and expenditure needs are identified for each 
(important) sector. This later document will be adopted by authorities as the final MTEF 
(Table1.1). Since early 1990s, MTEF has been rapidly adopted across the developing 
world (just between 1997 and 2001 more than 25 countries adopted the MTEF reform). 
Even if these figures might be interpreted as a success for PEM initiative, there has not 
been done yet an empirical assessment of the MTEF policies. Future studies could run 
macro-impact analysis and see whether these amendments have been successful in helping 
budgetary policies to targeting social and pro-poor expenditures.  
The next section will present the rationale of this dissertation 
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Table 1.1 The Different Stages of a MTEF 
STAGE CHARACTERISTICS 
I. Development of 
Macroeconomic/Fiscal 
Framework 
 Macroeconomic model that projects revenues and 
expenditure in the medium term (multi-year)  
II. Development of Sectoral 
Programs 
 Agreement on sector objectives, outputs, and activities 
 Review and development of programs and sub-programs 
 Program cost estimation 
III. Development of Sectoral 
Expenditure Frameworks 
 Analysis of inter- and intra-sectoral trade-offs 
 Consensus-building on strategic resource allocation 
IV. Definition of Sector Resource 
Allocations 
 Setting medium term sector budget ceilings (cabinet 
approval) 
 
V. Preparation of Sectoral Budgets  Medium term sectoral programs based on budget ceilings 
VI. Final Political Approval  Presentation of budget estimates to cabinet and parliament 
for approval 
Source: PEM Handbook (World Bank, 1998, pp. 47-51).  
 
1.4.4 Contribution of  this PhD dissertation and details 
on the content  
 
The first chapter has been dedicated to first present key and commonly used fiscal 
concepts. These aggregates and concepts will be used all along the three remaining 
chapter to explain the phenomenon will be focusing on.  
In a first stance this review indicated that developing countries especially low income ones 
have been running unsustainable fiscal policies. Debt levels had reached certain threshold 
that made compulsory adjustment and debt relief programs. Despite such indebtedness 
the success of fiscal policy in terms of poverty alleviation, output growth, employment 
and poverty reduction has been extremely modest. Given that traditional theories on 
fiscal policy failed to explain such situations, we have investigated the other arguments. 
“Structural Economic explanation” has argued that fiscal policy is neutral toward its 
objective due to the economic structures (large unregistered sector, weak tax revenues, 
scarcity of external resources etc.). On the other hand political economy theories argue 
that the strength of fiscal institutions and all political institutions in general has been the 
main cause of such underperformances of fiscal policies.  
Chap1 : General Introduction & Overview 
35 
 
The common point between these different observations is that fiscal policy in 
developing countries is an essential component in the development process and ignoring 
or imposing unreasonable fiscal discipline could threatens its main objectives. The second 
and very obvious observance is that public finances are not “healthy” in these economies. 
However studies focusing on the empirical analysis of fiscal effects in developing 
countries have remained scarce.  First of all studying fiscal policy effect for developing 
countries requires the use of relevant statistical tools and assumption since these 
economies are quite different from what can be seen in their developed counterparts. The 
literature survey has shown that several recesses up to now have not been investigated. 
This dissertation overarching aim will be, through three fields of analysis, provide a better 
understanding of fiscal policies effects in developing and show how the situation has 
changed over years.  
 
Chapter 2: Fiscal Policy Shocks in Developing Countries: A panel SVAR approach 
The literature on fiscal policies effects has mainly covered three aspects. The first aspect 
(see supra) focused on the taxation system and the inefficiencies related to tax revenues 
collection. Secondly institutional aspects characterizing budget policies, especially political 
budget cycle theories have been developed and empirically tested. Finally the third group 
of research wonders what would be the effects if developing countries decide to use fiscal 
policy in order to influence the real economy. The responses to such question have been 
inspirited by “traditional” theories (Keynesians, neo-classicals) and recent analysis has 
proven non-linear relationship between fiscal variables and agents‟ responses to fiscal 
stimulus (see supra). However it can reasonable happen that a (developing countries‟) 
government tries to run surprise policies in order to avoid adverse agents‟ anticipations 
and adaptation. Only limited empirical studies are related to this issue of the impact of 
non-anticipated fiscal measures. In additional, only little attention has been dedicated to 
developing economies (compare to OECD countries especially the US economy on 
which several articles focused on). Schclarek 2010 on a panel of 21 developing countries 
showed that spending shocks have Keynesian effect while tax shocks also have Keynesian 
impact on private consumption. Nevertheless these results raise important questions 
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regarding both the identification method and the underlying assumptions. The two steps 
estimation strategy, using IV-GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) does not 
guarantee the clear identification of exogenous and unanticipated changes in taxes and 
government spending. Also the definition of public revenues restricted to the (poor) tax 
revenues neglect essential aspect of budget characteristics in developing countries. The 
aim of this chapter will be, using original identification method, to answer whether 
government can reasonably recourse to “surprise policies” as an efficient tool to positively 
influence the real economy (and avoid adverse anticipations from private agents)?  
 
Chapter3: Impact of Large Fiscal Imbalance in Advanced Countries on 
 Developing  Countries 
For developing economies it has been largely demonstrated in several articles that they are 
closely related to business cycles in advanced economies. The change in exchange rate, 
output growth, interest rates in western countries and their influence on the global 
economy are the commonly effects studied. The consequences of developed countries‟ 
fiscal policies on their developing counterparts have received less attention.  On the other 
hand since early 1990s, after the debt crisis, fast growing “new economies” start receiving 
important and capital flows. The several crises that emerging economies experienced 
during the last decade of the twentieth century demonstrated how these emerging markets 
were dependent toward external financing. During 2008 the new financial crisis whose 
origins lie in industrial countries affected the world economy. Among the solutions 
advocated by international organizations (IMF, G20, World Bank), there was the use of 
fiscal stimulus I order to mitigate the systemic risk related to the “too big to fail”17. Hence 
leading world economies (USA, European Union countries) engaged in important public 
spending in order to keep macroeconomic stability. The third chapter investigates 
whether it is reasonable to worry about a potential “world crowding out effect”. 
                                                          
17 In a famous article in the Financial Times Oct.2009 (“How the Fed Can Avoid the Next Bubble”) 
Nouriel Roubini states that the stimulus packages might induce moral hazard and encourage risky 
strategies by large firms (e.g. General motors, Northern Rock) that believe that they are Too Big to Fail. 
Simply because the systemic risk that the collapse of such firms might cause is too important.  
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Advanced countries engaged into important public spending and increase their debt levels 
in the same vein might compete with developing economies in terms of access to capital 
flows. Another possible fact could be that emerging economies are entering into a new 
paradigm where they are getting disconnected from business cycles in the rich world.  
 
Chapter 4: Fiscal Policy for Stabilization in Developing Countries 
Despite the well known limitations of fiscal policies in developing countries does still 
public authorities tries to use it in order to stabilize macroeconomic fluctuations? Or 
rather governments simply run procyclical policies as the majority of empirical analyses 
argue. Indeed for these analysts, developing countries‟ fiscal authorities usually increase 
their delivery of public goods (and lower taxation) in good times and run the inverse 
policy in bad economic periods. This ends up worsening the severity of economic 
downturns. Some authors (e.g. Carmignani 2010) fiscal policy in developing countries has 
remained invariably procyclical since 1960s. Especially Carmignani 2010 who studied this 
on a panel of 37 African countries found that since 1960 all these governments keep 
running strong procyclical policies and a fortiori they did not learn from past situations and 
crises. However the recent IMF‟s Regional Economic Outlook report in April 2010 
(dedicated to Sub-Saharan African economies) calls into question these results. It has 
been found during the 2010 global economic crisis that low income countries had 
adopted counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Therefore a doubt arises on the validity of 
Carmignani 2010 (and those sharing the same thought) findings. The last chapter 
overarching aim is to show, on a yearly basis, how fiscal policies have been used in 
developing economies (both Africans and Latin-Americans). Our analysis will also 
address the question that is usually neglected: are procyclical fiscal policies as bad as we 
might think? 
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2.1 Introduction 
The effects of fiscal policy is one of the most important and controversial issues in 
macroeconomics. Furthermore it would be interesting to study the outcome of a sudden 
and unexpected change in the fiscal policy for both developing and advanced economies. 
This chapter investigates the effects of government revenue and spending shocks on 
private consumption, output, external sector competitiveness and on trade balance. To 
study such effects one can use the narrative approach or the Vector Autoregressive 
method (VAR).  
In the narrative approach, the studies on fiscal policy effects pose the hypothesis that a 
decision relating to public finance taken during period t-1 is not made public until period 
t. But this hypothesis is not strong enough since it is rare for a decision of this type to be 
taken without any debate taking place either through the parliament or through the media. 
Therefore economic agents anticipate the decision from the government and adapt their 
behaviour. So the anticipation and adaptation from economic agents introduce a bias in 
the identification of the effects of the fiscal change. According to Poterba (1988) (other 
authors such as Leeper (1989) present a similar argumentation) if the effectiveness of a 
policy is low, there is no way of verifying whether this is partially due to anticipation by 
economic agents. But another theory led by Blanchard & Perotti (2002) demonstrates that 
this judgment is not immutable and that by using VAR estimation it is possible to identify 
exogenous (thus, unanticipated) impacts on budgetary policy.  
Sims (1980) first formulated the basis for the VAR modelling. The modelling came from 
the critiques against the theoretical restriction imposed on structural econometrics 
(especially multi-equations modelling). These critiques concern the simultaneous 
equations bias that resulted from the correlation of error terms with some explanatory 
variables and the causality problem between variables. Indeed the endo versus exogenous 
division of variables could lead to a bias as some variables could have reciprocal effects 
(Charemza & Deadman 1992). VAR modelling considers first that there is no endo-
exogenous division of variables and second, the random errors are assumed to be 
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contemporaneously correlated but not autocorrelated. Since this system can be estimated 
consistently by ordinary least squares, VARs can be used for forecasting and analyzing 
causal relationship between variables. In order to make causal inference, some changes 
must be introduced in the VARs and this is called Structural Vector Autoregressions 
(SVARs). The main difference between SVARs and VARs is that the structural modelling 
requires very specific assumptions of what is exogenous or not (Stock & Watson 2007). 
And by putting some restrictions in the SVAR one can identify the impact of 
unanticipated fiscal or monetary policies. However VARs have received some strident 
criticisms for its atheoretical approach, due to the unrestricted nature of the lag structure 
that could be synonymous with unstructured18 (Greene, 2008). The answer given by VAR 
users is that people should consider VAR models as reduced forms of a dynamic 
structural model (Diebold, 1998). Hence, in order to interpret VAR outcomes, one will 
need first to shed light on the theory underlying the model. This modelling method is 
usually used for monetary policy forecasting. But, according to Blanchard & Perotti 
(2002), the SVAR approach seems to be more suitable in fiscal policy analysis to the 
extent that there exist some genuine exogenous fiscal shocks (not due to output 
stabilization) and, decision and implementation lags in fiscal policy imply that there is little 
discretionary response (within a quarter) to unexpected movements in activity. It was in 
this context that some researchers began studying the impulse response to fiscal policy, 
but this was done mostly for industrialized countries.  
The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, it fills this gap for developing countries by 
studying the outcome on economic activity from sudden change in the budget stance. In 
addition, developing countries are highly vulnerable and subject to several external and 
internal shocks. Furthermore public finances are one of the main channels through which 
these shocks impact on the real economy. Indeed, due to some fiscal weaknesses (this 
issue is covered in the first and fourth chapter) very often in low and middle income 
countries both public expenditures and revenues exacerbate cyclical downturns. The 
second objective is to investigate, in comparison to previous studies, whether developing 
countries follow the same behaviour in terms of fiscal shocks as their developed 
                                                          
18 This would mean that there is no theoretical background under the choice of lags.  
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counterparts. We expect from the empirical results to answer the question whether 
developing countries can reverse the negative effects of shocks on the real economy. 
I use SVAR with a panel of developing countries and the results show that a government 
spending shock has a positive effect on output, government revenue and private 
consumption. The impulse response of the external sector appears not to be statistically 
significant. Explanations of these results will be given taking into account the 
characteristics of developing countries.  
This study is organized around five sections. The following section covers the related 
literature. Section three details the model specification while the fourth section presents 
the data and the forecasting results. The fifth section provides some discussion on the 
results. The last part concludes.  
 
2.2 Fiscal policy effects in the literature  
Literature on fiscal policy is divided in two areas. The first deals with fiscal policy 
effects without mention of the “unanticipated” aspects. The second set of studies deal 
with the latter, with recourse to different methods. This section will therefore initially 
cover the narrative approach of fiscal events before presenting studies and methods 
aimed at solving the identification problem.   
 
2.2.1 Narrative approach  
In their study, Ramey & Matthew (1998) first define the date at which agents learn 
about the upcoming increase in government expenditures. They identify three dates 
(1950: Q3; 1965: Q1 and 1980: Q1) associated to some important military spending19 (and 
some authors add 2001:Q4 to the list of dates on which news about expansionary defence 
                                                          
19 These dates correspond respectively to the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan 
defence program.  
Chap2: Fiscal Policy Shocks in Developing Countries: a Panel SVAR Approach 
43 
 
spending arrived after the September 11th attacks). They find that government spending 
starts rising only two or three quarters after the dates identified above (Burnside & al., 
2004 reach the same conclusion) and the maximum value is reached after 6 quarters 
(Ramey & Matthew 1998). So, one cannot directly compare the SVAR method and the 
narrative approach as the latter only identifies anticipated changes in fiscal policy while 
SVAR shows government spending innovations that are orthogonal to past information. 
Using a simple model, which takes into account both unanticipated and anticipated 
innovation in government purchases, confirms the above results. The explanation given is 
that when agents learn about the increase in government spending in period zero, this 
creates a negative wealth effect (a decrease in private consumption). Firms will hence 
increase their prices to cover the “loss” in demand and obtain more profit. But in period 
two, when the measure is effective, firms on the domestic market expect higher demand 
and low markups. It is therefore optimal for them to disinvest in domestic market share 
whereas it is optimal for firms on the foreign market to invest on this market as markups 
are expected to increase in the future. In their paper, Ravn & al. (2007) reconcile the two 
methodologies and show that the only difference in the results between the SVAR 
method and the narrative approach is due to the behaviour of agents depending on when 
they know about the change in fiscal policy.  
However studies on fiscal policy effects using SVAR (or even simple VAR) on panel data 
are quite rare certainly owing to the challenge associated with the identification strategy. 
Despite that, after presenting some analyses using time series data in the next sub-section 
the following one will review other studies on fiscal policy effects using panel data.  
 
2.2.2 Literature on fiscal policy shocks 
Blanchard & Perotti (2002) using a four-variable SVAR model on US quarterly 
data of government spending, taxes, output and its components find that positive 
government spending shocks have positive effects on output. The effects are completely 
different after a government revenue shock, as output and public spending decrease. A 
structural decomposition is implemented in order to identify unanticipated shocks. The 
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method of identification used relies on theory and institutional information. So, for 
instance, Blanchard & Perotti (2002) postulate that government spending responds with 
at least a one-quarter lag to structural innovations other than innovations to government 
spending itself. In other words, within a quarter only government spending can influence 
itself. After defining the reduced-form residuals as a linear combination of the structural 
innovations, they estimate all coefficients of those equations. For the remaining 
coefficients they could not estimate (the structural innovations), they therefore imposed 
some restrictions. The main limit of their study is that they do not give any explanation or 
channel of transmission to explain the impulse responses of American economy to a fiscal 
shock. Even if some other studies are applied to the USA, the comparison with Blanchard 
& Perotti (2002) will be confined to the “statistical” outcomes and to the identification 
method used. The other studies presented below try to offer a wider analysis framework. 
 
2.2.2.1 Use of panel data 
Ravn & al., (2007) use a panel SVAR of five variables for four advanced 
economies. Using the Blanchard & Perotti (2002) identification strategy, they find for four 
industrialized countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Austria) that 
unanticipated government spending shocks lead to an increase in output and private 
consumption and a deterioration in the trade balance. Perotti (2004; 2007) finds the same 
results. Ravn & al., (2007) go a little bit deeper in comparison to some other studies 
(except Monacelli & Perotti, 2006) in the sense that they look at the effects of the increase 
in government purchases on the competitiveness of the country compared to its trade 
partners. The results show that a positive shock in government spending causes a quite 
persistent depreciation of the real exchange rate implying that the domestic prices become 
cheaper than the foreign prices. This could be a little bit astonishing, but the authors 
develop a model based on “deep habit” mechanism to give a theoretical explanation of 
their findings. Under deep habits, after a positive shock of government expenditures, the 
resulting increase in aggregate demand gives an incentive to firms to reduce their markups 
(as they can sell more and get more revenue). Then the domestic prices become inferior 
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in relation to foreign prices and the real exchange rate declines. As a consequence of the 
increase in labour demand the real wage rises. And here, one can deduct that there will be 
an equilibrium increase in private consumption as the substitution effect and the wealth 
effect will compensate. After an empirical test, the deep habit model confirms all the 
predictions and hence is a good theoretical framework of what is observed in developed 
countries when government spending increases. Therefore a key issue will be to see 
whether these deep habit model predictions are relevant for developing countries. Ravn & 
al., (2007) also reconcile the two ways of measuring the effects of fiscal policy, the SVAR 
approach and the narrative method pioneered by Ramey & Matthew (1998). The 
difference in results between the two methods solely depends on whether the change is 
anticipated or not. Studies relying on the SVAR method (most of them use the Blanchard 
& Perotti 2002 identification strategy) basically consider that the change in government 
expenditure is unanticipated whereas the narrative approach only considers anticipated 
changes, hence one should not expect the same result from the two analyses. The main 
finding from the narrative approach is that a government positive spending shock fails to 
cause an increase in private consumption. 
 
2.2.2.2 Back to fiscal policy shocks 
Mountford & Uhlig (2005) study the fiscal policy shocks on US quarterly data from 
1955 to 2000. They use a different identification method from what is available in the 
literature on fiscal policy shocks. First they define fiscal policy shock as the linear 
combination of two basic shocks, the government revenue shock and the government 
spending shock20. Their identification methodology mainly tries to distinguish the genuine 
fiscal policy shocks from movement in fiscal variable in response to business cycles or 
monetary policy shocks by only using macroeconomic quarterly data (no assumptions on 
coefficient and on series). The first problem they address is the effects of the plausible lag 
                                                          
20 Government spending shock is defined as a shock where government spending rises for a defined 
period following which a distinction between anticipated and unanticipated fiscal policy measures can be 
made.  
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between the announcement and the implementation of the policy (this can bias the result 
as agents adapt their economic choices before the effectiveness of the measure). The 
identification strategy therefore directly identifies a shock for which there is a lag between 
the announcement and the implementation21. Second, to make sure that movement in 
fiscal variables are not due to other factors than fiscal policy shock; this article also 
defines business cycle and monetary policy shocks. Then genuine fiscal policy shocks 
must be orthogonal to business cycle shocks and to monetary shocks (monetary policy 
and business are also orthogonal). Practically, Mountford & Uhlig (2005) consider that 
when the government revenue (or government spending) moves in the same direction as 
output, the economy experiences a business cycle shock instead of a fiscal policy shock. 
The monetary policy shocks move the interest rate up and reserves and prices down. 
After those assumptions one can easily identify the real cause of fiscal variables 
movement. They find that unanticipated government revenue shock has a positive effect 
on output, consumption and national investment increase while when the same measure 
is anticipated we obtain inverse effects (GDP and consumption decline). Unanticipated 
government spending shock has a positive effect on output, a weak effect on 
consumption whereas investments decline in response. When the increase in government 
expenses is anticipated, we have positive impact on output and consumption. This study 
is interesting for two reasons. It can be a sort of benchmark of results from other papers 
and it raises some criticisms related to the method used. First, one observes that 
Mountford & Uhlig (2005) retrieve the main outcomes as in Blanchard & Perotti (2002). 
The effect on private consumption of a spending shock is positive in both studies but the 
impact is greater in Blanchard & Perotti (2002) which is in accordance with the Keynesian 
model (Galí & al. 2004 also reach the same conclusion on consumption as Blanchard). 
On the whole, Mountford & Uhlig (2005) find that the impact of fiscal changes on 
consumption is in general insignificant. Now, if we consider investment the effects are the 
same as it declines after a tax increase or a spending increase.  
                                                          
21 For instance, if a government spending shock only rises four quarters after its announcement, then this 
shock is defined as a shock where government expenses rise in the fourth quarter following the announce 
(Mountford & Uhlig, 2005 and Beaudry & Portier, 2003).  
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When we compare Mountford & Uhlig (2005) to other studies (like Ramey & Matthew 
1998 and Edelberg & al. 1999) pertaining to the impact of anticipated fiscal measures, the 
findings remain the same as changes occur with regard to private consumption when 
government spending increases. The only difference is in investments as our benchmark 
studies find that a public spending increase has an initial and transitory positive effect on 
investment. All the papers in consideration find that residential investments fall after a 
government spending shock and non-residential investment is crowded out.  
This paper raises some questions. Even when one uses other identification methods, the 
Blanchard & Perotti results are confirmed thus showing that their approach is 
appropriate. With regard to the Mountford & Uhlig (2005) identification method, authors 
warn readers from the onset that they use “strong assumptions” in their identification 
strategy. Their estimations allow them to consider the business cycle shock to be causally 
prior to the fiscal policy shock (it is fully plausible that an increase in tax receipt causes a 
business cycle upturn). Some similarities therefore exist between this study and the related 
literature. The strength of the Blanchard SVAR identification strategy is that the SVAR 
matrix solves the problem of causality and anteriority between the variables of interest.  
Fatás & Mihov (2001) use a VAR estimation for the purpose of comparison between the 
real business cycle (RBD) model predictions and the main findings in the literature. The 
identification strategy used is almost the same as Blanchard & Perotti 1999. Indeed with a 
“simple” VAR22, they assume that any government spending components react 
automatically to changes in economic conditions23. Fatás & Mihov (2001) adopt the same 
procedure as in semi structural VARs as they do not make restrictions in the relationship 
between the macroeconomic variables and the government tax revenue. They find that an 
increase in government spending has a positive and persistent impact on private 
consumption (and on all its components: durable goods, non-durable and services) and 
                                                          
22 By “simple” VAR, I mean a VAR with no structural restriction.  
23 Government spending variables do not move in reaction to shocks in the economy (Fatás, A., Mihov, I., 
2001). The authors recognize that the assumption arguing that decisions on tax are taken only after 
spending is determined is a plausible idea but unfortunately not testable. This, in our point of view, shows 
how Blanchard & Perotti‟s (1999) identification strategy to shock can be plausible, useful and testable.   
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this rise explains the positive reaction of output. In their results, investment does increase 
after six quarters and returns to trend within the three years following the shock. 
Nonetheless, , Fatás & Mihov (2001) find that following the spending shock, wages and 
employment increase; this result is in accordance with Rotemberg & Woodford (1992). 
Their robustness check using forecast policy variable confirms the earlier findings. The 
robustness analysis confirms the assumption that no other macroeconomic variable 
affects the public expenses (one can say that what is identified in this paper is really 
unanticipated changes in government spending). Comparing their results to the RBS 
predictions they find both similarities and differences. Thus the empirical model finds 
(VAR specification) that increase in government spending is expansionary, which is not 
consistent with the benchmark model. This is due to the simple reason that the RBC 
model argues that government spending shock is expansionary (but) and the multiplier 
associated can be greater than one. Second, in the benchmark model, private 
consumption fails to increase24 after a government spending shock and only the increase 
in investment drives the expansionary effect. However in the VAR specification, one 
found that a fiscal policy shock leads to an increase of private consumption hence an 
increase in output. For the authors, those differences show the limits of the RBC model 
in explaining the most plausible effects of a fiscal policy shock. And another failure of the 
RBC model is the negative correlation that it predicts between consumption and 
employment. Indeed in the VAR specification, consumption and employment move in 
the same direction after a public spending increase. This is due, according to Fatás & 
Mihov (2001), to the fact that there has to be a large change in real wages to compensate 
for the fact that if consumption and leisure are normal goods they will tend to move in 
the same direction in response to changes in a household‟s wealth.  
So as we can observe, the VAR specification is a good specification as it clearly shows the 
different impacts of a fiscal policy shock on the components of the economy. In the next 
section one will look more deeply at the SVAR specification using panel data and how 
this can help to explain the effects of fiscal policy shocks in developing countries.  
                                                          
24 This is due to the negative wealth effects induced by the surplus of public spending.  
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Studies on fiscal policy shocks in developing countries are relatively scarce. Papers 
focusing on fiscal policy in developing countries usually follow Giavazzi & Pagano (1990). 
These studies are interesting with regard to the effects of fiscal policy based on the initial 
situation of the fiscal balance, the initial debt level and the composition of the fiscal 
measure considered. In that context, a recent study of Schclarek (2007) on developing 
countries shows that government spending and government revenue (taxes) has 
Keynesian effects on private consumption and its outcome do not depend on the initial 
situation of the public finance. This literature cannot be used as a benchmark for the 
results in this paper, as Schclarek (2007) (and similar studies) rather than identifying shock 
(i.e. unexpected change in fiscal policy), identify fiscal effects once private agents get and 
analyse all information available to them. The main issue in this paper is to ascertain 
whether an unanticipated fiscal measure in developing countries has the same effects as in 
the developed world. For the developing world, I expect government spending to work 
through a channel different from the one proposed by the deep habit model. Given that 
competition between firms is not as high as in advanced countries, firms can leave their 
markups unchanged and the aggregate demand will even increase. In the discussion 
section some alternative explanations will be provided for developing countries. 
 
2.3 The SVAR specification in fiscal policy literature 
In this section, I present the SVAR analysis for studies on fiscal policy (same 
specification for monetary policy) and later the model used.  
The VAR analysis has been used more often in research on monetary policies. But as said 
above the VAR analysis can be quite suitable for fiscal policy analysis for three main 
reasons according to Mountford & Uhlig (2005). First the VAR analysis can help to 
model the effects of announcements, second, one can distinguish the changes in fiscal 
variables caused by fiscal policy shocks and those caused by other shocks (business cycle 
and monetary policy). Finally any additional information (such as the timing of the policy 
change) is necessary to perform the simulations.  
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2.3.1 Fiscal Shocks: unanticipated discretionary measures 
The concept of shocks needs to be clearly defined and understood. Even if this issue 
was briefly addressed earlier in this chapter, one can wonder what is meant exactly by 
fiscal shocks. Shocks are considered as discretionary (unanticipated) fiscal measures 
different from stochastic automatic feedback effects. In other worlds the change is due to 
a voluntary action from fiscal authorities while the other parameters in the economy (for 
instance output growth) do not exert any influence on that. The inverse of such concept 
of shock could be for instance fiscal automatic stabilizers which are independent from 
policy makers‟ actions and solely depend on economic activity level.  
Therefore one needs to implement and use an approach that permits the distinction 
between stochastic automatic responses and real discretionary policies on one hand and 
an estimation of the direct impact of shocks so identified.  
Hence, obtaining a clear identification of independent policy shocks depends on an 
appropriate specification of the VAR. The SVAR specification is presented hereafter, and 
identification strategies will be detailed later.  
 
2.3.2 The structural VAR specification with panel data 
In econometrics the most common situation consists of having an equation where 
there is a dependent variable and some other explanatory variables. Nevertheless, one can 
have simultaneity between variables when explanatory variables are also determined by 
the dependent variables they aim at explaining. According to Sims (1980) when there is 
simultaneity among a number of variables, then these variables should be treated in the 
same way (Asteriou & Hall, 2007). So, all variables should be considered as endogenous. 
Following which, VAR can allow us to perform tests in order to identify the direction of 
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causality among variables25. After Sims (1980), VARs have been mostly used to identify 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policies.  
We present below a model of SVAR applied to panel data. The main advantages of this 
procedure are discussed in the following section.  
First we show that a basic structural VAR with time series data can be written as26: 
 
(1)  1
1
1 1
t t t
m m m m m m k k m
A Y B Y C X U
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     
 
(1) Is a multivariate structural autoregression model. With tX  a k  exogenous vector 
autoregression. 1tY   are the lag values of the “dependent” variable. tU  a m  
structural (exogenous) shocks. So with (1) we have m  different variables27.  
Once we want to apply to this model panel data, some changes should be made to take 
into account the multidimensional nature of our series. The model can be written as 
follows: 
 
(2)  1
1 1 1 1
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Index i refers to the cross sectional observations and t the time period. Here in equation 
(2), if  is the unobserved individual effect. This specification implies that the error term 
itU  satisfies the orthogonality condition which allows us to consider lagged values of Y  
as instrumental variables (Holtz-Eakin & al. 1988).  
                                                          
25 To determine the direction of causality, one can use the Granger causality test or the Sims causality test. 
We will not discuss this point in detail as it is not our main field of interest in this paper.  
26 We follow the analysis of Holtz-Eakin & al., 1988. 
27 For instance, if 2m   we have two different equations.  
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The main advantage of introducing the individual effect is that it allows us to consider 
that the time series relationship between the dependent variables, its lag values and the 
exogenous variables is not identical (Holtz-Eakin & al. 1988). In equation (2) we also 
allow the variance of U  (the structural innovation) to differ with the cross-section unit 
(that‟s why U is indexed with i). 
According to Holtz-Eakin & al. (1988), using SVARs with panel data has the advantage of 
allowing us to relax the assumption of time stationarity, as the presence of a large number 
of cross-sectional units makes it possible for lag coefficient to vary over time.  
In this model, though we want to estimate the coefficients A , B and U , the issue is that 
one can only observe a statistical VAR (reduced-form VAR): 
(3) 1it it it itY VY WX e    
With ite  is a vector of statistical innovations (a reduced-form residual and not a structural 
shock) which are a combination of the structural innovations ( itU ). The main question is 
how to recover the “missing” coefficient from V  and e . To do so, one can write: 
 
1
1 1 1
1
1
1
it it it it
it it it it
it t
AY BY CX U
Y A BY A CX A U
V A B
e A U

  



  
   
 

 
 The variance of ite is:  
21var( ) var( )it ite A U
 .  
The assumption that the structural innovations are uncorrelated across time and between 
individuals means that the matrix of the variance of those structural shocks is a diagonal.  
1 0
var( )
0 1
itU I
 
 
  
 
 
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The orthogonality condition presented above also holds for the structural innovation on 
the panel model28.  
And the variance of the reduced-form residual ite  is a symmetric matrix: 
var( )
ij
it
ji
a
e
a
 
 
  
 
 
 
var( )ite  is a m m  matrix; with ij jia a  
Then we have:  
1
var itA e

     
So from this matrix one can recover  
21
2
m
m

  coefficients. Whereas we need to 
estimate 2m coefficients of A  (to retrieve A ) but we only have  
21
2
m
m

  of estimates 
available from var( )ite .  
To solve this problem we need some restriction on matrix A  as Blanchard & Perotti 
(2002), or use the Cholesky decomposition.  
In this study we will use both methods to estimate the impulse responses from our SVAR 
in order to have a situation of reference and benchmark estimation. 
 
2.3.3 Identification methods: Blanchard & Perotti and 
Cholesky ordering 
 
Before presenting our data and the sample used in this paper, explanations will be 
given on the two different identification methods: the Blanchard & Perotti technique and 
the Cholesky decomposition method.  
                                                          
28
 This condition is that :     0it it it itY U X U     
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2.3.3.1 Blanchard & Perotti identification method: 
First Blanchard & Perotti (2002) write down the reduced form residuals (of the three 
different VARs they are using) as a linear combination of the underlying structural 
innovation. Then, they rely on institutional information (and on other studies) to estimate 
the impact of unexpected movements of GDP on taxes and government spending. To do 
this they construct the elasticities to output of public spending and government revenue. 
The estimation of those coefficients will allow them to construct the cyclically adjusted 
reduced form of their variables of interest (taxes and spending). As the cyclically adjusted 
reduced form of tax and spending are not correlated to the structural shocks we can use 
them as instruments to estimate the impact of unexpected movement of taxes and 
spending on output. The remaining problem to solve here will be the estimation of the 
impact of the unexpected changes of taxes (spending) on spending (government revenue). 
To solve the problem they do not consider the two decisions at the same time. For 
instance, the decision of increasing the expenses can be considered as coming first and 
one is able to estimate the impact of unexpected change of spending on taxes29.  
In more detail, by using matrices the SVAR specification is as follow:  
 
24 21 23
34 31 32
42 43 41
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
govspen govspen
t t
govreve govreve
t t
priconso priconso
t t
y y
t t
u v
u v
u v
u v
  
  
  
      
      
      
      
      
         
 (4) 
 
Here I will use only some variables to illustrate the Blanchard & Perotti identification 
method. The full set of variables is presented in the empirical section of the chapter. The 
vector of variables tX =  t t t tgovspen , govreve , priconso , y  represents 
                                                          
29 However as authors said, we believe that the ordering does not make big differences in the results as 
there is little correlation between the cyclically adjusted reduced form of taxes and spending.  
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government spending, government revenues, private consumption and GDP. tv is the 
matrix of structural shocks, and the right hand side coefficients capture the automatic 
stabilizers effects (Kumah & Matovu, 2007) and as said earlier this matrix is uncorrelated 
with a diagonal contemporaneous covariance matrix   , tu  is a matrix of innovations. 
The coefficients of the left-hand side (the tu ) capture the stochastic effects (automatic 
stabilizers) and the right-hand side coefficients (the tv ) represent the effects of 
discretionary policies (policy shocks).  
Therefore the issue here will consist of identifying discretionary shocks (from automatic 
responses of fiscal variables to change in economic activity). For Blanchard & Perotti 
(Kumah & Matovu, 2007 used the same approach), using quarterly data ensures that there 
is no reaction of fiscal variables due to an automatic stabilizers effect. Therefore within a 
quarter a change in any fiscal variable is due to a voluntary action from policy makers. In 
addition, the structure of the model allows us to introduce clear constraints that refrain 
other variables (in case they could influence fiscal aggregates within a quarter) from 
influencing the public finances stance.  
 
31 32
41 42
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0
0 1
govspen govspen
t t
govreve govreve
t t
priconso priconso
t t
y y
t t
u v
u v
u v
u v
 
 
    
    
    
    
    
       
 (5) 
 
The final form of the system is presented in equation (5). Government spending and 
public revenue shocks are strictly exogenous30. Coefficients 31  and 32   show the 
response of price level to government spending shocks and public revenue shocks. While 
42  and 41  represent the effects on output of shocks on fiscal variables.  
                                                          
30 Here it is possible to consider that government revenues can respond to discretionary change in public 
expenditure. In such situations, the coefficient (second raw, fourth column) will be different from zero.  
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2.3.3.2 The Cholesky ordering 
Cholesky ordering is a statistical decomposition of symmetric positive-definite matrix. 
This procedure allows us to orthogonalise the residuals using the inverse of the Cholesky 
factor of the residual covariance matrix. This procedure is simple as one does not need to 
write a matrix and impose restrictions (Younus, 2005). But it is quite risky when the 
ordering of the variables in the VAR is vital as it attributes all of the effects of any 
common component to the variable that comes first in the VAR system. Once we change 
the ordering we obtain different results.  
In the estimations, I will use both methods and see which one gives the most interesting 
empirical explanations of the phenomenon studied in this chapter.  
 
2.4 The data and estimations 
This section gives a brief presentation of the data, and presents the empirical results. 
The list of countries is shown in appendix. 
We use quarterly panel data in our estimations. The use of quarterly data is mainly 
justified by our objective to identify the outcomes of fiscal policy shocks. If annual 
instead of quarterly data was used, there might be loss of information. This is simply due 
to the fact that shocks happening in the first months of the year can be completely 
smoothed at the end of the year. Besides, in a quarter, a change in fiscal variables is only 
due to fiscal policy shocks and not the economic activity. In other words it takes more 
than one quarter for fiscal variables to react to variation in the economic activity 
(Blanchard & Perotti, 2002). This assumption justifies basically the restriction I make on 
the structural residuals.  
The long period of observation in our data (1960 to early 2002) gives us the opportunity 
to take into account many changes in fiscal policy that have taken place in developing 
countries (debt crisis for some, raw materials shocks, etc.). Moreover this deep temporal 
dimension is necessary to obtain enough instrumental variables to identify the system as 
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this is necessary to estimate (according to the number of VARs in our model) an 
important number of coefficients.  
 
2.4.1 The data and summary statistics 
One uses the International Financial Statistics (IFS) data base of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). As said above the data covers the period from 1960 to 2002. All 
variables are in percent of GDP (consumer price index used as deflator) and put in log 
form (except the real effective exchange rate).  
The main series are general government spending and revenues, private consumption, 
trade account balance, and real GDP per capita, all from the IFS data base. In what 
follows, an increase in the real effective exchange rate (REER) reflects an appreciation 
and therefore a loss of competitiveness. A full definition of the variables is presented in 
annex.  
Like many others, this study faces the problem of availability of data especially with 
regard to quarterly data. Despite this issue, the frequency and the length of the data end 
up being an advantage since it gives enough observation and variability allowing us to run 
the estimations. 
I use data from a sample of 34 developing countries. Table 2.1 gives some summary 
statistics.  
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics  
 
 
PRICE 
 
PRIVATE_CONS 
 
REER 
 
TRADE_BALANCE 
 
OUTPUT 
 
G_REVE 
 
G_SPEND 
 
 Mean  38.91108  3.886120  5233.505 -0.263240  4.575331  4.189924  4.476237 
        
 Median  27.50500  4.046847  101.7600 -0.319265  4.911819  3.274677  3.375112 
        
 Maximum  153.7800  10.55872  7116400.  4.687524  11.00112  12.69606  12.99033 
        
 Minimum  0.000000 -1.474936  12.46000 -6.990538 -1.200986 -5.418711 -3.874312 
        
 Std. Dev.  37.02202  3.141912  147623.6  1.860719  3.231279  2.748820  2.896620 
        
 Sum  192687.7  1876.996  17286267 -85.28965  2337.994  6481.813  7242.552 
        
 Observations  4952  483  3303  324  511  1547  1618 
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2.4.2 The empirical results 
The main concern while running the impulse responses on panel data was a possible 
correlation between residuals across countries. But Ravn & al., (2006) show that this 
problem is very negligible and results do not change if one applies GLS estimation31.  
Formally, following Blanchard & Perotti‟s identification method, I consider that within a 
quarter, government spending (or government revenue) only respond to innovations to 
government spending. Then I just impose the first row of matrix A to be equal to 1 for its 
first element and zero elsewhere. After that, I present in this section the impact of a fiscal 
policy shock on output, private consumption, real effective exchange rate and trade 
balance. To avoid having an important number of coefficients to estimate and therefore 
the loss of a degree of freedom, I do not introduce all variables of interest in the same 
VAR. Only a maximum of five variables are therefore considered in one SVAR 
specification to sort out this problem.  
I first present the results from a structural decomposition using the Blanchard & Perotti 
(2002) method and use the Cholesky decomposition as a benchmark to our findings. 
 
2.4.2.1 Responses to a government spending shock 
Statistically significant estimations are those for which the two standard error bands 
do not include the zero line. In other words as soon as the zero line is between the 
standards error bands this would mean that the impulse response is not statistically 
significant, and hence the variable considered is not responding to the shock32. Another 
particular aspect of SVAR is that since it is a forecasting tool showing outcomes after a 
sudden change in policy, then there is not a single coefficient estimated. The model only 
                                                          
31 Generalized Least Squares (used when OLS is inconsistent) is an estimation method used when there is 
some heteroscedasticity or a correlation between the observations.  
32 Mountford & Uhlig, (2005) used the same method to interpret their results.  
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estimates the coefficients inside the matrix which will be used to determine impulse 
responses.  
I consider that the government purchases increase suddenly and this situation is 
unexpected. Figure 2.1 displays the impact from a structural decomposition.  
As we see, the shock on government spending itself is persistent. The impact on GDP is 
quasi simultaneous, positive and lasts relatively long. The private agents, unexpecting the 
fiscal policy increase their consumption probably due to a wealth effect. The effect on 
trade balance is negative but not very significant. Obviously, this shows us that after the 
shock, the country seems to increase its importation and that this situation is transitory as 
after five to seven quarters the effects of the fiscal policy on the trade balance disappear. 
These results, which will later be compared to other findings, remain strong even when 
the Cholesky decomposition is used (Figure 2.2).  
In Figure A.2.1 (Appendix1), only the real effective exchange rate is added and the trade 
balance taken out as we avoid an important loss in the degree of freedom. The same 
effects are found with slight differences. The government spending shock seems to be 
persistent. For output and private consumption, the response comes with a small lag of 
less than six month but it remains that the effect on those variables is positive and 
persistent. Unfortunately, the real effective exchange rate (REER) does not respond 
significantly to a spending shock even when one uses a different identification method 
like the Cholesky decomposition (Figure A.2.2, Appendix1). 
 
2.4.2.2 Impulse response to a government revenue shock 
Impulse responses to a government revenue shock are presented in Figures 2.3 & 2.4. 
The sudden increase of government revenue is quite persistent and also has an impact on 
government purchases that increase at the same time. It can be surprising to see that a 
public revenue shock has a positive impact on output and on household consumption. 
These results are at odds with Blanchard & Perotti (2002) results for the US economy. 
Some ideas will be brought to try to explain these “uncommon” results for developing 
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countries. When one has a look at the external sector, we first see that REER do not 
respond to a revenue shock (Figures A.2.3 & A.2.4, Appendix2). The trade balance 
deteriorates but the shock seems to be transitory. Most of our results for this sample of 
developing countries are quite original. But as said above one cannot perform a 
comparison as no other study on panel SVAR is applied to developing countries to 
identify fiscal shocks. Nevertheless in the coming section, and relying on what is known 
of the economic environment of developing countries, some interpretations will be given.  
 
Figure 2.1: Impulse response from government spending shock 
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses from government spending shock 
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response to Government revenue shock 
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response to Government revenue shock 
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2.4.3 The Stationarity Issue 
Given the length of the period of observation (more than 150 quarters) some series 
can be deemed as non-stationary. However another view states that this issue is not a 
major concern in panel SVARs and (many) other studies ignore the possible existence of a 
unit root. For instance, Ravn & al. 2007, Montford & Uhlig 2005 consider that their 
quarterly series has no unit root during the period 1955-2000. This assumption (not 
considering the existence of unit root in such data) for series like price, trade balance and 
output seems a bit hard to defend. In what follows, one tries to address this issue by 
running several panel unit root tests.  
Apart from the usual panel unit root tests (details on such tests are provided later in this 
paragraph), VEC models (Vector Error Correction Model) can be used to sort out the 
non-stationarity. The VEC model is a restricted VAR designed for use with non-
stationary series that are known to be cointegrated. Indeed, once the econometrical tests 
show that variables are non-stationary and if there exists some cointegration, then VEC 
procedure becomes robust. Despite such advantages the VEC model presents some 
limits. Indeed with VEC procedure, structural shocks with transitory effects do not have 
contemporaneous effect on weak exogenous variables (Fisher & Huh, 1999). In addition, 
VECs can only be used with unrestricted VARs, and are therefore not consistent with the 
main purpose of this chapter. Given these important limits, the VEC model will not be 
used. 
Hence our method will consist of testing for the stationarity of each variable and once a 
variable has a unit root the first difference will be used in the estimations. The results 
indicate that (see Appendix5) private consumption, government spending, price level and 
output growth are non-stationary, while other variables (government revenue, trade 
balance and exchange rate seem more stationary). The next step is to use first differences 
instead of the simple log of variables. Then the same shocks are introduced with new 
variables, as previously.  
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Once first differences are considered, the immediate effect after the shock is roughly 
identical to previous results. Appendix 6 FigureA.2.5 shows that a spending shock does 
not affect the external sector (trade balance)33. As previously, public spending 
discretionary increase receives a positive impulse response from private consumption, 
output and government revenue. However a major change is noticed on the durability of 
the responses of the variables of interest. Indeed, discretionary measures on public 
spending disappear after only 2 quarters (while in the previous paragraph the change was 
quasi-permanent). Impulse responses from output and private consumption also 
disappear after 3 to 4 quarters. The fact that the response to shocks disappears more 
rapidly than previously (situation where series were non-stationary) demonstrates that the 
series was highly non-stationary and this affected the results. Impulse responses after a 
government revenue shock are presented in Appendix6 FigureA.2.7 & FigureA.2.8. Here 
again no major change in the results except for the durability of the impact of shocks.  
The last puzzle remains the response of government revenues to public expenditures 
shock that remain unchanged for a relative long period (more than 9 quarters). Also 
usually discretionary changes in government revenue last quite longer. For developing 
countries, since automatic stabilizers are weak (Carmignani, 2010) due to small 
government size, public revenues do not readapt quickly to change in economic activity34. 
Indeed this denotes rigidity, especially on the revenue side since policy makers are not 
able to change tax rates after the period of resilience of real economy following a shock.  
 
2.5 Discussion and Policy Recommendations 
The impulse responses to a government spending shock in developing countries are 
similar to those found in advanced economies. Indeed the main studies find a positive 
effect of an unexpected increase in spending on output and private consumption 
                                                          
33 The result is similar when REER is considered instead of trade balance.  
34 In most African countries, the substantial ineffectiveness of formal social safety networks implies that 
automatic stabilizers are weak (Carmignani, 2010). 
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(Blanchard & Perotti 2002; Giordano & al. 2007 and Ravn & al., 2007). According to 
Giordano & al. (2007) the positive impact on government revenue of a spending shock is 
due to the increase in wages that enhances tax revenue. This result can hold for 
developing countries once one knows that the public sector is a major actor (in many 
instances, government is the first employer) in these economies. Nevertheless the effect 
on output for developing countries works differently from what was found previously in 
the literature. That is in some cases when the data provides the opportunity to see which 
part of public spending, after a rise in government expenditures. This is simply due to the 
fact that when government purchases increase the public revenue remains the same (or 
decreases) and this facilitates the rise of economic activity. For developing countries (even 
if we do not test this hypothesis due to the scarcity of quarterly data), when the 
government suddenly increases its expenses, public revenue and output increase. This is 
not a surprising result as government is the major actor in developing economies and 
most of investments are public. Therefore it is understandable that the GDP increases.  
Concerning the external sector, our findings are in line with the results in the literature. 
Funke & Nickel (2006) find that an increase in government expenditures has a positive 
impact on both import of goods and services. This leads to a deterioration of the trade 
account. The same mechanism works in our analysis (even if our results are not highly 
significant) in the sense that consumption needs for the public sector after a shock are so 
important that imports should increase. However we still don‟t have the exact impact of 
government spending shock on the competitiveness of developing countries. This will be 
understood after I make clear the impact of a shock on trade balance. The first 
explanation could be the quality of our data when we see how scarce quarterly data can 
be. Another explanation for this outcome can be that the developing countries import 
most of their consumption during shocks or in normal times. Therefore the situation 
does not change that much after a shock in the sense that the country is not shifting from 
a state of net exporter to a net importer (only imports increase so there is not any 
important variability).  
The impulse responses to a government revenue shock can be seen as counter-intuitive. 
We find a positive response of GDP and private consumption to a government revenue 
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shock. Blanchard & Perotti (2002) as said above found different results that are more 
close to the Keynesian predictions. In the context of developing economies, positive 
effects on government spending are understandable. As previously said, in these 
economies, the government is the main investor and in many situations it is the first 
employer35. So once the revenue increases the expenses go the same way. Another 
argument to this could be the idea of “starving the leviathan”. This argument was used to 
explain why fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries.  Indeed, when the 
economy is doing well, and the government is getting more revenue, the voters do not 
want the government to appropriate the rent so they ask for more public goods or higher 
wages (Alesina & Tabellini, 2005). Aware of that, the government increases its expenses 
after a revenue shock since it anticipate the political pressure from citizens. A government 
revenue shock has a small effect on the external sector and only the trade account 
deteriorates (the impulse response on REER remaining not statistically significant). The 
explanation is that the government can afford more goods and services from abroad after 
the shock and it is obliged to do so by its citizens in accordance with the “starving 
leviathan” idea already seen.  
According to Favero & Giavazzi (2007) the impulse response estimated in VAR studies 
of fiscal policy shocks are all biased. The reason for this is that these studies do not 
consider the debt dynamics that arise after a fiscal policy shock. In other words, the 
response of tax and spending after a fiscal shock depends on the path the government has 
chosen to meet its intertemporal budget constraint and this depends on the level of public 
debt. Nevertheless this critique does not mean that the traditional VAR findings should 
be sent to the bin as only the very short run effects are indentified by this approach. The 
intertemporal budget constraint has to be met evidently, but as the shock is unanticipated 
(in this SVAR studies), in the short run private agents only focus on the “shock”.  
 
                                                          
35 Giordano & al. 2007 find the same “surprising” results to a government revenue shock. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
After summing up our findings, one can see that in some way fiscal policy shocks 
have a different effect in developing countries compared to their industrial counterparts. 
Though the effects of a government spending shock can be positive for a developing 
economy in the sense that it brings growth and induces more consumption on the one 
hand, the effects seem to be the same after government revenue shock on the other. But 
the second aspect of these results means that there is a weak (or a less strong) private 
sector in the developing world. Compared to previous studies, this one addresses the 
important issue of non-stationarity of series. The numerous tests implemented have 
shown that some series were non-stationary. Once this issue is corrected, a noticeable 
change arises: impulse responses are shorter, the effect of the shock disappearing after 
four quarters on average. However due to weak automatic stabilizers in developing 
countries, impulse response of government revenues (even if series are purged from unit 
roots) was persistent. 
For policy makers a possible response regarding the effects of revenue shocks could be 
the adoption of more transparent budgetary processes. Implementing a fiscal rule might 
add some discipline and afford some credibility to fiscal authorities. Weak automatic 
stabilisers, with the possible consequence of increasing procyclicality of fiscal policies, 
could be addressed with a larger government size (a long term process). 
This study fills an important gap since such analysis has not been done yet for middle and 
low income countries. Despite the diversity of economic structures for countries in the 
sample, the analysis did not suffer much of that since SVARs are robust sample 
heterogeneity and the unit root test in a sense removes some inconsistencies in the results.  
Future analysis may focus on ways and means to improve the credibility of fiscal 
authorities. As the third chapter in this dissertation will demonstrate, developing 
countries‟ main cause of fiscal policy inefficiency is due to the poor confidence of tax 
payers on public authorities. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Figure A.2.1: Impulse responses to Government spending shock (Structural ordering) 
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Figure A.2.2: Impulse responses to Government spending shock (Cholesky ordering) 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Figure A.2.3: Impulse responses to Government revenue shock (Structural ordering) 
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Figure A.2.4: Impulse responses to Government revenue shock (Cholesky ordering) 
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Appendix 3: List of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Output Real GDP per capita 
G_Spend General government spending: includes all major 
transactions that decrease the net worth of government 
(compensation of employees, purchase of goods and 
services, subsidies, social benefits, interest). IFS-2008 
G_Reve General government revenue: this includes major 
transactions that increase the net worth of government 
(taxes, social contributions and grants). This definition is as 
broad as data allows it to be. Since developing countries‟ 
sources of revenue are not only taxation. GFS-2008 
Price Consumer price index, IFS-2008 
REER Real effective exchange rate: based on relative consumer 
prices. IFS-2008. 
Trade_Balance Trade balance: balance of exports and imports. WEO 2008 
Private_cons Private consumption driven from data on “consumer price 
index”: the cost of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and 
services by the average consumer. IFS-2008. 
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Appendix 4: SVAR Matrix 
 
 Structural VAR Estimates   
 Date: 01/24/11   Time: 15:20   
 Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2002Q4   
 Included observations: 282 after adjustments  
 Estimation method: method of scoring (analytic derivatives) 
 Convergence achieved after 8 iterations  
 Structural VAR is over-identified (3 degrees of freedom) 
     
     Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I   
Restriction Type: short-run pattern matrix  
A =     
1 0 0 0  
C(1) 1 0 0  
C(2) 0 1 0  
C(3) 0 0 1  
B =     
C(4) 0 0 0  
0 C(5) 0 0  
0 0 C(6) 0  
0 0 0 C(7)  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) -0.803133  0.049224 -16.31603  0.0000 
C(2) -0.599033  0.033430 -17.91897  0.0000 
C(3)  0.271954  2.579397  0.105433  0.9160 
C(4)  0.232511  0.009790  23.74868  0.0000 
C(5)  0.192194  0.008093  23.74868  0.0000 
C(6)  0.130528  0.005496  23.74868  0.0000 
C(7)  10.07131  0.424079  23.74868  0.0000 
     
     Log likelihood  -801.2223    
LR test for over-identification:    
Chi-square(3)   56.51947  Probability  0.0000 
     
     Estimated A matrix:   
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-0.803133  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-0.599033  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  
 0.271954  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  
Estimated B matrix:   
 0.232511  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.192194  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.130528  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  10.07131  
     
          
 
 
 
Chap2: Fiscal Policy Shocks in Developing Countries: a Panel SVAR Approach 
77 
 
Appendix 5: Panel Unit Root Test  
 
Table 1 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  Private Consumption   
Date: 01/18/11   Time: 17:24  
Sample: 1960Q1 2002Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 7 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.42597  0.3351  10  429 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   5.11188  1.0000  10  429 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  13.5207  0.8539  10  429 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  8.40285  0.9888  10  456 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Table 2 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  Government Spending   
Date: 01/18/11   Time: 20:48  
Sample: 1960Q1 2002Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 8 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  6.09230  1.0000  24  1495 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   7.44552  1.0000  23  1492 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  37.9217  0.8512  24  1495 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  146.786  0.0000  24  1577 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Table 3 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  PRICE   
Date: 01/18/11   Time: 20:40  
Sample: 1960Q1 2002Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 12 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  12.0889  1.0000  34  4749 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   17.6911  1.0000  34  4749 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  15.6799  1.0000  34  4749 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  8.85315  1.0000  34  4913 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
Table 4 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  OUTPUT   
Date: 01/18/11   Time: 20:40  
Sample: 1960Q1 2002Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 7 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.03618  0.4856  11  457 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   6.20757  1.0000  11  457 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  12.1481  0.9542  11  457 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  8.23494  0.9965  11  483 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Table 5 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  REER   
Date: 01/18/11   Time: 20:44  
Sample: 1960Q1 2002Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 6 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.31853  0.0102  34  3244 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.36108  0.0004  34  3244 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  143.726  0.0000  34  3244 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  136.415  0.0000  34  3269 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  TRADE_BALANCE   
Date: 01/18/11   Time: 20:49  
Sample: 1960Q1 2002Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.70765  0.2396  13  241 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -1.26014  0.1038  13  241 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  48.5254  0.0047  13  241 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  37.1985  0.0717  13  255 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Table 7 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  Government Revenue   
Date: 01/20/11   Time: 15:27  
Sample: 1960Q1 2002Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User specified lags at: 0   
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.05028  0.1468  24  1510 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.00654  0.0000  23  1507 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  143.014  0.0000  24  1510 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  151.831  0.0000  24  1510 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Appendix 6 
FigA.2.5: Response to Government spending shocks with stationary variables 
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Figure A.2.6: response to government spending shock (after stationarization of variables) 
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FigA.2.7: Response to government revenue shock with stationary variables 
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FigureA.2.8: Response to government revenue shocks (stationary variables) 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
List of countries  
Bahrain, Kingdom of 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Hungary 
Iran, I.R. of 
Israel 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Poland 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Solomon Islands 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & Grens. 
Uganda 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The financial and economic crisis, that started in late 2007 has shown how much 
developing and emerging economies are vulnerable to any economic turmoil in advanced 
countries. Indeed what started with the subprime problem in the USA spread out to the 
entire financial market and contaminated the real sector economy through several 
channels among which one can cite falling exports, higher interest rates and lower prices 
in the real estate sector in advanced economies. During autumn 2008, capital flows to 
developing countries started drying up (WEO April 2009). Given the dependence of such 
countries on external financing this leakage of capital flows caused an economic crisis and 
a downfall of confidence leading to a demand shock in developing countries.  
Since the early 1990s, when important capital flows were invested in fast growing 
emerging countries, analysts believed that the cause of such inflows was the so-called 
“pull factors”. Indeed some incentive policies in EMEs like market oriented policies, 
sound monetary policies, privatization and deregulation were believed to be the main 
factors determining capital inflows. However some empirical studies (e.g. Calvo & al. 
1994 and more recently Felices & Orskang 2008) have shown from empirical estimations 
that “push factors” were more important in explaining determinants of capital flows. 
Namely, economic and financial conditions in mature markets explain the majority of 
capital flows to emerging markets. For instance, Fernandez-Arias 1994 argue that more 
than half of investments in emerging markets are due to lower return in the USA and in 
advanced economies in general. This argument is consistent with the idea that the rate of 
return of capital investment (marginal productivity of capital) is higher in middle and low 
income countries where the ratio capital to labor is lower than in Western countries. In 
addition to return rates, capital flows toward developing countries are highly dependent 
on output growth and availability of savings in source countries. While these channels are 
well documented and identified in the literature, the impact of fiscal policies in developed 
countries on emerging markets has received less attention in empirical studies.  
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What can be expected, in terms of investment in developing countries, when advanced 
markets face large fiscal imbalances and huge debt? In what follows I will be assuming 
that fiscal policy is countercyclical in industrial countries (Talvi & Vegh 2002, Alesina & 
Guido 2005); even if this answer is not clear cut and not unanimously shared in the 
literature. For some authors, in industrial countries, fiscal policy is rather acyclical than 
countercyclical. Meaning that, the fiscal balance is completely disconnected from the 
business cycles. However this argument does not weaken our assumption that large 
deficits happen during “bad times”. Indeed, if one considers that fiscal policy is acyclical 
then, when the output growth slows down, the fiscal deficit (and debt) does not change 
that much. But since no study defends a procyclical fiscal policy in industrial countries, 
one can reasonably say that, periods of high increase of public deficit (and debt) 
correspond to economic downturn in advanced countries (Alesina & Guido 2005). This 
might be caused by the effects of automatic stabilizers which are (more) important in 
developed economies (compared to developing economies; Fatas & Mihov 2001, Debrun 
& Kapoor 2010). The theory, for which I will revisit the fundamentals, predicts that large 
deficit causes interest rates to increase in developed economies and this could crowd out 
investment in developing countries36. Also an increase in public deficit causes global 
savings37 to fall, which in turn exacerbates the rise of real interest rates.  In addition, 
usually during global economic crises, bonds issued by emerging countries are less 
attractive due to the decline in confidence on these financial assets. Indeed, the deflation 
in the price of goods exported by developing countries, due to less demand from 
advanced countries, keeps the confidence on the ability of developing countries to repay 
debt at a lower level.  
This paper investigates the relationship between public finances in advanced economies 
and capital flows to EMEs relying on some identified transmission channels. As said 
above, these channels are threefold: higher interest rates in western countries; increased 
risk on developing economies‟ debt; and lower global savings. The main issues here are to 
                                                          
36 The results of this paper confirm this crowding out effect since the fiscal deficit of advanced countries 
has a strong positive effect on emerging market interest rate spreads. 
37 Global savings refers to the aggregate national savings from industrial countries.  
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determine whether there is a direct impact of fiscal imbalances on investment flows to 
EMEs and, determine which has the greatest effect on investment between fiscal deficit 
and the stock of debt in rich countries?  
In addition to such questions, it is important to run estimations that can clearly identify 
the effect of public deficit (or debt) for each industrial country considered in order to 
avoid spurious coefficients. The idea is simply that, the impact of US budget deficit has 
little chance to be of similar size as German fiscal balance on capital flows to Singapore 
for instance. Therefore, if usual estimation methods are used (OLS for example) the 
underlying assumption will be that all fiscal deficits exert the same influence on investors‟ 
decisions. Of course, running such reasoning is quite risky since no theoretical analysis 
can confirm that. A possible answer to that issue would be to introduce elasticities or 
weights (a geometrical mean similar to a calculation of real effective exchange rate) on the 
calculation of total capital inflows for each developing country, then run normal 
regressions (e.g. OLS). But this procedure might introduce some bias since the choice or 
the calculation of such weight can be hazardous. The second possibility is to find a way 
that allows to include all data without any calculation of average. A suitable database and 
the relevant empirical method therefore become necessary. 
The CPIS database which is broken down by the economy of residence of the issuer of 
the securities, cross classified by type of security, offers a unique opportunity to address 
the issue of interactions between fiscal stance and capital flows. As it will be detailed later 
in this chapter, the gravity model is one of the most suitable methods to be used with 
such data. The gravity model gives the advantage of gathering a lot of information and 
helps to identify the bilateral fixed effect (these bilateral fixed effects consist mainly of 
country pair dummies). 
The main findings of this paper are that there is a negative and strong effect of industrial 
countries‟ fiscal deficits on capital flows to developing countries. Also all emerging 
markets face the same risk, i.e. countries that have previously defaulted on sovereign debt 
are not perceived as more risky than other countries in terms of probability of default. 
The results also confirm that external factors such as growth, returns rate in advanced 
economies are dominant in explaining capital outflows. Alongside these factors the level 
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of risk related to debt issued by emerging markets is the key “pull factor” (internal factor 
to emerging countries). Based on these results, it clearly emerges that the relationship 
between budget deficit and capital flows is not linear. Indeed above a threshold, the fiscal 
deficit has inverse effects on capital flows to EMEs denoting that despite the deficit, 
investors resume their transfers toward the developing world.  
In what follows, the concept of “developing countries” used here mainly refers to middle 
income (and upper middle incomes countries) rather than low income countries. Low 
income countries are not among the sample because data on portfolio investment are not 
available and these countries rarely request funds from the international (private) financial 
market. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the following section, some determinants 
of capital flows and an overview of the literature on the relationship between fiscal policy, 
interest rates and capital flows are presented. The third section presents the model and 
the theoretical background, whereas Section 4 shows the data used and the empirical 
results. Policy implications and recommendations are shared and discussed in the fifth 
section, and the last section concludes. 
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3.2 Capital Flows in Developing Countries: History & 
determinants 
3.2.1 After the first oil shock 
 
Recent history of capital flows to developing countries has been characterized by 
periods of large inflows followed by crisis. For each episode, surge in inflows followed by 
a crisis, various determinants and explanations of the burst have been advanced in the 
literature. The first end of capital inflow to developing countries was in 1982 with the 
debt crisis in Latin America. Indeed, things started after the first oil shock as governments 
of advanced countries decided that private financial intermediaries would be more 
efficient than governments at recycling investments from oil producers to developing 
countries. The private intermediaries of choice were large commercial banks chartered in 
industrial countries (Dooley 2000). So banks were recycling all these funds by lending 
massively to governments in developing countries. This came to an end when the US 
interest rate suddenly soared, increasing at the same time the debt burden of public 
sectors in South American countries. At the same period, the price of primary goods fell, 
especially oil, drying up a bit more funding possibilities for developing American 
economies. Consequently the capital flow stopped and private banks in US and elsewhere 
in the developed world were in turmoil. Latin American countries represented at that time 
a great opportunity to recycle the excess of “petro-dollars” in commercial banks of 
advanced countries. These funds, from international banks, were for the developing 
countries the opportunity to finance important needs in both private and public 
investment. Suddenly, in the early 1980s, the Federal Reserve (FED) started implementing 
a tight monetary policy in response to growing inflation in the US economy (this inflation 
was mainly caused by high oil prices following oil shocks in the 1970s and the Iranian 
revolution in 1979). Restrictions on the money supply growth rate caused interest rates to 
soar up. And debtors who signed for floating interest rates contracts saw their interest 
payments almost double. Meanwhile the prices of primary commodities went down; for 
instance after 1981 Iranian oil production resumed, deepening the debt crisis in 
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developing countries. As one might observe, the determinants of this capital inflow and 
the causes of the crisis were both external to EMEs. Consequently, when investment 
became more profitable in the US capital flew toward North America bringing a 
depreciation of developing countries‟ currencies and huge loss of international reserves 
(Agénor 1999). Cumulated with a growing inflation, the real exchange depreciated caused 
a currency crisis at the end.  
 
3.2.2 Capital inflows in the 1990s: internal and external causes 
Nearly ten years later, the developing countries experienced a new surge in capital 
inflow. However this new episode of investment flows is quite different from the 
previous one since the international environment and the characteristics of the inflows 
have changed. Indeed, during the 1970s, capital flows from commercial banks were 
almost exclusively in the form of lending to the public sector. This led to a debt crisis and 
default by some countries (for instance Mexico suspended its external debt repayment in 
August 1982), leaving countries with a large fiscal deficit and higher levels of inflation. In 
1989, following an agreement between Mexico and its external banks creditors based on 
the Brady plan38 (Buiter & al. 1989), a new episode of capital inflows started. The Brady 
plan asked highly indebted countries to implement structural reforms consisting mainly in 
serious programs of stabilization, market oriented structural reforms (e.g. privatization, 
capital account liberalization). For countries like Mexico, deep reforms were introduced. 
Indeed, the country switched to a heterodox approach to tackle the high level of inflation 
(implementation of nominal anchors, agreement between private and public sectors to 
freeze wages and prices). Furthermore, the financial sector was reformed. The reserves 
requirement was replaced by a 30% liquidity ratio, time controls on interest rates and 
maturities were abolished (Agénor 2008). A change in the legislation, in 1990, allowed full 
                                                          
38 In 1989 Nicholas Brady, US treasury secretary at that time proposed a plan aimed to help developing 
countries to come out of the debt crisis. The developing countries would implement substantial economic 
reforms. Commercial banks creditors should reduce their claims in exchange they would get credit 
enhancements. 16 countries implemented the Brady plan.  
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private ownership of banks. This reform in turn induced private capital (FDI and 
portfolio) inflows to resume.  
For Mexico and Thailand (later in 1997) these flows came to an end. The causes were 
quite similar. First, in both countries the initial conditions that created vulnerability and 
weakened them toward all external or internal shocks were already there. There was slow 
output growth during this period (1990-1997) cumulated with an over-appreciated 
exchange rate, a deterioration of the current account balance (despite public sector 
finance improvements) due to an excess of investment over savings. In order to fight 
inflation, Mexico for instance, implemented a tight monetary policy with higher domestic 
interest rates. This encouraged more speculative capital flows and worsened even more 
the current account deficit. At the same time, the country experienced slow economic 
growth due to a lack of demand induced by the real appreciation of the currency. The 
situation was similar in Thailand, where short term capital flows increased sharply from 
1990 causing inflation to rise, deteriorating the current account and appreciating the 
exchange rate. The conditions in the financial system were not better due to a 
misconceived liberalization. Demand for loans was sustained despite high real interest 
rates. This was due to the inflated assets used as collaterals by borrowers leaving financial 
institutions vulnerable to any downward adjustment of assets to inflation. Moreover both 
countries  tried to fight the overheating economies using only tight monetary policies, 
fiscal policy being inadequately inflexible.  
However as Agénor (2008) underlines it, despite all these vulnerabilities in emerging 
economies, in the absence of negative shocks, a crisis would have been avoidable (Agénor 
2008). As one will see later, the external shocks (which will be referred to later as the push 
factors) triggered the crisis. The US Federal Reserve (FED) during this period started 
changing its monetary policy, increasing Treasury bond yields. Therefore causing a risk-
adjustment by investors, who preferred to purchase US securities. For South-Asian 
countries the sudden appreciation of the US dollar against the Japanese Yen depressed 
exportation from these countries as their REER was appreciating against Japan, their 
main trade partner. Also economic conditions in Europe and Japan, with weak demand, 
contributed to precipitate the crisis. The manifestation of the crisis was through a 
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speculative attack on the EMEs currencies as they were overvalued and investors 
anticipating a nominal readjustment in the short term.  
These key points are intended to point out that despite internal unfavorable conditions; 
the triggering causes of the crisis were the situation in advanced markets (monetary policy 
in USA, Japan and West-Europe economic downturn). Once again, this fact highlights the 
relevance of “Pull factors” when one explains capital flow motivations.  
More recently in 2007, a major financial crisis hit the world economy. The condition and 
localization of this latter crisis are completely different from the previous one. This 
episode originated in the world leading economy and spread out to the real sector and 
outside US borders. The objective of this chapter is however not to discuss the financial 
crisis; our main issue being to identify the link between fiscal loosening in the developed 
world and capital flows to EMEs. From the previous crisis we have learnt that the rates of 
returns and economic conditions in advanced countries were the dominant factors driving 
capital investments. Using these stylized facts in this study will give a first intuition on the 
expected outcomes.  
 
3.3 Related Literature 
3.3.1 On the effects of fiscal variables on interest rates in 
industrial countries  
 
The “common wisdom” is that fiscal deficit and debt cause real interest rates to 
increase. Budget balance impacts on interest rates through two channels mainly: risk 
premium and crowding out effects. Gale & Orszag 2003, Barth & al. 1991, Cohen & 
Garnier 1991 found that public deficit has a positive effect on interest rates in developed 
countries. Gale & Orszag 2003 found, on the US economy, that each percent of projected 
future deficit raises interest rates by 40 to 70 basis points. Laubach 2003 using CBO and 
OMB39 projections found that a one percent increase in projected deficit raises forward 
                                                          
39 Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  
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long-term interest rates by 24 up to 40 basis points. Engen & Hubbard 2004 on their side 
have similar outcomes but with a smaller coefficient; according to them, a percentage 
increase in deficit raises interest rates by 12 basis points. This relative low coefficient, for 
some authors (e.g. Cohen & Garnier 1991), could be due to the VAR framework. For 
Cohen & Garnier 1991, studies that do not find an effect of deficit on interest rates are 
mainly those using VAR specification (e.g. Evans 1987, Plosser 1987). The bottom line of 
such methods is that VARs are based on a limited number of variables and this might 
induce certain analysts to ignore some information which is relevant for market 
participants.  
However this shortfall cannot be extended to all VAR specifications, for instance, when 
SVAR are used with the right constraints it gives interesting results (e.g. Dai & Philippon 
2004 found that a percent increase in deficit over GDP raises government yields – 10-year 
bond yields – by 41 basis points).  
All the studies cited above use the level of anticipated deficit to assess the impact of the 
state of fiscal accounts on the financial sector. For Feldstein (1986) it is inappropriate to 
use the current budget deficit since financial markets are forward looking. Therefore, 
expected deficit is more relevant. But other studies, using an “event analysis” try to assess 
the behaviour of financial markets when information on future government spending 
and/or deficit increases. Elmendorf (1996) found that immediately after the 
announcement of higher spending, financial markets expect higher deficit and debt and at 
the same time interest rates rise. On the same strain, Ardagna (2009) analyzed from an 
annual data set of 16 OECD countries from 1960-2002 the effect of changes in the fiscal 
stance on several financial variables including government and corporate bonds yields, on 
market stock prices and on LIBOR interest rate. His results show that, in a period of 
fiscal consolidation, government bond yields fall by 124 basis points and in a period of 
fiscal expansion, government bond yields rise by 164 basis points.  
A key issue is raised by Hauner & Kumar (2006): Did the main determinants of real 
interest rates change overtime? In other words, do we have new factors influencing 
interest rate instead of traditional determinants such as budget deficit, foreign interest 
rates, real money supply, inflation and expected return of investment? If the answer to 
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this question is affirmative, then one should expect only a very marginal effect of fiscal 
deficit in industrial countries on the financial sector especially on capital flows toward 
emerging markets. They noticed that despite large fiscal imbalance and public debt in G7 
countries, the long-term bond yields have remained at a low level. From 1960-2005, the 
interest rates were relatively low not because of a “new economy” of interest rate but 
rather the investment motives have changed a bit. Indeed investment in G7 countries 
(investment mainly in the form of reserves from emerging central banks) are not 
motivated by return rates but by insurance. The investors are willing to accept relative low 
returns from their capital in lieu of placing the money in safer “shelters”. These findings 
confirm that the traditional (or structural) determinants of interest rates still hold and 
what was observed during this period was just cyclical. Therefore one can expect that in 
an unusual period of huge fiscal turmoil the “traditional” determinants recover their 
importance.  
This survey underscores two facts. First, in advanced markets the fiscal deficit is a key 
determinant of the interest rate level. This is basically relevant to this paper since one of 
my hypotheses says that a channel through which fiscal deficit in industrial countries 
impacts on capital flows could be the global interest rate. Whichever one is considered, 
the current fiscal deficit or the expected fiscal deficit, the effects on interest rates are 
substantially identical. Second, since the main determinants of interest rates in Western 
Countries did not change overtime, I expect our fiscal variables (through some 
transmission channels) to influence the capital flows.  
 
 
3.3.2 Importance of external factors for capital flows toward 
EMEs.  
3.3.2.1 Relevance of Domestic or Pull Factors 
Investment in developing economies, whether FDI or portfolio flows, is determined 
by two sets of factors: internal or “pull factors” and external or “push factors”.  
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After the debt crisis in the late 1980s, EMEs engaged in deep structural reforms. Capital 
account was liberalized, deregulation of domestic financial markets (for instance reserve 
requirements were lowered and this encouraged financial intermediation) privatization 
and removing restriction on foreign investments were among the most important changes 
introduced. Almost all EMEs abandoned financial repression policies, and with the 
increasing integration of markets, these economies became a great opportunity for capital 
seeking higher returns. These reforms were followed by a relative long period of capital 
flows toward EMEs in South-Asia and Latin America (Fig3.1, Fig3.2).  
The internal conditions induced by reforms played an important role during this process 
of investment inflow. This result appears to be straightforward when one has a look at 
other developing countries that did not implement such reform and compare the amount 
of foreign investments between the two groups (Fig3.1). For instance in Fig3.1, low 
income countries received a minor share of international investments during the whole 
period (1980-2006).  
 
 
Fig3.1: Portfolio Bond Investment Flows across developing countries 
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Fig3.2: FDI inflows across regions 
 
 
 
3.3.2.2 The External or Push Factors 
If these factors are important in explaining capital flows to EMEs, then one can 
expect industrial countries‟ public finances to highly influence capital flows.  
One of the usual external factors cited in the literature is the risk-return characteristics on 
securities issued in developed economies. Indeed when interest rates are low in issuing 
countries, capital flies out seeking higher returns in emerging markets. For instance, when 
in the early 1990s the US changed its monetary policy and lowered interest rates to 
stimulate activity, such measure caused capital to run to EMEs where returns were higher.  
In addition, world interest rate can affect EMEs through other channels. Indeed lower 
interest rates discourage private savings in industrial countries and enhance private 
consumption. This will lead to higher exports from developing economies (as will be seen 
later in this chapter), which in turn improve the solvency of EMEs. For instance, the 
main channel through which the later financial crisis in advanced countries spread out in 
EMEs was the global demand. Indeed, after the subprime crisis, global demand shrunk 
and the exporting sectors in developing countries saw their activities severely sliced.  
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The 1990s also saw deep changes in financial institutions in advanced economies. The 
increasing role of pension and mutual funds, the development of securitization reinforced 
the diversification needs. Therefore, the portfolio investment in developing countries 
increased and became a wide funding source for these countries. 
 
3.3.3 Fiscal Issues and Capital Flows 
As said above, fiscal stance in advanced countries has an impact on their interest rates 
which in turn, intuitively one can say, have consequences on emerging market economies. 
The reason is that macroeconomic policies in industrial countries determine the global 
financial environment. Goldstein & Khan (1985) identify a first link which is through the 
procyclical nature of demand in industrial countries for goods produced in developing 
countries. Specifically, in good economic times, the demand in OECD countries for 
exports from EMEs is high but in periods of economic downturn their imports decrease. 
The corollary effect is lower prices of developing economies‟ exportations40 in bad times.  
Emerging economies are also dependent on the level of national savings in partner 
countries. As Frankel & Roubini (2001) emphasize it, capital flows toward EMEs is 
largely dependent on the balance of investments and savings in rich economies. Excess of 
savings in the developed world combined with profitable investment in EMEs create a 
flow of capital. Inversely when one of these two elements is missing, when return rates or 
savings are low, the capital flows dry out or worse this could result in capital outflow. For 
instanc,e some analysts link the unprecedented capital flows to developing countries 
during early 1990s with the US record high level of national savings.  
The exchange rate policies of Western countries play an important role in emerging 
countries‟ access to capital and more generally in their economic and financial stability. 
Developing countries are vulnerable to sudden variations and frequent fluctuations of 
                                                          
40 For instance Frankel & Roubini (2001) give the example of the recession among industrialized countries 
in 1980-82 that depressed prices and volumes for developing countries‟ exports and this led to the 
international debt crisis.  
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major currencies. Indeed Frankel & Roubini (2001) among others reminded us that one 
cause of the Asian crisis in 1997 was the sudden appreciation of the US dollar against the 
Yen. Since most of these countries were pegged to the dollar, when it appreciated they 
faced loss of competitiveness, loss of reserves and large current account deficits 
(therefore speculators attacked some EMEs currencies). 
On the whole, this section sheds light on a key argument: the economic state of emerging 
markets and their access to foreign investment is highly procyclical depending on 
macroeconomic cycles in Western countries. Output growth, interest rates and trade 
policies are the main factors discussed in the literature, however fiscal policy and 
especially fiscal balance deserve more attention in this context of global crisis.  
Actually the issue could be summarized by one question: how likely exit strategies (mainly 
fiscal stimulus) in advanced countries could deepen the crisis in EMEs by drying out 
investments?  
 
3.4 Theoretical Background and Modelling 
3.4.1 Theoretical motivations 
This section will review (even though main channels were discussed in previous 
sections, the following lines will be a summary) the channels of transmission through 
which fiscal policy in developed countries will impact on capital flows to the developing 
world. 
 
3.4.1.1 Possible channels 
Global saving: The first direct effect of large deficit is less availability of national 
saving in industrial countries (FigA.3.4). This fall is not only due to less public saving but 
also to a possible decline in private saving (Frankel & Roubini 2001). Therefore in these 
situations less capital will be available for investment in emerging economies.  
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Macroeconomic policies & return seeking: As already mentioned, external factors 
(“push factors”) are the most important factors in explaining investment in EMEs. 
Therefore, this kind of capital flow is very sensitive to macroeconomic conditions in 
source countries (advanced countries) and especially sensitive to profitability and risk. The 
level of interest rates, for instance low interest rates, in industrial countries can be the 
result of easing monetary policies and/or a consequence of some “unorthodox” fiscal 
policies. In any case, the effect will virtually be the same, but becomes worse when the 
cause is fiscal41. When interest rates increase in developed countries, savings remain in 
countries of origin where the profit is higher and the level of risk might increase in EMEs 
as well. 
Risk on Debt: High level of fiscal deficit in advanced economies (as said above) happens 
when the economy is decelerating (Fig3.3). This fact drags along two negative 
consequences for EMEs. First interest rates raise in developed countries and the effects 
have been discussed above. Second there might be a crisis of confidence on EMEs 
financial assets since investors believe that they are less able to repay loans. The reason is 
simply that most developing countries rely on export proceeds for debt repayments. 
When prices depress and interest rates go up, the investment return is believed not to be 
guaranteed (compare to US treasury bonds for example). 
These are, briefly presented, the channels of transmission underlying our analysis and 
framework. In what follows I will present the model and the data used to assess the 
hypothesis.  
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Since large fiscal deficit occurs in periods of global economic downturn, any reduction in capital flows 
creates severe financial and economic crisis in EMEs because of their vulnerability and dependence 
toward external capital.  
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Fig3.3: Fiscal deficit and Output gap in Major Advanced Economies42 
 
 
 
3.4.2 The gravity model of impact of fiscal imbalances in 
industrial countries on capital flows. 
 
Gravity model is “conventionally” used in issues like trade flows between countries 
and controlling for gravitational forces such as distance and weight. It is usually added to 
the specific factors of countries as well as bilateral factors to capture any trade resistance 
or incentive. In this analysis, the gravity model helps to explain the extent to which 
foreigners will hold financial assets (private and corporate bonds) issued by another 
country. As Portes & Rey 2005 underlined it, Gravity models can explain transaction in 
financial assets between economies at least as well as trade on goods. Trade in bonds like 
any other exchange of goods and services depends on three sets of factors; factors 
                                                          
42 Output gap is computed as the difference between current output and the potential output. Therefore 
this diagram tells that in a period of higher deficit the output gap widens (becomes “more negative”).  
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specific to the destination country, factors unique to source countries and a set of factors 
common and shared between (financial) partners. Usually the decision to buy bonds 
issued by a country is made according to some characteristics of the issuer country like 
the size (which can be captured by the population or the GDP), the soundness of 
macroeconomic policies, political environment, etc. On the other hand, the size and the 
economic conditions in the source country (purchaser) are key determinants in the 
decision to invest abroad or not. For instance the return rates in the source country are 
one of the most important elements in the decision to buy EME bonds, as previously 
said. Additional to this Ghosh & Wolf (2000) argue that geography also matters in 
explaining financial flows. Ghosh & Wolf (2000) found that distance between countries, 
common language, shared borders or not, are some of the geographical variables that 
could influence the flows of capital.  
However, in my estimations I do not expect that these geographical variables to play an 
important role. Since the 1990s (period considered by Ghosh & Wolf 2000) many things 
have changed and technology and computing facilities have improved a lot. Therefore 
physical distance, sharing a border or not, same language or not seems to be obsolete 
concepts while studying decision making in the financial market. Nevertheless distance 
can still be relevant. Indeed an investor can feel more comfortable to invest in a relatively 
near market. Therefore these geographic variables will be considered in this analysis for 
robustness purposes.  
Moreover the gravity model is a suitable way to avoid the loss of information. Indeed, if I 
would have used normal aggregate data for this study I would be computing the mean of 
industrial countries series at least for fiscal deficit variables. This poses the problem of the 
robustness of any findings since we aggregate deficit from different countries with 
different economic size and different influence on a given emerging country. For instance 
if we consider Argentina and look at the impact on capital inflows of deficit of all G7 
countries, one will consider that US and France have exactly the same impact on 
Argentina. Theoretically this argument is weak and hard to defend.  
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3.4.3 The Data: The Coordinate Portfolio Investment Survey 
The Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) database is an IMF survey on 
capital flows for 75 countries, both developing and advanced economies, which offers a 
great opportunity to access data on bilateral capital flows. Many series in CPIS data have 
been available since 2001 (only some data is also available from 1997). For each country, 
it provides information on individual economy year-end holdings of portfolio investments 
and debt securities valued at market prices cross classified by the country issuing the 
securities43 . From that point, I re-managed the data in order to make it suitable to the 
actual issue in this paper.  Indeed, I only consider the capital flow in one way, which is, 
securities issued by EMEs and sold in industrial countries. The rest of the data 
management consists in matching countries and identifying economies for which any data 
is recorded. 
Later in the analysis, the total debt securities will be the variable of interest. It is the total 
of long term and short term debt securities. The database considering exchange of bonds 
in one direction only, issued by EMEs and sold to foreign investors, is partly justified by 
this fact. Indeed due to poor availability of short term debt security issued by industrial 
countries and bought by investors in EMEs, this variable could not be implemented for 
capital outflows towards developed markets. The other main reason is related to the 
rationale of the analysis in this chapter which focuses on the fiscal influence of developed 
countries on portfolio investments to EMEs.  
The CPIS has already been used in previous studies as in Eichengreen & 
Luengnaruemitchai (2006). These authors were mainly interested in assessing and 
comparing financial integration between different regions (East Asia, Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe and Latin America), and used the CPIS database on a gravity model.  
Despite an increasing use of the CPIS database some limits still remain in it. Indeed, some 
information such as Central Bank reserves are not recorded (countries refusing to release 
such sensitive data). Also, important countries, in terms of large portfolio holdings, like 
                                                          
43 Details on CPIS database are free of charge and available online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm 
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China, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates did not participate in the survey. 
Therefore, this might undermine some results especially those comparing financial 
development between countries or regions. Finally, the database does not record 
corporate and government bonds separately, it only reports the sum of both bonds. 
Regarding this study, these inconveniences are not expected to influence the results. The 
missing countries (China, Saudi, UAE) will definitely cause a loss of information but will 
not change the impact fiscal deficit might have on capital flows. This is simply due to the 
fact that what drives investment in Hong-Kong might not be far from the motives of 
portfolio holdings in Singapore. Additional to that, the CPIS covers interesting periods. 
For instance this period considers the sovereign default of Argentina and the Turkish 
financial crisis. Also, the end of 2003 was characterized by low global interest rates and an 
increase in cross border investment (Fig A.3.5). 
 
3.4.4 The estimation Method: a panel Gravity Model 
3.4.4.1 The theoretical background and discussion on gravity 
modelling 
 
The gravity equation was first developed by Anderson (1979). The main idea is after 
controlling for size and distance, trade between two regions is decreasing in their bilateral 
trade barriers relative to the average barrier to trade between the two regions (considered) 
and their other partners. Namely trade between two regions will increase the more 
important are barriers between a country and the rest of its partners. This is idea is namely 
the “multilateral trade barrier” developed by Anderson 1979; Anderson & Wincoop 
(2003)44 in response to McCallum‟s (1995) (biased) equation and unexplainable findings. 
Indeed, McCallum (1995) found that the US-Canadian border caused an increase in 
Canadian inter-provinces trade while the change in inter-American State trade was 
                                                          
44 In the full version of this paper the Anderson & Wincoop (2003) model is presented and compared to 
McCallum.  
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relatively insignificant45. This was considered as one of the most challenging puzzles in 
open macroeconomics (Obstfelt & Rogoff 2000). To address this issue Anderson & 
Wincoop (2003), Adams & Cobham (2007) used the same model as McCallum 
augmented with some multilateral resistance variables. These multilateral resistance 
variables are meant to capture the impact of barriers between a country and other trade 
partners (different from the main partner considered). Also these authors consider that 
results from studies, like McCallum (1995), which do not take this concept of multilateral 
resistance into account, as suffering from biased coefficients due to omitted variables. 
This limit to previous studies on gravity equations does not seem to affect that much the 
estimation results. Anderson & Wincoop (2003) found almost the same results as 
McCallum, the only difference being the size of the coefficient (McCallum‟s coefficient 
being higher). When they introduce the multilateral resistance, which is the trade barriers 
across all countries, a response to the puzzle is provided. Indeed the trade between 
Canadian provinces is a increasing factor with border with the USA since these provinces 
are less integrated to the world trade. On the other hand, US states are more integrated to 
the world economy so when trade with Canada decreases, the inter-state trade does not 
follow this trend. This is simply due to the fact that their exchange with the rest of the 
world is not affected.  
However while these analyses are relevant regarding exchange of goods where one has 
imports and exports, our study seems to be closer to the McCallum modelling. Our 
analysis focuses on bond sales by EMEs and purchased by investors in advanced 
countries. Therefore investment on financial assets has only two alternatives, EMEs 
bonds or industrial countries bonds46. These two possibilities are captured by the interest 
rate effect on capital flow and other control variables I include. Also, since financial 
integration between developing countries is relatively weak (Eichengreen, 
                                                          
45 Trade between Canadian provinces was a factor 22 (2,200%) times trade between US states and 
Canadian provinces; while Anderson & Wincoop have a factor of approximatively 16 times.  
46 Regarding the latest financial crisis, another possibility has emerged which is deleveraging. The onset of 
the crisis has caused a capital outflow from EMEs even though the yields in advanced economies were 
still low. This capital outflow was mainly motivated by deleveraging since investors and banks needed to 
clean up their balance sheets.  
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Luengnaruemitchai 2006), considering the multilateral resistance to trade on bonds may 
be irrelevant in this analysis. If Ohmae‟s (1990) assessment, arguing that distance and 
borders have ended in the world trade, was almost unanimously rejected; for trade on 
financial and derivate assets this could come true.  
 
McCallum‟s equation:  
ij i j ij ij ijx a by cy ddist eDUMMY u        
ijx  is the logarithm of goods shipments from region i to j, iy  and jy  are the GDP in 
regions i and j, ijdist  the distance between i and j and ijDUMMY  a dummy variable 
equals to 1 for inter-provincial trade and 0 for province-to-state trade. McCallum‟s data 
consist in imports and exports for each pair of Canadian province (10 provinces) and 
exchanges between the 10 Canadian provinces and the 50 US states. While after 
adjustment they have quite a good sample coverage (683 observations), their estimation 
may suffer from missing variables (this criticism can also be directed at Anderson & 
Wincoop). Including solely the GDP as a control variable is not enough since other 
variables, such as current account position and inflation can affect trade and GDP as well.  
In our analysis, I address this issue by augmenting the McCallum model in two ways. First 
I introduce relevant control variables for each group of countries and second I consider 
bilateral fixed effects. The latter captures the common invariable effect between purchaser 
country and issuer country. Namely it introduces a country pair dummy.  
 
3.4.4.2 Data and Series in the model 
The data base is built in order to have series on industrial countries and on EMEs 
simultaneously. For each of the 25 developing countries in the database there are 18 
financial partners.  
(1) 
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Total debt securities, the dependant variable, indicates the flow of portfolio investment 
between EMEs and industrial countries. It is the total number of public or private 
corporation or government agency bonds issued by developing countries and purchased 
by a given investor47 resident48 in one of the 18 developed countries. This variable 
includes both short-term (original maturity of over one year) and long term (original 
maturity of one year or less) debt securities.  
Alongside the dependent variable, the main interest is on fiscal series. Two fiscal 
variables, fiscal deficit in both EMEs and advanced economies and public debt for both 
set of countries, will be used in the estimations.  
For Fiscal deficit in industrial countries, the overall deficit is used. In this analysis, this measure 
seems to be more suitable, since for instance the use of structural deficit would be 
irrelevant. Indeed if the structural deficit was used, one would purge the effects of cyclical 
situation of the real economy on the public budget. Statistics on this budget deficit (in 
percent of GDP) is presented in Table 3.1. During the period from 2001 to 2007, fiscal 
deficit seems reasonable (compared to the situation after the onset of the financial crisis 
in the autumn of 2008), with the notable exception of Japan, which had a deficit of 8% of 
GDP in 2002 and 2003 (Fig A.3.6). The definition is identical for fiscal deficit in EMEs.  
The weak performances in terms of output growth especially in 2003 for some countries 
confirm what was said earlier in this chapter concerning low global interest rates and 
capital inflow in developing countries. Indeed in 2003, Germany, Italy and Switzerland 
run poor growth performance (Ragacs & Schneider, 2007)49.  
                                                          
47 The holder of a security may be a government entity, a public or private corporation (including a 
financial institution), a quasi-corporation (including a financial institution), an enterprise as defined in 
SNA, a nonprofit institution serving households (NPISH), or an individual. 
 
48 For the CPIS, the residence of individuals that hold securities is established by their center of economic 
interest, as interpreted by the 1993 SNA. This is determined by the location of their principal residence (as 
a member of a household) or by their employment status. An individual who is employed for one year or 
more in a country is deemed to be resident in that country. 
 
49 This underperformance was due to cyclical effects such as increase in unemployment while investment 
and exports stagnated and a restrictive fiscal policy (Ragacs & Schneider 2007). 
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Returns on treasury papers in advanced economies remained relatively stable during this 
period, only Japan did run yields lower than 2 percent during the whole period.  
Government debt shows important disparities among industrial countries, if we consider 
European Monetary Union member countries for which the Stability and Growth Pact 
can be used as a benchmark. Indeed only Italy and Belgium have remained above the limit 
for public debt of 60 percent of GDP all throughout the period. France and Germany 
(and other countries) managed quite well their level of debt until 2005 when they slightly 
reached the 60% limit (Fig A.3.7). 
 
The early 2000s saw good economic performance for major EMEs. However, the weak 
output growth performance between 2000 and 2002 was due to the crisis for some 
developing countries (e.g. Argentina, Turkey, and Singapore).  
The indebtedness of developing countries is captured in the variable “external debt”. 
External debt, as it indicates, is the total outstanding debt other than bonds owed by the 
public sector to non-resident creditors. This variable, alongside the fiscal deficit, captures 
the dynamic of past behaviour of the public sector. The highest level of debt was for 
Argentina (as well as Uruguay and Lebanon) between 2002 and 2005 probably a 
consequence of the late 1990s‟ financial crisis. A higher level of public debt might be 
considered by investors as an indicator of future fiscal turmoil and therefore lowers the 
confidence on repayment capabilities.  
Summary statistics on Stock market index clearly demonstrates that investing in developing 
countries has been highly profitable. Table 3.2 details the statistics on other relevant 
variables.  
Later in this chapter, one will investigate if the industrial countries‟ government net debt has 
the same impact on capital flows as budget deficit. The matter will be to determine the 
impact of the “stock of deficit” on portfolio investment abroad. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Industrial Countries 
 
 
FISCAL_DEFICIT 
 
CURRENT_ACCOUNT 
 
GDP 
 
GDP_GROWTH 
 
GOV_DEBT 
 
GOV. BOND 
YIELD 
 
 Mean -0.002351  0.024699  1623.501  2.525058  0.598006  4.200928 
 Median  0.001253  0.021119  440.4587  2.502810  0.549490  4.291273 
 Maximum  0.080327  0.172325  13807.55  6.579860  1.916415  6.327500 
 Minimum -0.184824 -0.100794  20.21628 -0.217425  0.060525  1.011667 
 Std. Dev.  0.042598  0.058634  2736.973  1.422092  0.374929  1.032172 
       
 Sum -0.296280  3.112042  204561.2  318.1574  75.34870  529.3169 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.226828  0.429746  9.36E+08  252.7932  17.57145  133.1723 
       
 Observations  126  126  126  126  126  126 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for EMEs 
 STOCK_INDEX OVERALL_DEFICIT_GDP 
OVERALL_DEFI
CIT2 
GOV_EXPEN_G
DP GDP_GROWTH 
EXTERNAL_DEBT_GD
P CURR_ACCOUNT_GDP CREDIT_SWAP 
 Mean  11521.27  0.023484  3.886170  0.295254  3.956872  0.389131  0.012644  136.9722 
 Median  8113.430  0.020982  2.722493  0.292416  4.115649  0.358751  0.003332  70.00000 
 Maximum  63465.54  0.212470  56.79870  0.519237  16.23571  1.420028  0.259092  613.3000 
 Minimum  295.3900 -0.090518 -87.76098  0.006698 -11.76508  0.000000 -0.193426  6.700000 
 Std. Dev.  14491.75  0.049609  17.30833  0.109493  3.913747  0.287610  0.070549  144.4032 
         
 Sum  322595.5  4.109613  680.0798  51.66938  692.4526  68.09786  2.212720  10820.80 
         
 Observations  28  175  175  175  175  175  175  79 
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3.4.4.3 Estimations 
1 2ln( )ijt jt it ijt ijtbond EME Indust Gravity        
 
Where i denotes the source country of capital and j the host country (the bond 
seller) and t the time going from 2001 to 200750. 
  represents the vector of fixed effects. In this analysis, I will be using host country 
fixed effects and bilateral fixed effects, i.e. the common fixed effects between source and 
destination countries. The results presented are those obtained with bilateral fixed effects. 
jtEME  is the vector of host country specific explanatory variables and itIndust  the 
source country specific explanatory variables. ijtGravity  is the vector of gravity variables 
which are variables of control, common to emerging and industrial countries. In our 
estimations I include a dummy for common language and the logarithm of the distance 
between countries. However I expect these variables not to be statistically significant as is 
the case for trade in physical goods; here the transfers are mainly immaterial. ijt is the 
error term which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (Eichengreen 
& Luengnaruemitchai, 2006).  
The full set of variables and some elements of descriptive statistics are presented in the 
Annexes.  
 
 
                                                          
50 This period was chosen because the CPIS database runs from 2001 to 2007.  
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3.5 The Baseline Results 
3.5.1 The effect of fiscal Deficit 
The period of estimation runs from 2001 to 2007. The database includes 25 emerging 
countries and each country has 18 financial partners (industrial countries). Therefore, the 
total number of observations will be equal to 3150 observations.  
Presented below are the results with both bilateral fixed effects and industrial countries 
fixed effects. It can be observed that estimations using industrial countries‟ fixed effects 
(excluding the other common elements between industrial countries and EMEs) give less 
robust results due probably to the exclusion of some information when one controls for 
fixed effects only for a set of countries.  
On our first set of estimations, I run regressions for the same set of variables using 
Industrial fixed effects and bilateral fixed effects. Table 3.3 presents the result from a 
pooled OLS estimation, which shows a good behaviour of gravity variables and country 
sizes. From column 1, one can notice that distance between countries enters negatively 
consistent with the information-cost hypothesis. However, the language dummy does not 
appear to be determinant in bond issuing and purchasing, since “English” has become the 
main communication tool in financial markets. Once the bilateral fixed effects are 
considered, of course, we are obliged to drop country pair variables that do not vary over 
time. Therefore Table 3.3 column-2 confirms that both deficits impact negatively on 
portfolio capital flows to EMEs with quite a large coefficient.  
As said earlier, considering only source country‟s fixed effects induces a loss of 
information due to the fact conditions in both countries are relevant for investors. 
Therefore, when other control variables are introduced, the model (with Indus FE only) 
becomes less robust due to some loss of degree of freedom.  
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Table 3.3: The Effects of Fiscal Deficit in Industrial Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Indus FE51 Bilateral FE Indus FE Bilateral FE 
     
overall_deficit_gdp -3.209*** -4.340*** -1.276 -3.141*** 
 (1.046) (0.635) (1.056) (0.624) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -4.119*** -5.725*** -4.452*** -3.416*** 
 (0.394) (0.446) (0.419) (0.493) 
Distance -0.623***  -0.686***  
 (0.0526)  (0.0536)  
Language 0.0917  0.0653  
 (0.0643)  (0.0634)  
GDP_growth   0.178*** 0.146*** 
   (0.0213) (0.0127) 
gdp_growth_2    0.0311*** 0.00630* 
   (0.00530) (0.00348) 
Constant 1.467*** -0.831*** 1.394*** -1.265*** 
 (0.201) (0.0137) (0.216) (0.0381) 
     
Observations 2482 2482 2482 2482 
R-squared 0.079 0.108 0.110 0.169 
Number of indus_id 18  18  
Number of bilateral_id  419  419 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
                                                          
51 Indus FE= industrial countries fixed effects. Bilateral FE= fixed effects for both industrial and EMEs.  
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When one takes into consideration, in the estimations, the country‟s size and economic 
dynamism approximated by GDP growth, the results show that economic growth (or 
“economic health”) in industrial countries seems to be more important (Table 3.3 
Column-4). Indeed the GDP growth for advanced economies comes with a positive and 
strongly significant coefficient as is the case for growth in EMEs with a coefficient 
statistically significant at only 10%. Fiscal deficit for developed countries still impacts 
negatively on capital flows to EMEs.  
Up to this point, the results have confirmed the importance of “push factors” since both 
economic growth and fiscal stances in industrial countries remain important determinants 
for capital flows (more than GDP growth for EMEs).  
Fiscal deficits in both industrial and emerging countries have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on debt securities. These coefficients remain stable in all our estimations 
especially for the fiscal deficit of advanced economies. When one controls for other 
effects, western countries‟ fiscal variables remain significant while those of developing 
countries lose their significance. For instance, when the external debt level of developing 
countries is considered, their fiscal deficit and debt still influence bonds trade. But as soon 
as the stock market index is considered, EMEs fiscal balance is no more relevant. The 
main assumption underlying this statement is the fact that, developing countries follow 
the business cycles of western countries (Agénor & Dermott, 2000). However it seems, 
according to the recent developments in the international financial market, that there is a 
new paradigm. Indeed, how could we interpret that capital flows to EMEs have resumed 
(from late 2009) despite huge debt needs in some developed countries such as those part 
of the Euro area? This question will be addressed further in this paper. The credit default 
swap (CDS) also has a negative effect on bond purchasing and EMEs fiscal deficit losses 
its significance. 
The output growth, Table 3.4 column-1 & column-2, captures the general state of the 
economy; confirms the hypothesis that the strongest positive effect on capital flow is 
exerted by the GDP growth in industrial countries (consistent with Frankel & Roubini 
2001).  
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Bilateral FE Bilateral FE Bilateral FE 
    
overall_deficit_gdp -3.352*** -3.543*** -2.572** 
 (0.745) (0.746) (1.030) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -2.756*** -2.561*** 1.051 
 (0.556) (0.557) (0.838) 
Distance    
    
Language Dummy    
    
GDP_growth 0.145*** 0.163*** 0.00647 
 (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0241) 
gdp_growth_2 0.00480 0.00468  
 (0.00381) (0.00379)  
external_debt_2_gdp -0.243** -0.195* -0.177 
 (0.109) (0.111) (0.119) 
current_acc_indus_gdp  -3.237*** -0.273 
  (0.682) (0.924) 
curr_account_2_gdp  0.187  
  (0.441)  
govt_bond_yield   -0.137*** 
   (0.0416) 
log_stock_index_eme   0.270*** 
   (0.0876) 
Constant -1.216*** -1.218*** -1.072** 
 (0.0686) (0.0682) (0.425) 
    
Observations 2044 2044 419 
R-squared 0.164 0.175 0.189 
Number of bilateral_id 349 349 71 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.4: The Effects of Fiscal Deficit in Industrial Countries 
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Table 3.5: The Effects of Fiscal Deficit in Industrial Countries 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES log_debt_security_2 log_debt_security_2 
   
overall_deficit_gdp -5.689*** -2.317** 
 (1.246) (1.048) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -1.205 0.282 
 (1.039) (1.027) 
Distance   
   
Language   
   
GDP_growth 0.0206 0.00264 
 (0.0229) (0.0243) 
gdp_growth_2 0.00668 -0.00909 
 (0.00939) (0.00703) 
external_debt_2_gdp -0.0392 -0.153 
 (0.202) (0.121) 
current_acc_indus_gdp -3.336*** -0.179 
 (1.080) (0.926) 
curr_account_2_gdp -0.552  
 (0.620)  
govt_bond_yield -0.00300 -0.138*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0416) 
a5_year_cds -0.000855**  
 (0.000397)  
log_stock_index_eme  0.324*** 
  (0.0971) 
Constant -0.664*** -1.238*** 
 (0.164) (0.444) 
   
Observations 960 419 
R-squared 0.101 0.193 
Number of bilateral_id 282 71 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Indeed during good times in Western countries, investors are more confident and 
developing countries receive more capital flows.  
When I consider now the level of external debt (Table 3.4, column-1), the results are 
consistent with those of Baldacci & al. 2008. The higher the external debt (in percent of 
GDP), the less attractive the bonds of developing economies, since the risk of default or 
debt rescheduling increases.  
The current account deficit in source countries comes with a negative sign as expected. 
Since capital outflow in industrial countries improve the current account balance.  
The results also confirm the high importance of “push factors” for capital inflows to 
EMEs. A high level of stock market index in EMEs (Table 3.4 column-3) encourages 
capital inflow motivated by return from investments. But when the rate of return is higher 
in industrial countries (government bond yield on Table 3.4 column-3) investments in 
developing countries diminish, as investors prefer source country bonds.  
The interesting thing is that when some control variables are introduced in the 
estimations, the fiscal deficit and the output growth in EMEs are no longer significant. 
Actually this highlights the fact that the decision to purchase bonds issued by EMEs is 
made (almost) solely based on the relative profitability of this investment. When the stock 
market index and government bond yields are considered, EMEs variables become less 
important in explaining capital flows (Table 3.4 Column-3). The level of risk on EMEs 
bonds (approximated by the 5-year Credit Default Swap (CDS), as expected, has a 
negative impact on portfolio investment in developing economies (Table 3.5 Column-1). 
Moreover when the 5-year CDS is introduced, the negative impact of fiscal deficit in 
industrial countries is greater and all other control variables (such as GDP growth in both 
sets of countries) become statistically insignificant. Thus, this confirms the assumption 
that large deficits in advanced countries always cause financial risks to increase in 
developing countries.  
Summing up all the previous findings, one can reasonably say that the effect of fiscal 
deficit in industrial countries on capital flows to EMEs is strongly negative. Table A.3.8 
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presents in greater detail, this impact on each developing country if you choose a marginal 
impact of 4 and 952.  
In the following section, the investigation will answer the question of whether the stock 
of debt in advanced economies has the same impact as their fiscal deficit on portfolio 
investment.  
 
3.5.2 The effects of Public Debt  
Following the previous analysis, we estimate here the effect of industrial countries‟ 
government debt on bond purchases. This will allow us to see whether investors are also 
sensitive to the stock of public deficit. Indeed, if capital owners adjust their investment 
according to the level of debt, this would mean that they assess the sustainability of the 
source country‟s current fiscal policy. Once this policy is considered unsustainable53 
(meaning that if the government keeps pursuing the current policy they will not be able to 
repay the debt and a restrictive fiscal policy will be unavoidable), portfolio investments are 
reduced or capital is withdrawn from developing countries since a worsening of the 
situation is expected (countercyclicality argument). This is simply due to the argument 
developed earlier that when governments of western countries have higher capital needs 
this creates a crowding-out effect in developing economies. 
 
                                                          
52 Indicative marginal effects.  
53 Several methods allow assessing the sustainability of the fiscal policy among which one can cite the 
Solvency Condition. The solvency condition states that the public sector is solvent if the present 
discounted value of government current and future spending is at least equal or lower than the present 
discounted value of government current and future path income net of any initial indebtness. Another 
method would be to look at the gap between real interest rate and real growth rate, if the latter is greater 
public debt therefore needs to be stabilized.  
Chap3: Impact of Large Fiscal Imbalance in Advanced Countries on Developing Countries 
119 
 
3.5.2.1 The Results 
Table 3.6 presents the results from both the invariable characteristics and bilateral 
fixed effects of industrial countries. The first fact that comes out of these sets of 
estimation is that advanced countries‟ government debt is statistically significant only 
when Bilateral fixed effects are used. Therefore, even if both results are presented, the 
focus will be on outcomes from estimations using bilateral fixed effects.  
Table-3.6 Column-1 shows roughly the main results when only industrial countries‟ fixed 
effects are considered. Compared to Column-2, the results are similar except for the 
variable of interest (government debt). First the gravity variables, distance and language 
dummy, behave quite well with distance between countries impacting negatively on capital 
flows (same as in previous results). Higher government net debt, therefore higher 
borrowing needs, crowds out portfolio investment in developing countries. Developing 
countries‟ external debt, as previously indicated and consistent with Baldacci & al. 2008, 
still discourage capital inflows.  
Since the stock of debt is considered as an indicator of the sustainability of the fiscal 
policies of industrial countries, it becomes reasonable for “push factors” to be more 
visible. Indeed when there is any risk in investing in EMEs (due to fiscal turmoil in 
advanced economies), all other EME variables might not be relevant for investors while 
making their decision. For instance, in all estimations, GDP growth in developing 
economies is not statistically significant (Table-3.6 Column-2).  
The remaining tables show a normal sign for current account deficit in industrial 
countries. Table-3.8 Column-2 underlines an important result consistent with previous 
findings. Indeed as soon as the level of risk is included, captured by the CDS, one 
observes a direct outflow of capital without any consideration to the rates of return. This 
result suggests that even if returns on bonds in industrial countries are low and/or stock 
market index in EMEs is high, as soon as the level of risk increases capital will flee toward 
safer shelters in developed economies. 
Based on this set of estimations using developed economies‟ net public debt as a variable 
of interest, it appears that the effects on capital flows are similar to the effects of fiscal 
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deficit. This similarity is not surprising since both variables (fiscal deficit and public debt) 
indicate the wellbeing of the real economy in industrial countries.  
The next section will be the place to undertake some robustness check and further 
investigation. 
 
 
Table 3.6: Effects of Industrial Countries’ government net debt 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Indus FE Bilateral FE 
   
log_gov_debt -0.208 -0.262** 
 (0.189) (0.105) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -3.272*** -2.697*** 
 (0.564) (0.567) 
Distance -0.553***  
 (0.0788)  
Language 0.0333  
 (0.0773)  
external_debt_2_gdp -0.538*** -0.289*** 
 (0.0928) (0.110) 
GDP_growth 0.163*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0162) 
gdp_growth_2 -0.0314*** 0.00195 
 (0.00617) (0.00385) 
Constant 1.756*** -0.411 
 (0.633) (0.313) 
   
Observations 1732 1732 
R-squared 0.093 0.145 
Number of indus_id 15  
Number of bilateral_id  295 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Chap3: Impact of Large Fiscal Imbalance in Advanced Countries on Developing Countries 
121 
 
Table3.7: Effects of industrial countries’ government net debt 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Indus FE Bilateral FE 
   
log_gov_debt -0.226 -0.210** 
 (0.191) (0.105) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -2.492*** -2.538*** 
 (0.550) (0.538) 
Distance -0.436***  
 (0.0767)  
Language 0.0175  
 (0.0785)  
external_debt_2_gdp -0.569*** -0.224** 
 (0.0939) (0.112) 
GDP_growth 0.128*** 0.160*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0161) 
current_acc_indus_gdp -2.105 -3.407*** 
 (1.287) (0.717) 
curr_account_2_gdp -0.871** -0.137 
 (0.418) (0.450) 
Constant 1.340** -0.594* 
 (0.635) (0.313) 
   
Observations 1732 1732 
R-squared 0.083 0.158 
Number of indus_id 15  
Number of bilateral_id  295 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8: Effects of industrial countries’ government net debt 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Indus FE Bilateral FE 
   
log_gov_debt -0.159 -0.332* 
 (0.191) (0.183) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -2.128*** 0.679 
 (0.559) (1.881) 
external_debt_2_gdp -0.557*** -0.400** 
 (0.0936) (0.172) 
GDP_growth 0.108*** 0.0604** 
 (0.0279) (0.0257) 
gdp_growth_2  -0.0438 
  (0.0351) 
current_acc_indus_gdp -2.006 0.978 
 (1.283) (1.313) 
curr_account_2_gdp -0.842** 2.752 
 (0.416) (3.521) 
govt_bond_yield -0.165*** -0.0833 
 (0.0486) (0.0555) 
stock_index_eme  -5.65e-06 
  (3.56e-06) 
5_year_cds  -0.000413** 
  (0.000181) 
distance -0.430***  
 (0.0765)  
language 7.64e-05  
 (0.0784)  
Constant 1.829*** 0.926 
 (0.649) (0.561) 
   
Observations 1732 195 
R-squared 0.089 0.127 
Number of indus_id 15  
Number of bilateral_id  52 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.6 Further Analysis and some Robustness check 
First a robustness check is implemented on the baseline estimation using the 
Heckman selectivity correction. The results (Table A.3.5) show the countries selected are 
those with the highest output growth (advanced and emerging economies as well), and 
EMEs in the sample seem to have better current account positions. Despite these 
possible biases the results remain strongly similar to the baseline estimation outputs.  
 
3.6.1 Countries with previous default 
The last century and the early years of the 21st have seen the debt burden of some 
countries reaching unsustainable and unaffordable levels. Markets anticipated a default 
and in most situations this prediction came true due to speculative attacks and higher 
premiums requested. One can make the hypothesis that not all EMEs face the same level 
of risk and for some, particularly developing countries in periods of global economic 
crisis, the effect of fiscal deficit in developed countries is not the same for them. The 
countries that have defaulted in the past (or recently) might be perceived as more risky 
than other developing countries. If this argument is relevant, the industrial countries‟ 
fiscal deficit combined with the default dummy variable should have an important 
influence on bonds trade. Therefore to capture this fact, I construct a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for countries that have defaulted54 at least once in the past and 0 otherwise, 
then this variable is introduced multiplicatively with fiscal deficit in advanced countries to 
see if there is a special treatment for these countries. When introduced (TableA.3.2), this 
variable becomes non-significant and leaves previous results perfectly stable. It appears 
that the effect of a fiscal stance in advanced countries is not discriminative with regard to 
                                                          
54 According to Moody‟s data base, sovereign default was recorded 12 times in the recent period, 
from 1983 to 2007. Exactly 11 countries were concerned with Ukraine defaulting during two different 
periods. These countries are: Venezuela (07/1998), Russia (08/1998), Ukraine (09/1998), Pakistan 
(07/1999), Ecuador (08/1999), Ukraine (01/2000), Peru (09/2000), Argentina (11/2001), Moldova 
(06/2002), Uruguay (05/2003), Dominican Republic (04/2005), Belize (12/2006).  
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a previous sovereign default on external debt; investors award the same level of risk to all 
countries in our sample.  
 
3.6.2 Episodes of large fiscal deficit in advanced economies 
One should distinguish between a normal situation and an episode of “severe” fiscal 
imbalances. Indeed the results available until now could be qualified as being in line with a 
general rule but one can ask what should be the case during periods of unusually high 
deficit? To do so, episodes of large fiscal deficit were defined as periods during which the 
overall deficit for a country is above the mean plus one standard deviation. We construct 
a dummy variable to capture this fact (equal to 1 if the deficit is higher than the mean plus 
one standard deviation). Then, the latter variable is interacted with the fiscal deficit in 
advanced countries. However the interactive term (fiscal deficit*dummy) is not 
statistically significant. The reason for this curious result could be that very few 
observations correspond to this definition of high deficit. Indeed the period 2001-2007 
was mainly characterized by fiscal soundness in industrial countries (no major fiscal shock 
was noticed in the data). But the overall deficit in advanced countries coefficient, still 
statistically very significant, goes up. Even if the interactive term is not significant, the 
high coefficient of fiscal deficit shows us that it has a particular impact during episodes of 
large deficit. This coefficient might suggest that when there is a change in the fiscal policy 
path, namely a period of severe crisis, (for instance an expansive fiscal policy) the quantity 
of investments drying out increases.  
 
3.6.3 Testing for non-linear effects and further analysis 
Here I will be testing for changes in the effect of industrial countries‟ fiscal deficit 
(and debt) on bonds sale. Namely, can “extreme” level of deficit lead to a race toward 
developing countries‟ financial assets? A positive answer to this question could be the sign 
of the birth of a new period.  
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When I introduce the square of the advanced countries fiscal deficit, this coefficient 
comes positive and statistically significant. This means that above a certain limit, fiscal 
deficit in industrial countries reaches a level believed by investors as unsustainable. 
Therefore for bond holders a sovereign default by developed western government is no 
longer an unthinkable scenario (TableA.3.4). This would mean that at a certain point, the 
old rules of fixed income world are being outdated. Indeed, until recently developing 
countries‟ debt was viewed as too risky compared for instance to western European 
assets. A key question one could ask is whether this theoretical result is consistent with 
the actual situation in the world economy? Indeed the recent fiscal turmoil in the 
developed world confirms this result in a quite eloquent manner.  
 
After the onset of the financial crisis, in late 2008, one saw a sudden drop in investments 
in developing countries and capital outflow. According to analysts, (e.g. Kapur & Rakesh 
2010) this capital outflow has different determinants from the previous ones. In the past 
crisis, capital was fleeing from EMEs due to poor sovereign (as well as corporate) 
solvency. More recently, late 2008, capital outflow was mainly motivated by deleveraging55 
motives (Kapur & Rakesh 2010). One year later the portfolio investment on bonds 
resumed while fiscal deficits and public debt were at their highest level in advanced 
countries. Two arguments could explain these facts.  
First the quantitative easing policy in major economies (USA, UK)56 flooded the economy 
with cheap money. For investors it therefore became possible to arbitrate between cheap 
money at home (with lower return at home as well) and higher yields abroad especially in 
EMEs. This is the so called “Carry Trade”57. As narrowly defined, the carry trade is the 
                                                          
55 Deleveraging consists simply of reducing the debt to total assets ratio and thus cleaning one‟s 
balance sheet.  
56 The ECB, from late 2008, maintained its interest rates at a low level of 1% in order to ease access 
to liquidity for banks.   
57 In the early 2000s, the Yen served as fuel for carry traders and recently history repeated itself with 
the US dollars. For instance the recent world financial crisis, which induced a weaker US dollar and 
lower interest rate, some investors might find profitable to borrow in dollar and invest in some 
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practice of borrowing currency from a country where interest rates are low and then 
lending the proceeds in the currency of a country where interest rates are higher. The goal 
is to profit from the interest rate differential (Grenville Stephen, 2010).  And this was 
among the determinants in the re-surge of bond investments in developing countries in 
late 2009. FigA.3.1 shows clearly that after 2008 outflow, capital movement toward 
developing economies resumed progressively. 
The second argument also linked to the previous one is the unprecedented level of public 
sector deficits and debt in the developed world. In the USA, the debt burden is expected 
to rise to more than 90% of GDP by 2011, in UK the public debt in 2010 represents 
79.1% of GDP (a fiscal deficit more than 12% of GDP)58, in Spain, Greece and France 
the public debt is also above 70% of GDP (and fiscal deficit nearly reaching 11% of 
GDP). On the other hand, for investors Brazilian, Mexican, Chinese, even Russian (that 
defaulted in 1998) bonds are less risky than Euro Zone ones. The reason for this reversal 
is that most of middle income economies have strong economies, low budget deficits and 
current account surpluses59. So the fundamentals look much better than in major 
developed economies such as USA, Japan, UK and in most Euro area countries. 
Additional to the fiscal turmoil in major developed countries, the growth prospects are 
also relatively weak (FigA.3.3). Consequently investors believe that nothing in the medium 
term can be in favour of an improvement of the fiscal stance. The purchases of 
developing countries‟ bonds in 2010 (from January to early May) have reached 15.3 billion 
US dollars and, this inflow has never been seen before. Moreover the EMEs sovereign 
bond index spreads (compared to US bond yields) have been tightening since October 
2008 (based on JPMorgan data, this gap is around 1.48% in 2010 compared to 2.58% in 
2005).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
developing economies where one might have double returns. Indeed one gets profit from the 
exchange rate arbitrage and from the yields difference.  
58 The Institute for Fiscal Studies database, “Debt and Borrowing” data.   
59 This was a great achievement for EMEs since they learnt from previous crises. Therefore more 
prudential fiscal and monetary policies were implemented during the boom period. After 2007, in the 
middle of the crisis these countries had enough possibilities to support their economies with fiscal 
and monetary stimulus packages.  
Chap3: Impact of Large Fiscal Imbalance in Advanced Countries on Developing Countries 
127 
 
At the same time countries, despite the “safe” Euro shelter, are struggling to have access 
to private capital in the bond market. Indeed for Greece, Spain, Portugal, perhaps later 
Ireland and Italy debt restructuring (or default) is not excluded60.  
This situation could mark the start of a new paradigm or at least the end of the one that 
sees developing countries as fiscally irresponsible, with huge deficits and procyclical fiscal 
policies. And developed countries being characterized by sound and consistent fiscal 
policies. Even if it becomes evident that this paradigm has ended or is living its last 
moments, as soon as data becomes available, further investigation should be done on this 
issue. Right now, one can only say that the developed world bonds are not the only ones 
holding the label “safety guaranteed” FigA.3.2.  
 
                                                          
60The first results on the non linear effects were anterior to the crisis in the Euro area. Then the 
Greek (and Spain?) crisis helped to interpret such results which were incomprehensible before.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
It comes out of this paper that higher fiscal deficit in industrial countries crowds out 
capital flows to emerging market economies. We showed that if one considers the specific 
variables for EME and industrial countries and the shared variables as well, the overall 
deficit in rich countries lowers significantly capital flows to developing countries. While 
the deficit of developing countries lowers also, but with less intensity, the variable of 
interest. Indeed in recession periods, governments in advanced economies, by 
implementing countercyclical policies increase their deficit in order to stabilize the real 
economy. But in doing so, they compete with developing countries for access to capital. 
Moreover, investors‟ confidence falls (due to lower exportation by EMEs), and all of 
these effects contribute to reducing capital flows.  
It was found also that all developing countries share the same level of risk since the fact 
that the country has defaulted or not is not relevant to investors. Therefore when the 
CDS level increases it affects almost all countries in the same way.  
However these results need to be a bit nuanced, because the (old) paradigm arguing that 
developing countries‟ cycles are indefinitely synchronized to those of advanced countries 
doesn‟t seem to hold. The recovery path from the 2007 global crisis has shown recently 
that developing countries are leading the global economic recovery while major countries 
like USA, UK and Euro zone faced low GDP growth prospects. Also, a non-linear 
investigation outcome shed light on this issue. Above a certain level of fiscal deficit, 
considered as unsustainable by investors, the risk of default by a Western country 
becomes non-negligible; they withdraw their capital from former “safe countries” in 
favour of emerging economies. The first quarter of 2010 has clearly shown that financial 
markets were worried about the fiscal stance in advanced countries. And the markets have 
forced, with higher premiums on sovereign borrowings, governments to tighten their 
fiscal policy (earlier than predicted) and reduce debt to more reasonable levels. 
Nevertheless after full recovery, it would be interesting to check whether this result was 
cyclical or a deeper change. 
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Before any policy recommendation, one has to notice that EMEs have learnt from their 
previous experiences during past crises. At the onset of this crisis developing countries 
were in a good position with current account surpluses, low (or surplus sometimes) fiscal 
deficit, negligible external debt, and huge foreign reserves; owing to prudent policies. In 
order to stay as much as possible safe from fiscal (and financial) turmoil in developed 
countries, financial integration between EMEs should deepen. Trade in goods between 
developing economies should also increasingly concern finished product so they can stay 
safe from any crunch in Western economies.  
All along this article emerging market and developing countries were employed as 
synonyms. Obviously any low income country was among the sample used here and, two 
reasons explain this. First low income countries essentially borrow capital from bilateral 
or institutional partners, and international bond negotiations are extremely scarce. Second, 
low income countries due to high levels of debt and poor governance do not have access 
to capital from the financial market (at least for the bond market), except of course FDI 
flows.  
Despite these relevant results, the database only concerns bonds exchanged in the primary 
market. In other worlds, after purchasing a developing country‟s bond, an investor can re-
sell it in the secondary market. In this situation, the coefficient estimated could be higher 
than the actual impact of advanced countries deficit on bond purchases. For instance 
despite a situation of crisis, a speculator can buy a EMEs bond in the secondary market at 
a lower price and bets on an increase of its value in the future. On a large scale, trading in 
the secondary market will be a non-negligible source of funding for developing countries. 
Even though such data are not available (or not easily accessible), this does not affect our 
results which focuses mainly on the primary bonds markets.  
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Table A.3.1: Data used gravity estimations: from 2001 to 2007. 
Notation Definition Source 
Dependent variable: 
log_debt_securities2 
Total debt securities hold by 
non-resident. (annual frequency) 
CPIS database available online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm  
Overall_deficit_gdp Overall fiscal deficit for 
industrial countries over GDP 
(annual frequency) 
World Economic Outlook, 2009. 
Overall_deficit2_gdp Overall fiscal deficit for emerging 
countries over GDP (annual 
frequency) 
World Economic Outlook, 2009. 
Gdp_growth Real GDP growth for industrial 
countries. (annual frequency) 
World Economic Outlook, 2009. 
Gdp_growth_2 Real GDP growth for emerging 
countries. (annual frequency) 
World Economic Outlook, 2009. 
Ln_distance Natural log of distance between 
capital cities of EMEs and their 
industrial country partners, (in 
kilometres).  
CPII (French research center in 
international economics). Data 
available online at: 
http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm  
lang Dummy of common language.  CPII (French research center in 
international economics). Data 
available online at: 
http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
external_debt_2_gdp Total external debt stock over 
GDP, for emerging countries. 
(annual frequency) 
World Economic Outlook, 2009. 
current_acc_indus_gdp  
Industrial economies Current 
account balance (annual 
frequency) in percent of GDP. 
Annual data. 
 
International Financial Statistics.  
curr_account_eme_gdp Emerging economies Current 
account balance (annual 
frequency) in percent of GDP. 
Annual data. 
International Financial Statistics. 
stock_index_eme Stock market index of emerging 
countries. (annual frequency) 
Global Data Source 
govt_bond_yield 5-year emerging government Datastream. (Credit Market Analysis 
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bond yield database, CMA) 
5_year_cds Sovereign 5-year Credit default 
swap on emerging market bonds.  
Datastream. (Credit Market Analysis 
database, CMA) 
default Dummy variable= 1 if the 
country has defaulted in the past, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Moody‟s Global Credit Research, 
March 2008. 
default_risk The interaction between the 
dummy default and the overall 
deficit in industrial countries 
 
Large_deficit_dummy Interactive variable between 
dummy of large fiscal (mean +1 
SD) and the overall deficit in 
industrial countries in percent of 
GDP. 
 
 
Chap3: Impact of Large Fiscal Imbalance in Advanced Countries on Developing Countries 
133 
 
FigA.3.1: Portfolio, Equity Investment evolution: Prospects after the financial Crisis. 
 
 
 
 
FigA.3.2: Government Bond Yields comparison across countries
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FigA.3.3: GDP Evolution across countries in recent period.  
 
 
 
FigA.3.4: Evolution of public and private saving in the USA compared to fiscal deficit. 
 
 
 
 
In billions USD 
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Fig A.3.5: LIBOR as Global Interest Rates 
 
 
 
Fig A.3.6: Budget Deficit in Industrial Countries 
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Fig A.3.7: Government Debt Budget Deficit in Industrial Countries 
 
 
 
FigA.3.8: Portfolio Investment per income level 
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TableA.3.2: Effect of Default history 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES log_debt_security_2 log_debt_security_2 
   
overall_deficit_gdp -3.666* -4.951*** 
 (2.046) (1.269) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -1.867** -1.646 
 (0.809) (1.028) 
default_risk 2.220* 1.200 
 (1.279) (2.155) 
Distance -0.748***  
 (0.0859)  
Language 0.112  
 (0.107)  
GDP_growth 0.0494 0.0224 
 (0.0480) (0.0231) 
gdp_growth_2 -0.0300** 0.00133 
 (0.0127) (0.00938) 
external_debt_2_gdp 0.0106 -0.140 
 (0.182) (0.197) 
govt_bond_yield 0.0493 0.0254 
 (0.0800) (0.0405) 
a5_year_cds 0.000612*** -0.000298** 
 (0.000199) (0.000145) 
Constant 1.857*** -0.784*** 
 (0.446) (0.160) 
   
Observations 960 960 
R-squared 0.084 0.086 
Number of indus_id 18  
Number of bilateral_id  282 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TableA.3.3: Large deficit episodes 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES log_debt_security_2 log_debt_security_2 
   
overall_deficit_gdp -3.102 -4.665*** 
 (2.119) (1.175) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -1.810** -1.743* 
 (0.809) (1.016) 
large_deficit 0.00198 0.00349 
 (0.122) (0.0583) 
log_dist -0.735***  
 (0.0857)  
lang 0.110  
 (0.107)  
GDP_growth 0.0502 0.0220 
 (0.0480) (0.0231) 
gdp_growth_2 -0.0287** 0.00217 
 (0.0127) (0.00926) 
external_debt_2_gdp 0.0169 -0.120 
 (0.183) (0.194) 
govt_bond_yield 0.0482 0.0247 
 (0.0802) (0.0407) 
a5_year_cds 0.000596*** -0.000312** 
 (0.000199) (0.000143) 
Constant 1.800*** -0.789*** 
 (0.446) (0.160) 
   
Observations 960 960 
R-squared 0.081 0.086 
Number of indus_id 18  
Number of bilateral_id  282 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.3.4: Test for non-linear effect of Fiscal deficit in advanced economies 
 (1) 
VARIABLES log_debt_security_2 
  
overall_deficit_gdp -9.781*** 
 (1.764) 
overall_deficit_gdp^2 3.199* 
 (1.787) 
curr_account_2_gdp 0.696 
 (0.908) 
overall_deficit2_gdp -13.25*** 
 (1.036) 
Constant -1.933*** 
 (0.0418) 
  
Observations 2482 
Number of bilateral_id 419 
R-squared 0.104 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TableA.3.5: Heckman Selectivity Bias Correction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES log_debt_security_2 select mills 
    
overall_deficit_gdp -7.957***   
 (0.821)   
overall_deficit2_gdp -3.908***   
 (0.730)   
log_dist -0.455***   
 (0.0916)   
lang 0.305***   
 (0.0902)   
GDP_growth 0.247*** 0.130***  
 (0.0516) (0.0120)  
gdp_growth_2 0.0130 0.0390***  
 (0.0170) (0.00604)  
external_debt_2_gdp -0.676***   
 (0.115)   
govt_bond_yield -0.0823***   
 (0.0292)   
current_acc_indus_gdp  -0.136  
  (0.408)  
curr_account_2_gdp  1.844***  
  (0.425)  
lambda   1.764** 
   (0.685) 
Constant -0.219   
 (0.675)   
    
Observations 2712 2712 2712 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.3.6: List of Countries 
 
EME Industrial countries (partners) 
Argentina Australia 
Brazil Austria 
Chile Belgium 
Colombia Canada 
Czech Republic Danmark 
Egypt                Finland 
Hungary              France 
India Germany 
Indonesia            Ireland 
Kazakhstan Italy 
Korea, Republic of Japan 
Lebanon              Luxembourg 
Malaysia             Norway 
Mexico Spain 
Pakistan Sweden 
Philippines Switzerland 
Poland               United Kingdom 
Russia USA 
Singapore 
 South Africa         
 Thailand 
 Turkey 
 Ukraine 
 Uruguay 
 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
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Emerging Market Economies 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        Argentina 20,2135988 12,0512427 14,84813265 22,6440529 21,2626126 28,8482692 23,9535992 
Brazil 32,7932791 29,8009002 42,71421017 45,7438385 45,5502463 47,7849384 47,9262259 
Chile 4,67804861 5,91763623 8,690728487 10,486016 10,3301313 10,0184015 9,0398209 
Colombia 5,18280576 4,11041208 5,390877776 7,06159237 6,82273528 9,74549021 10,5626153 
Czech Republic 0,92430026 1,25391389 2,032604968 6,57370386 8,07199177 9,66907489 11,8639581 
Egypt                0,46679471 0,23032024 0,13341374 0,18623668 2,99768638 10,4448504 5,31190793 
Hungary              11,283218 15,1779654 18,40544181 29,7169284 27,5098044 38,299947 45,2127409 
India 1,3319923 0,63425535 0,668670887 3,02790024 6,34323942 10,7855952 7,81571885 
Indonesia            0,82617379 0,93595812 1,542644613 1,89686839 4,77054361 7,01849582 7,65399782 
Kazakhstan 0,2667178 0,1633899 0,207881489 1,09926246 1,9386824 5,46151842 1,60718684 
Korea, Republic of 17,7355249 18,8592426 13,28675823 24,5129483 29,9682833 35,763395 54,1942114 
Lebanon              0,33659113 0,12253173 0,159760991 0,92050429 0,66960265 1,35266114 0,88868932 
Malaysia             5,54978873 6,37355149 8,899041378 11,9517866 13,3146288 14,9779449 18,1560648 
Mexico 38,944225 39,7929232 43,61005904 47,3749417 53,7457806 50,3328553 46,5778904 
Pakistan 0,17448557 0,09805692 0,060597489 0,15917301 0,09497859 0,73021496 0,87684137 
Philippines 6,45401654 6,57093926 9,942804167 10,4036327 14,242407 17,2146028 17,0417561 
Poland               5,89158171 10,1697224 16,69905114 32,069651 44,0658511 49,418353 54,6720256 
Russia 13,6208786 16,1344907 18,79732069 23,7795795 19,0493735 34,5359609 31,5836017 
Singapore 11,203308 6,52799134 7,96613773 12,4757594 18,9958937 22,7165174 26,7246961 
South Africa         6,14303513 6,62794806 11,21277915 13,9824335 15,9617414 15,7689611 17,6594652 
Thailand 2,27413414 1,76825638 2,213316781 2,60040958 3,05269723 4,09866741 2,12823758 
Turkey 11,1418409 10,0973892 10,73380633 14,3559091 20,1839554 33,4275956 32,0236165 
Ukraine 0,8547097 1,29769033 1,902753075 3,51472488 3,02053825 7,74125878 7,63898009 
Uruguay 1,24649995 0,96204917 1,30307472 2,27884269 2,73898858 4,12152239 4,93149874 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 7,91576386 8,48390624 8,650560528 13,0087742 17,3090399 13,9073518 12,7286546 
 
Annual Total Debt Securities 
in billions of $US 
Table A.3.7 
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Table A.3.8: Indicative values of Marginal effects of Fiscal deficit in industrial countries 
on portfolio 
investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging Market Economies Mean  4% 9% 
 20,5459297 0,82183719 1,84913367 
Argentina 41,7590912 1,67036365 3,75831821 
Brazil 8,45154043 0,33806162 0,76063864 
Chile 6,98236125 0,27929445 0,62841251 
Colombia 5,76993539 0,23079742 0,51929419 
Czech Republic 2,82445858 0,11297834 0,25420127 
Egypt                26,5151494 1,06060598 2,38636345 
Hungary              4,37248175 0,17489927 0,39352336 
India 3,52066888 0,14082676 0,3168602 
Indonesia            1,53494847 0,06139794 0,13814536 
Kazakhstan 27,760052 1,11040208 2,49840468 
Korea, Republic of 0,63576304 0,02543052 0,05721867 
Lebanon              11,3175438 0,45270175 1,01857894 
Malaysia             45,7683822 1,83073529 4,1191544 
Mexico 0,31347827 0,01253913 0,02821304 
Pakistan 11,6957369 0,46782948 1,05261632 
Philippines 30,4266051 1,21706421 2,73839446 
Poland               22,5001722 0,90000689 2,0250155 
Russia 15,2300434 0,60920174 1,37070391 
Singapore 12,4794805 0,49917922 1,12315325 
South Africa         2,59081701 0,10363268 0,23317353 
Thailand 18,8520162 0,75408065 1,69668146 
Turkey 3,71009359 0,14840374 0,33390842 
Ukraine 2,51178232 0,10047129 0,22606041 
Uruguay 11,7148644 0,46859458 1,0543378 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.    
Note: This table presents the mean of yearly value of total debt securities from 2001 to 2007. 
The 4% (9%) column represents the effect of a 4% (9%) increase in overall fiscal deficit in 
industrial countries.  
Values are in Billions of US dollars.  
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4.1 Introduction 
The issue of efficiency of macroeconomic policies on short term economic activity 
has remained an unsolved question where several theories give different predications. A 
first set of studies has tried to define the nature of and how policy makers were using 
macroeconomic policies to influence the real economy. These studies reveal that OECD 
countries (advanced economies in general) run countercyclical fiscal policies and 
developing countries implement procyclical policies (details on this literature are given 
later). Countercyclical fiscal policies consist in increasing budget deficit (or increasing 
spending and/or reducing tax rates) when the difference between the potential output 
and the current output decreases or even becomes negative. On the contrary, with 
procyclical measures the government simply increases its deficit in good times (positive 
output gap) and consolidates it in periods of recession. Despite these results one can 
wonder if macroeconomic fluctuations are bad for economic activity and what is the 
rationale behind the intervention of public authorities against these fluctuations. 
The real business cycle theory argues that business cycles can be interpreted as the 
economy‟s optimal response to shocks, at least in first-order approximation. While some 
inefficiencies and distortions may be present in the economy, they are not viewed as 
central to cyclical phenomena. Most importantly, efforts of public authorities at 
stabilization may be counterproductive, and could even reduce welfare, since these 
interventions might keep on track inefficient and expensive firms. Indeed recession helps 
to correct organizational inefficiencies and encourage firms to reorganize, innovate or 
relocate to new markets (Aghion & al. 2005). Another view similar to the neoclassical one 
defends the idea that macroeconomic policy should primarily focus on price and income 
stability since long-run economic growth depends only on structural characteristics such 
as quality of institutions (Easterly 2005, Acemoglu & al. 2003). Therefore, and according 
to these theories, even in a period of recession the government should not intervene and 
stabilizing policies should remain at their lowest level possible. However for firms willing 
and able to improve their efficiency, the main barrier will be access to funds in periods of 
economic downturn since their profits are sliced. Therefore without an “external 
intervention”, even good firms will be ejected from the market and this might delay any 
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recovery. To avoid these negative effects a government could increase public investment 
or its spending and thereby foster national demand. Another possible answer from public 
authorities could be to directly subsidize enterprises by supporting them in their R&D 
expenses.  
Moreover, according to Keynesians, recessions are considered as periods where the use 
and the allocation of productive resources are inefficiently low. In a recent work, Galí & 
al. 2005 identify the presence of large efficiency gaps in recession periods which are 
associated with a declining aggregate efficiency. They develop a simple analytical 
framework that justifies the pursuance of countercyclical fiscal policies in order to 
overcome the inefficiencies associated with recessions (see infra). Finally, bailing out the 
economy during bad times is sometimes almost compulsory for public authorities when 
the country faces a systemic hazard. For instance, in economic crises like the recent one in 
2010, without public intervention, major firms (General Motors in USA, Northern Rock 
in UK etc.) could fail and leave thousands of workers unemployed and many households 
losing their life-time savings. By bailing out such “too big to fail” firms, public authorities 
preserve their economy from a general collapse with unpredictable social consequences. 
This sheds some light on why fiscal policies should be a stabilizing tool and used by both 
advanced and developing countries.  
Also recent studies have shown that countercyclical public debt policy is highly growth-
enhancing (e.g. Aghion & Marinescu 2005). Therefore, even though the level of 
institutional development matters, this does not exclude that cyclicality of fiscal policy 
plays an important role for GDP growth.  
In this chapter the contribution is twofold. Until recently, studies on the cyclicality of 
fiscal policies in developing countries did consider that policies were not changing that 
much, in other words a government running procyclical policies was “obliged” to 
maintain such policy. What is shown here is that many developing countries were steadily 
adopting better fiscal policies and therefore voracity effects were progressively 
disappearing. The second aspect of this chapter is that it answers the question whether 
procyclical fiscal policies are harmful always and everywhere. Indeed, one can imagine 
good procyclical policies that would consist in running higher deficit in good economic 
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times to foster and strengthen economic activity. However the results in this chapter 
show that countercyclical fiscal policies reduce GDP volatility and therefore reduce 
uncertainty and encourage private initiatives.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: The next section presents the related 
literature and some stylized facts of fiscal policy in developing countries. Section 3 details 
theories in favor of fiscal policy as an efficient stabilizing tool. Empirical methodology 
and results are presented in section 4. The last part concludes.  
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4.2 Related Literature 
The investigation of what has been done by researchers in the field can be divided 
into two components. The first is a positive analysis and the second a normative analysis. 
In the positive analysis area, people are interested in the real nature or the effective 
behaviour (whether a government pursues a pro or a countercyclical policy) of fiscal 
authorities (e.g. Rand & Tarp, 2002). The normative analysis gives details and evidences 
on how the fiscal tool should be used to avoid loss of efficiency and to get less 
macroeconomic fluctuations. A deeper look at what has been done allows us to say that 
the two analyses are unequally treated in the literature (in terms of quantity of papers 
dedicated); a clear advantage being given to the positive analysis area. In this paper 
however, both analyses, normative and positive, are empirically tested showing why 
countercyclical fiscal policies are preferable to procyclical ones.  
 
4.2.1 Main characteristics of fiscal policy in developing 
countries 
 
The first step will be to investigate the main characteristics of fiscal policy in 
developing countries. As said above it is commonly admitted in the literature that fiscal 
policy is procyclical in many non-OECD countries. In what follows, one will investigate 
these facts and arguments in the literature for developing countries.  
In economic theory, a common wisdom would advise that fiscal policy, namely 
government spending and tax revenue, is to remain constant throughout the business 
cycle. In other words, fiscal policy will follow a countercyclical rule (spending going down 
and tax revenues increasing in good times and public expenditures going up and tax 
revenues decreasing in recession periods) so the budget surplus, as a share of GDP, 
should increase during economic booms and decrease during recession. This is the case if 
policymakers follow the Keynesian prescriptions. One the other side, tax smoothing 
models inspired by Barro 1979 suggest that fiscal policy should remain neutral all along 
the business cycle, i.e. one should have zero correlation between government spending 
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and output (Lucas & Stokey, 1983). As said above the dominant thought is that fiscal 
policy should be countercyclical.  
Alesina & Tabellini 2005 try to test for this effect in developing countries61. They found 
that in developing countries fiscal authority behave differently and conduct procyclical 
policy. Indeed during expansions, government spending as a share of GDP increases and 
goes down in bad times (the budget deficit follows the same path, increasing in good 
times and decreasing in recessions). They develop a model considering that the 
procyclicality arises much more from voters due to a lack of information and a political 
agency problem. There are two actors in the model, the government and the private 
sector consisting of a representative consumer. The private agent maximizes the value of 
his expected utility from private consumption. The model is as follows: 
The expected utility from consumption is as follow:
0
( )t t
t
E u c


 . tc  is the 
consumption in period t, E  the expectations factor, u (.) is a smooth and strictly concave 
increasing factor. In this model one considers that the government uses all its tax revenue 
for non productive expenditures (rents) and the private agents focus only on controlling 
the government agency problem. tr  is the total of non-productive spending62 in the 
form of rent solely benefiting the government. These rents are financed through t  
unproductive taxes paid by consumers. Still for the government, it issues debt 1tb   in 
period t at a market price  .  
Once government budget constraint is considered then the consumption function 
becomes: 1t t t t tc y r b b     . Here the consumption depends on the endowment 
                                                          
61 In OECD countries, fiscal policy has countercyclical properties as it was shown first by Gavin and 
Perotti (1997), Galí 2005 and Perotti 2004.  
62 For simplicity purposes Alesina and Tabellini do not include in the model productive public spending. 
Even if such spending was considered the results would remain unchanged.  
Chap4: Fiscal Policy for Stabilization in Developing Countries: A Comparative Approach 
151 
 
of income ( ty ) net of tr unproductive spending (rents paid through taxes). tb  is the 
repayment of previous debt63.  
The government tries to maximize its utility which depends mainly on the money 
available for rent. Voters are especially concerned about the minimization of their loss in 
terms of utility and this is the main criteria when they vote for a new government. At the 
beginning of each period the consumers, knowing their level of income before tax and the 
level of debt outstanding, select a reservation level of consumption. Consumers vote for a 
candidate only if he promises to attain the reservation level of consumption. Following 
that, the government sets its policy for the period, namely the level of debt ( 1tb  ) and 
rents ( tr ). The government does not have any reason not to respect its promise toward 
consumers since voters can punish the government for not doing so during the current 
legislature. Therefore, the Alesina & Tabellini (2005) development maximizes the utility of 
the government that does its best to please the voters, subject to budget constraints. At 
the steady state, the debt and the rent are not affected by income shock (two effects: the 
government does not save windfall from a positive income shock and it does not increase 
its borrowings after a negative income shock). This situation of non-smoothing is due to 
agency problem. Indeed the consumers do not observe the current debt level and they 
don‟t have any information on the amount of rent held by officials. The only solution for 
them is to ask for a higher utility now as they don‟t trust the government and don‟t want 
the officials to keep all the surplus of income for rent. Their econometric outcomes are in 
line with the forecast as for developing countries (Latin America and Caribbean), they 
found that fiscal policy is procyclical (and its behaviour is often countercyclical in OECD 
countries). This is mainly due to poor control over corruption rather than a borrowing 
constraint as mentioned by Gavin & Perotti (1997).  
This paper gives a good understanding of reasons behind the procyclical nature of fiscal 
policy in some countries. As we can observe, the borrowing constraint argument is not 
strong enough to justify the reason why government does not smooth income shocks. 
For a long time, analysts believed that procyclical fiscal policy was due to constraints in 
                                                          
63 1tb   means that private agents do not have information on the current level of debt or the indebtedness 
of the government. They only know about the debt when it is time to repay, namely in period t+1. 
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the financial market. This means that in periods of economic expansion, governments can 
borrow easily and increase their spending (in recession, the government can only borrow 
at high interest rate or sometimes they can‟t even get a loan at all). The main ideas against 
the borrowing constraint holds in two arguments. First why don‟t governments of 
developing countries self insure themselves by accumulating resources in good times so 
that they can won‟t face credit constraints in recessions?  And why should lenders not 
provide funds to countries even if in recession, if they were convinced that the borrowing 
would optimally smooth out the cycle? These two questions are the main limits of 
previous studies (e.g. Catao & Sutton 2001, Kaminsky, Reinhart & Vegh 2004) explaining 
the procyclicality of fiscal policy for less developed countries. Compared to Galí (2005), 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) went further in explaining the facts when they take into 
account the corruption and the level of democracy. But even if those variables are not 
integrated in the analysis. The result remains unchanged thus showing perhaps that, for 
developing countries, fiscal policy is strongly procyclical. If this is the case, all external aid 
(financial or even technical assistance) should emphasize on how to solve this problem.  
 
Talvi & Vegh (2005) found similar results but for them the issue should be considered in 
terms of optimality for the government. Even though they do not develop on the causes 
of the countercyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries (procyclical in advanced 
economies) they give interesting explanations regarding the mechanisms. Later in this 
article some of their hypotheses will be empirically tested. Indeed in developing countries, 
it is admitted that the tax base is at least four times variable than it is in rich countries 
(Talvi & Vegh, 2005). This is due to the fact that taxes in developing countries are highly 
dependent on private consumption (importations and Value Added Tax) and in bad times 
private agents reduce their purchases. Another even more interesting viewpoint is when 
they defend that it is optimal for the government to run procyclical fiscal policy by 
reducing the tax rate in good times. When the economy is doing well, the government 
knows that if it runs important surpluses it will face hard pressures from agents toward 
more public spending (optimal behaviour for private agents in order to avoid the political 
agency problems à la Alesina). So by lowering taxes the government allows the private 
sector to use those extra resources as it sees fit. Hence in this case, procyclical fiscal policy 
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is a means for the government to escape from public pressure. Another aspect of this is 
the inflation tax issue. Their empirical strategy is based only on correlation analysis 
between several variables. It emerges that output and private consumption are about 
twice as volatile in developing countries as in industrial countries. This lead to a high 
volatility of the tax base in non-OECD countries since tax revenue mainly depend on 
private consumption and not on income as in developed countries. Also it appears that 
government consumption is positively correlated to output in developing countries while 
any correlation is found between those variables in OECD countries. At the same time 
inflation tax rate is found to be highly procyclical in less developed countries (inflation tax 
rate increases in bad times and decreases during expansion)64. Finally, fiscal revenues 
appear to be procyclical for both OECD and developing countries (whereas tax rates are 
procyclical in developing countries only). This slightly surprising result when compared to 
the assumptions and to previous results will be discussed later on. As said above, the only 
argument to explain such government suboptimal policy (procyclical fiscal policy) would 
be to say that it does not have any other choice since pressures for higher spending are 
unavoidable.  
In our opinion, this paper gives details on some important aspect of fiscal policy in 
developing countries and is in line with other papers in the field (e.g. Little & al. 1993, 
Gelb 1989). Unfortunately basic correlation analysis is not, on its own, strong enough to 
cover and identify transmission channels that explain the procyclicality of public policies. 
In that sense, explaining procyclicality through tax base variability should be the outcome 
from multivariate estimations that simultaneously consider the change in public spending. 
The reason is that tax base variability is not the only means to explain procyclicality, as 
Talvi & Vegh (2005) suggest (but they don‟t develop nor test this idea) since government 
spending can increase ex-nihilo in good times. Therefore in this situation, which is very 
likely to occur in developing countries (see below), the problem arises from government 
purchases. Another limit would be to wonder how to explain the fact that tax revenues 
                                                          
64 In Talvi & Vegh 2005 the inflation tax rate is used as a proxy to show that all other tax rates are 
procyclical. I think that this is a good proxy since tax revenues depend on consumption in developing 
countries and inflation mainly touches product of wide use in developing countries (food and other 
basic items).  
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are procyclical when one has just been defending that tax rates are procyclical. The 
authors addressed this issue arguing that in good times the variability of the tax base 
causes an increase of consumption and therefore brings more tax revenues to the 
government even if tax rates are relatively low. In less prosperous periods, fiscal 
authorities increase tax rates while revenues decline because of a low level of 
consumption. If one can agree with the fact that inflation tax revenue and rate are 
procyclical it becomes a big challenge to assess the same for all other kind of taxes. This 
argument needs to be further developed using strong empirical analyses before giving the 
determinant role to the tax base. As a benchmark, in Alesina & Tabellini (2005), the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries comes from spending rather than tax 
revenues.  
 
4.2.1.1 Voracity effects 
Other authors develop a concept explaining why one should not neglect the spending 
side when studying response to shocks in developing countries. This is known as the 
voracity effect. The seminal contribution on this issue has been made by Tornell & Lane 
(1999) who define the voracity effect as a more-than-proportional increase in 
discretionary redistribution in response to an increase in the raw rate of return in the 
efficient sector. Several analyses on this topic depart from the observation that, countries 
with weak legal and political institutions and the presence of multiple powerful groups in 
society have relatively low economic growth. Compared to other anterior studies, (e.g. 
Knack & Keeper (1995) who only focused on the growth aspect), Tornell & Lane (1999) 
link procyclical response of fiscal policy (and decline in quality of public investment) and 
low economic growth to weak institutions and fractionalization, as possible explanations. 
They present a couple of assumptions and develop a model to assess these hypotheses. 
First Tornell & Lane (1999) model the extent of discretionary fiscal redistribution which 
is endogenously determined by the existence of powerful groups, the raw rates of return 
and by the institutional barriers. The underlying idea is to consider that if some groups are 
able to capture fiscal transfers this will create an unfair situation which will lead to a 
movement of capital in the shadow sector. Indeed as transfers have to be financed by 
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some taxation, higher transfer for one group means more taxation on other agents in the 
economy. To escape from this arbitrary taxation, private agents will prefer to invest in the 
“shadow” economy65. Three hypotheses are presented in order to explain the voracity 
effect in developing countries. First, growth rate is relatively lower in countries where we 
do not have strong and reliable institutions to avoid discretionary distribution with 
multiple powerful groups compared to countries with a single group. This is due to the 
fact that multiple groups create a redistribution struggle (as there is no cooperation 
between groups) and therefore more money for the public authorities. The second 
hypothesis considers the economy as a market in which firms play Cournot, meaning that 
the more groups we have (reduction in power concentration) in the economy, the better 
the economic performance. And the last hypothesis postulates that if the rate of return in 
the formal sector increases, growth rate will slow down. The reason for that is when the 
profitability of investment increases in the formal sector, increases will have a direct 
voracity effect since powerful groups will seek higher discretionary transfers. Indeed the 
government will need to increase tax rates since the revenues from “good shock” are no 
longer enough. These three assumptions lead to the same effect: capital switches from the 
formal sector to the “shadow” economy which is safe from taxation, and therefore a 
decline in the growth rate. A theoretical model is developed to demonstrate such effects.  
However this paper raises some questions and also identifies some limits. In our opinion, 
assuming that there is zero taxation in the “shadow” economy is far from the reality. 
Indeed in developing countries the informal sector pays taxes even if we can consider that 
it is not as much as in the formal sector. Therefore in their model, a tax rate (even if lower 
than that in the formal sector) should be included. A strong empirical assessment of the 
Tornell & Lane (1999) model could be an important contribution to demonstrate the 
accuracy of their findings.  
For some other authors, Tornell & Lane (1999) found only a partial equilibrium since the 
number of rent-seekers is not constant. Murphy & al. (1993) and Acemoglu (1995) 
advocate for the existence of multiple equilibriums. The first fact considers that rent-
                                                          
65 Here Shadow economy is defined as a sector that is out of the reach of fiscal authorities (no 
taxation) and where the raw rate of return for investments is lower compared to the formal sector of 
the economy.  
Chap4: Fiscal Policy for Stabilization in Developing Countries: A Comparative Approach 
156 
 
seekers prey on productive agents therefore an increase in the number of rent-seekers 
lowers the returns of both rent-seekers and private entrepreneurs. In this situation rent-
seeking activity can lower “honest” entrepreneurship activity since it becomes more 
profitable to seek rent rather than having “honest” activities. In this equilibrium the 
number of rent-seekers has increased compared to the initial situation.  
Another amendment was introduced by Baland & François (2000) who state that the 
causality can run in the opposite way. Indeed, they state that increasing entrepreneurships 
can also crowd out rent-seeking activities. When the entrepreneurship arena is producing 
new and better goods and services it can destroys existing rents. The main concern of 
Baland & François (2000) is to explain why in some countries rent-seeking increases with 
income and in other places it does not. The general rule from Tornell & Lane (1999) in 
that regard becomes partial since it is true only in very particular cases. According to 
Baland & François (2000) the response expected in a country after a positive shock 
(income or terms of trade) depends on the initial equilibrium of that economy. Indeed if 
at the beginning the number of entrepreneurs outweighs rent-seekers, a boom in the 
economy‟s resources would increase entrepreneurship and national income. As all rent 
opportunities are already destroyed by an increase in income, therefore demand increases 
leading toward higher profits and incentives for entrepreneurs. In contrast, if the initial 
equilibrium of the economy is characterized by a majority of rent-seekers, any increase in 
income (positive shock) will lower the returns of entrepreneurship compare to profit 
from rents. The increase in demand after the income shock gives greater opportunity for 
more rent. This was the case for countries like Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Trinidad, 
and the United Arab Emirates in the late 1970s after the oil boom that failed to increase 
their growth rate. These “failures” were characterized by an increase in the share of public 
consumption in GDP and a low share of manufacturing in GDP. This meant that the 
supplement of income was used for current spending instead of investment in the 
manufacturing sector or for any other efficient placement. On the other hand, countries 
like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Norway during the same period had increases in their GDP 
per capita growth as well as a higher share of manufacturing in GDP and a relatively low 
ratio of public spending over GDP.  For Tornell & Lane (1999) the two patterns are the 
outcome of different initial conditions. The cases of “failure” are explained by a low initial 
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industrial base and entrepreneurship while “success” cases are characterized by the 
opposite.  
This article was a great contribution in the literature explaining the procyclical behavior of 
fiscal policies in developing countries. However one should not limit the initial condition 
only to the dynamism of the entrepreneurial sector or to the activism of rent-seekers. 
These two activities are highly correlated to the quality and credibility of institutions in the 
economy.  
After presenting and giving some explanations regarding the consensus on the procyclical 
nature of fiscal policies, I determine in the following paragraphs whether fiscal policy can 
be seen as an efficient tool for stabilization. To our knowledge there are no recent studies 
on this topic for developing countries, apart from the model developed by Galí but which 
was only tested for advanced economies.  
 
 
4.2.2 Fiscal policy and its stabilizer properties: What do we 
know? 
 
4.2.2.1 The model of Jordi Galí (the Gap model)  
Galí (2005) exposes and sheds some light on two major themes for new Keynesians 
which are the negative effects of recessions on the economy and the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy as a stabilization tool. As already said this is a Keynesian point of view but for neo-
classicals (real business cycle theory) business cycles are viewed as the economy‟s optimal 
response to shocks and any attempt to stabilize may be counterproductive and reduce 
welfare. The first point for Galí (2005) is to give evidence of the negative effect of 
volatility and also of the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. To assess the 
relevance of the Keynesian view, they develop a model that measures the efficient level of 
economic activity and the effects on welfare once the economy is far from this 
equilibrium state. So the first step of their model will be to give evidences showing that in 
recession periods, efficiency losses are important.  
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The variable built called “inefficiency gap” (gap infra) is a measure of aggregate 
inefficiencies associated to the costs from the period of expansion or recession. This 
indicator is simply the difference between the marginal product of labor and the marginal 
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. The efficient level of economic 
activity is reached when                 at this point all resources are used at their efficient 
level. The measure is constructed as follow:  
t t tgap mrs mpn   
Where tmrs  and tmpn  are respectively the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor. tgap variable is assumed to 
follow a stationary process with a constant mean (gap). When constructing a measure of 
the gap from data for the US post-war economy it was found that there is a systematic 
relationship between large fluctuations in the degree of inefficiency in the allocation of 
resources and the business cycle (recessions correspond to periods with unusually large 
aggregate inefficiencies). These findings give favourable evidence for the Keynesian 
interpretation of business cycle and its effects. Continuing with this model, the next step 
of Galí‟s is to show that the gap can be written as an expression of the inefficiencies in 
the labor and in the goods market. Indeed one can have: 
( )p wt t tgap      
With ( ) ( )
p
t t t t t t tp w mpn mpn w p        
And ( )
t
w t t tw p mrs     
p
t  called average price markup, is the wedge between the log of the labor productivity 
and the log of the real wage. This corresponds to a measure of the deviation from perfect 
competition in the goods market. wt  called the average wage markup, is the wedge 
between the log of the real wage and the log of the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure (this reflects distortions in the labor market). tw  is the log of the 
compensation per additional unit of labor input. 
0tgap 
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Galí & al. (2005) find that the dominant fluctuations in the gap variable come from the 
larger variation in the labor market wedge rather than the wedge in the goods market. 
This is mainly due to the rigidity of nominal wage and to the non-Walrasian nature of 
contractual relationships between employers and employees. These rigidities explain the 
fact that real wages are higher than the marginal rate of substitution in downturn periods. 
Also making real wages fully flexible will not ensure that we retrieve the first best 
allocation66. The second best situation could be reached only if the aggregate demand 
increases. Now we are on course to show the effects (negative) of output gap fluctuation 
on welfare. They found that on average the fluctuation in the gap variable generates losses 
because “the welfare effects of employment fluctuations about the steady state are 
asymmetric”67. In others words, it is clear to them that there is a gain in stabilizing the gap 
variable otherwise one will have an important negative effect on welfare (measured here 
by the value of the utility)68. Applying the theory to post-war US data (from 1960:IV to 
2004:IV), Galí & al. (2005) found that in times of large recession the efficiency losses 
represent about 2% of the period‟s potential level of consumption (relatively to what 
should be equal to the level of consumption). And this negative effect tends to be 
persistent over years. On the other hand, the gain from major cyclical peaks is around 1%. 
Actually this is a clear evidence of the asymmetric effects of business cycle on welfare. 
Given these facts, what would be the answer one could expect from fiscal policy for 
stabilization? In the analysis of Galí & al. (2005), an increase in public spending (which 
has an expansionary effect in a Keynesian view) in periods of recession can offset (or at 
least reduce) the negative outcome. Also they found that the larger the government 
spending multiplier, the greater the incentive to raise government purchases in “bad 
times”. From the estimation of a linear model: 
                                                          
66 If there is no increase in the level of economic activity any decline in the labor market wedge will 
be offset by an increase of equal size in the average price markup.  
67 This means that the efficiency cost of a contraction is below the steady state (i.e. when the value of 
gap is very small or highly negative)  
68 Formally the equation is: 
2
t t tU U gap gap     with t tgap gap gap  . Then we can see 
that large variations of gap variable lead to a smaller value of tU  
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 * *0 1 1 1t x t t b t d t td E x b d u           
*
td  is the cyclically adjusted deficit for year t and 1tb   is the amount of outstanding debt in 
period t-1. If the government‟s fiscal policy is countercyclical, one will have a negative 
value for x  the coefficient in front of  1t tE x  which is the year t-1 forecast of output 
gap for year t. It emerges from these estimations that OECD countries mainly pursue 
discretionary countercyclical fiscal policies and they use their structural deficits to fight 
recessions and support their economy.  
This paper is a great contribution to the analysis of the efficiency of fiscal policy as a 
stabilizer tool for the macroeconomic environment in developed countries. And I believe 
that any other attempt at assessing fiscal policy as an answer to fluctuations should start 
from this analysis. The reason is straightforward and understandable in this world where 
intervention from public authorities to regulate the market or rescue private firms (and 
financial corporations) from a collapse is increasing crisis after crisis. At least one can say 
that for developed countries, Keynes was right when he said that business cycles have a 
negative impact on welfare and that government can be an efficient regulator. It seems 
trivial that for developing countries the same rules should apply. In what follows, I 
present some characteristics of business cycles in developing countries, before moving on 
to present our model.  
 
4.2.2.2 Business cycles in developing countries 
After explaining the behaviour of fiscal policies in developing countries we now come 
to the second issue we need to cover before any empirical assessment. As we did 
previously, we present the main characteristics of business cycles in developing countries. 
It will then become easier afterwards to determine whether fiscal policy can be an 
efficient tool to smooth the cycle (or stabilize the economy). It is widely accepted that 
macroeconomic instabilities have a negative effect in both advanced and developing 
economies. The literature is well documented on this issue but studies on developing 
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countries remain scarce. Agénor & al. (2000) using time series data of 12 developing 
countries study the nature of macroeconomic fluctuations.  
First they rendered stationary the macroeconomic series since many of them have 
different trends over time. From a univariate correlation analysis Agénor & al. (2000) 
found that volatility of output is higher in developing countries than in industrial 
economies depending on the filter used. Indeed the volatility obtained from the BP filter 
is lower than the one from the HP filter. This is mainly due to the fact that the BP filter 
eliminates the high frequency variations in the data whereas the HP filter only eliminates 
low frequency variations in the data. The results show also a strong persistence of the 
volatility across several quarters. This result is common to some other studies such as 
Rand & Tarp (2002) who found that shocks in developed countries are one of the main 
causes of short run macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries. A possible 
transmission channel could be throughout the world interest rate according to Agénor & 
al. (2000) which is believed to have an important impact on developing economies since 
these countries do not have a well developed local capital market. And the positive 
correlation between industrial output and a weighted index of real interest rate found for 
most of the countries seems to confirm this argument.  
The investigation about the relationship between the foreign trade and business cycle is 
done by looking into the correlation between trade balance and industrial output. For 
some countries (Chile, Mexico, Turkey, and Uruguay) this correlation is strongly negative 
(negative for both filters) meaning that when the industrial output goes up exportations 
decrease or importations increase. This correlation is strongly positive for the other 
countries in the sample such as Morocco, Nigeria, Colombia, Korea, and Mexico. Two 
arguments can be given to explain this positive correlation. First, this could be the result 
of the fact that merchandise imports are not highly sensitive to fluctuations in domestic 
demand. Second, since these developing and emerging economies are unlikely to any 
influence the world price of any industrial commodity, the positive correlation is 
consistent with demand shifts that cause a simultaneous increase in world price and 
export sectors (Agénor & al. 2000). As some authors mention (e.g. Deaton & Miller 1995, 
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Rodriguez-Mata 1997, Mendoza 1995), terms of trade shocks explain more than half of 
output fluctuations in developing countries.  
Another variable of interest is the behavior of wages (nominal and real) and, determining 
the sign of the correlations between wages and output is equivalent to an assessment of 
different theories and their predictions. Agénor & al. (2000) found evidence of procyclical 
real wage variation. This result is consistent with the predictions of the Real Business 
Cycle (RBC hereafter) models for which technological shocks are dominant and it shifts 
the labor demand in the short run. At the same time, this outcome shows the limit of the 
Keynesian view that real wages are countercyclical. One explanation of the difference 
between these theories could be the fact that, as Abraham & Haltiwanger (1995) have 
observed, the effect depends on the nature of the shock. Specifically, technological shocks 
have procyclical effects on real wages whereas nominal shocks have countercyclical 
effects on real wages. Therefore one can argue that the Keynesian analysis underestimates 
the effects of technological shocks. It is generally admitted that prices in industrial 
countries have a countercyclical behavior and this fact provides support for supply side 
models of business cycle (Rand & Tarp 2002). Agénor & al. (2000) found similar results 
for some developing countries in their sample (Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Nigeria and Turkey) for which price level and inflation are countercyclical 
(negative correlation between inflation, price and industrial output). This result seems to 
be strong since Rand & Tarp (2002) found also that the cyclical patterns of price level 
(CPI) and inflation are countercyclical (Hoffmeister & al. 1997 got the same outcomes for 
sub-Saharan African countries). 
Finally, we will focus on the behavior of public sector variable throughout the business 
cycle in developing economies. When one has a look at the current literature, it seems that 
consumption (both private and public) is positively correlated with output in least 
developed countries. For public consumption, the correlation remains positive (Rand & 
Tarp 2002), so this variable is procyclical which hence intensifies macroeconomic 
fluctuations. However Agénor & al. (2000) found an opposite result indicating that 
government spending plays a countercyclical role. This difference could have been due to 
two causes. First, the country samples are totally different; Agénor & al. (2000) usually use 
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data from countries classified as emerging markets (Korea, Chile, Mexico, Philippines 
etc.) while Rand & Tarp 2002 rely on “genuine” developing countries (Côte d‟Ivoire, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Zimbabwe etc.). The second possible cause could be their respective 
definitions of public expenditures that differ. Rand & Tarp (2002) decompose 
government spending into pure consumption and productive spending, namely public 
investment. When they do that, they find that public investment is procyclical for most of 
the countries in their sample (except for North African and Asian countries for which 
public investment is countercyclical). So, including investment and wage payments for 
example, could give us such results where government expenditures are countercyclical. 
Agénor & al. (2000) found that government revenues are countercyclical meaning that in 
good times people pays more tax. After summing up the global effect of government 
behaviour, they found that fiscal variables have countercyclical effects on business cycles. 
Therefore fiscal policy can play an important role in macroeconomic stabilization in the 
short-run. As said above, if one can accept that fiscal policy could effectively be an 
efficient stabilizer tool the question to be asked is whether this is a real situation in 
developing countries? Are fiscal variables really countercyclical? These questions will be 
answered in the following empirical sections.  
Two main points come to light in this review of the stylized facts on macroeconomic 
fluctuations in developing countries. First, terms of trade appear to be the main source of 
short-run fluctuations in developing (and emerging) countries. Second, fiscal variables are 
procyclical in developing countries, but this result seems to be different for emerging 
markets where fiscal policy effectively plays a stabilizing role. This section will be helpful 
in identifying the core variables to be included in our following estimations in order to 
define the potential stabilizer properties of fiscal policy.  
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4.3 Empirical Strategy: a two step procedure.  
The analysis of fiscal procyclicality in developing countries will be done in two steps. 
The first stage will be a comparison of fiscal behaviour across countries. Secondly, I will 
be estimating the impact of fiscal procyclicality on the real economies. The rational of 
such procedure is detailed in the following paragraphs.  
 
4.3.1 First Stage Regression: Measuring the Procyclicality of 
budgetary Policies. 
 
The hypothesis underlying the Gali‟s model has raised some issues. Indeed, in this 
model, a unique coefficient on the procyclicality of fiscal policy is calculated for the whole 
period (considered). However there is no evidence supporting the idea that a government 
that runs procyclical policies during a given period (a year for instance) will keep that 
strategy all along the period. Depending on cyclical conditions, public authorities can 
decide for a year to pursue countercyclical budget policies (if the previous policy was 
procyclical) and keep the latter policy (or not) for the future. Also it is difficult for existing 
models to capture the evolution of budget reaction to changes in output gap. Indeed in 
period t a fiscal policy can be procyclical (or countercyclical) but a change can be operated 
steadily (and not suddenly) so the policy becomes progressively countercyclical (less 
procyclical).  
To come over such limits, some authors (e.g. Aghion & Marinescu 2006) calculated time 
varying coefficients. These yearly estimated coefficients of procyclicality therefore give an 
indication on how government budget variables respond to change in the output gap over 
time.  
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4.3.1.1 Econometric Method 
In order to make full use of their structure, data for each country will be computed. 
The method using local Gaussian-weighted ordinary least squares estimates will be 
preferred (as Aghion & Marinescu) in the following.  
The equation estimated in this first stage will be in this form: 
1 2 1 3 vari it i it i it i ifiscal ygap b control iables             (1) 
The dependent variable ifiscal  , in country і and year τ, denotes the fiscal variable under 
consideration. In the following analysis, cyclically adjusted primary deficit, government 
investment and public spending will be used to measure procyclicality of fiscal policies. 
iygap   represents the output gap, while 1ib   is the value of public debt from previous 
period τ-1 of country і. Finally var icontrol iables  is a set of relevant control variables 
introduced in the time series estimation. Details on the control variables will be given later 
in the chapter.  
 
4.3.1.2 The budgetary variables: computing Fiscal Activism.  
The procyclicality of fiscal policies can be assessed through several methods. The 
most common variables used are fiscal budget deficit, public debt growth, government 
investment or government expenses. For any variable used, the main point will be to 
purge the cyclical components or automatic stabilizers (not managed by authorities). 
Indeed, once automatic stabilizers are removed from the selected fiscal variable, this will 
give the genuine policy that public authorities pursue. 
In other words, whenever for instance the output gap increases, i.e.; the actual GDP is 
higher than the potential output, the primary fiscal balance will be automatically 
improved. On the same vein, when the output gap falls primary fiscal balance also 
weakens. This is due to the fact that revenues are more responsive than expenditures to 
changes in the output gap simply because tax bases automatically change when the output 
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gap changes (Abdih & al. 2010). Therefore, the fiscal variables are influenced by both 
cyclical and policy actions. To distinguish the fiscal impulse from automatic responses I 
follow then IMF 2009 that breaks down the change in the primary balance (PB) as a 
function of the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and cyclical 
primary balance (CPB).  
 
PB CAPB CPB      
Where the change in the CAPB is defined as the fiscal impulse and the variation of CPB 
the automatic stabilizers. Therefore one can infer that Fiscal policy is contractionary when 
the change in the cyclically adjusted non-oil primary balance is positive (CAPB>0), and is 
expansionary when the change in the cyclically adjusted non-oil primary balance is 
negative (CAPB<0) IMF 2009.  
In this chapter, in order to assess the level of procyclicality of a fiscal policy, I need to 
investigate the relationship between output gap and the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB). Whenever the sign of the coefficient of the output gap variable is positive this 
means that cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit and the business cycle move in the same 
direction. In other words, the authorities run procyclical policies. If one obtains instead a 
negative sign for output gap, then public policies move in the same way as the business 
cycle.  
Also the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is obtained by applying the HP filter on the 
primary fiscal balance69.  
 
                                                          
69 Abdih & al. 2010 applied the same procedure while calculating the cyclically adjusted primary fiscal 
balance. Namely the use of the HP filter allows us to identify the a-cyclical component of the fiscal 
balance which is used in our estimations.  
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4.3.2 The method 
For each country, I estimated an equation in the form of (1), with 1it the coefficient 
of procyclicality. A negative sign for 1it  means that the budget deficit (or government 
spending) increases when the economy (output gap becomes more negative) slow down. 
Also and as said earlier, to make full use of the panel structure of the database a 
coefficient of procyclicality is estimated for each country i at year t.  
 
4.3.2.1 Finite rolling window least squares estimating method 
At least two methods of estimating yearly coefficients exist in the literature. The first 
method is to compute finite rolling window least squares estimates (RWLSE). The first 
step for this method is to choose a number of periods for centring the rolling window. If 
one chooses 10-years, the RWLSE method amounts to estimating the coefficients of 
procyclicality at year t in a given country by running the following regression for all 
periods: 
1 2 varit i it ifiscal ygap control iables       for     (t – 5, t + 4)   
However this method presents some limits and is not of common use in empirical 
articles. By construction, one loses the first five years and the last four years of data for 
each country. Also one can have important differences between estimated coefficients 
since the coefficients are estimated by discarding, at each time period, one old observation 
and taking into account a new one. Therefore, if there is a wide gap between the current 
observation and the “future”, one series may be noisier and affected by transitory changes 
(Aghion & Marinescu 2007).  
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4.3.2.2 Local Gaussian-weighted ordinary Least squares estimates 
The LGWOLS method allows the use of all observations for each year and the closest 
observations to the year considered are given a greater weight. To compute coefficients  
jit  the LGWOLS method uses all observations available; weighted by a Gaussian 
centered at t, for country i and then performs one regression for each date t. A single 
equation will be in this form: 
 
1 2 var ,it it i it ifiscal ygap control iables       (1) 
With 
2
0,
( )i t
N


 
 
 
 
  and 
2
2
1 ( )( ) exp
22t
t
 

 
  
  
 
Concerning the choice of the   parameter, there is no theoretical or special method to 
our knowledge. This explains our choice for a  equals to 5.70  
 
4.4 The Results from first step regressions: African 
Countries 
4.4.1 Procyclicality of Fiscal Policy in African Economies  
The results are presented in the form of diagrams for ease of reading. The 
dynamics of coefficients of procyclicality for each country is represented by dots with 
different colours. Indeed, when the coefficient of procyclicality is statistically significant 
(at least at 10% level) for the year considered, the dots are in blue colour. If red, the dots 
show statistically non-significant coefficients. These insignificant coefficients are 
interpreted as periods where fiscal policy is acyclical. 
                                                          
70 Aghion & Marinescu chooses the same parameter. Also when I try higher or lower parameters (near 5) 
the results do not change at all.  
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Control variables include inflation, GDP per capita growth, lagged public debt, and an 
indicator of government size71. The rational for the use of inflation is that it could prevent 
the government from borrowing during recessions if people expect that such borrowing 
might result in higher inflation in the future. When I introduce the lagged public debt, it 
reasonably supposes that the discretionary component of the budget has largely been 
made by the end of the previous year.  
In addition to these traditional factors, in this study I introduce two new variables: the 
current account balance and the durability of political regimes. The current account 
variable is here to capture possible current account targeting policies72. Indeed there is a 
possible bias in the regressions if the fact that the government can use the budget to 
adjust the level of the current account is not considered. Namely the government targets a 
given current account balance and uses the budget balance as a tool to reach that goal. 
Therefore this model will allow us to avoid a spurious 1it  coefficient since the current 
account targeting effect might be captured by this number.  
Also I consider an institutional aspect relevant to our topic which is the length of political 
regimes. Durable is defined as the number of years since the most recent regime change 
or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (Polity 
IV Project: Dataset Users‟ Manual). The idea is that, the longer a political regime stays in 
power, the lower the incentive to run procyclical fiscal policies. The “regime” pursuing 
procyclical policies runs the risk, if it stays in power for a long period, of facing a future 
severe economic downturn without any resource to bailout the economy. On the 
contrary, if the government knows that it might lose power very shortly, in periods of 
boom, the “rational” behaviour will be to increase expenses and consequently deprive the 
next ruling team of rents (fiscal-political cycle theory). Therefore, the longer the 
government remains the higher our expectations for a countercyclical fiscal behaviour.  
                                                          
71 Due to weak data, government size was not considered while studying government consumption 
procyclicality to avoid collinearity issues. Since details necessary to government size computing (which is 
computed as the total of all public spending including debt repayment) were very poor.  
72 The current account targeting theory is presented in more detail in the first chapter of this dissertation.   
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The regression results for each individual country (including the control variables) are 
presented in the next section.  
 
4.4.2 The Adjusted Primary Fiscal Balance 
The cyclically adjusted fiscal balance is computed “indirectly” by using the general 
government debt. Indeed the change in general government debt , 1( )it i tB B  gives 
the overall fiscal deficit. Once the overall budget deficit is obtained one purges the 
interest payments ( iti ) on debt and this is equivalent to the primary fiscal deficit.  
 
, 1( )it i t itB B i   Primary Fiscal Deficit (2) 
 
The baseline for African countries reflects a diverse situation. However the general 
statement is that a linear and constant policy does not exist. In other words, governments 
change their policies across years depending on punctual situations of the economy or 
they adopt a more structural change. Three cases are identified. First, some countries 
move steadily from acyclical toward strong countercyclical policies in recent years. 
Second, some governments keep a constant procyclical fiscal policy all along the period. 
Also, for a last group of countries, policies seem to remain acyclical since any reaction to 
output gap variations were noticed.  
In the first step estimations of the acyclical fiscal policies, meaning that public policies do 
not change when output gap fluctuates; are defined as the periods for which coefficients 
of procyclicality are statistically unsignificant73.  
 
                                                          
73 However one is aware that in some cases this can be due to irrelevance in the data.  
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4.4.3 The results 
Table of Figures 4.1 shows a set of countries for which initially the adjusted primary 
fiscal deficit was not reactive to the business cycle. From around 1971 up to early 2000, 
the fiscal deficits of Gambia, Kenya, Côte d‟Ivoire, Mauritius and Tunisia were acyclical 
but slightly countercyclical. A factor common to all od these six Sub-Saharian African 
economies is the deep change in the behaviour of their budget deficits, which became 
strongly countercyclical. Many factors that will be detailed later in this paper could explain 
this change. Swaziland presents a special case where fiscal policy (except during short 
episodes 1977 to 1983 and from 1993 to 2001) has remained countercyclical.  
 
Table of figures 4.1: Adjusted Primary Fiscal Deficit Procyclicality 
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Table of figures 4.1: Adjusted Primary Fiscal Deficit Procyclicality (2) 
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Table of figures 4.1: Adjusted Primary Fiscal Deficit Procyclicality (3) 
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A second set of countries is characterized by a first period from 1971 up to the late 1990‟s 
where the policy was mostly procyclical and then an improvement was noticed. Indeed, 
Table of Figures 4.2 (Algeria, Burundi, Central Africa, Egypt, Madagascar, Mauritania and 
Morocco) shows an initial situation of high procyclicality but later the policy changes to a 
more acyclical one. More precisely, for Central African Republic, Algeria and Mauritania, 
the recent behaviour of their budget deficit could mean that the situation will become 
more countercyclical in coming years.  
Finally and still concerning the discretionary behaviour of budget deficit, a third group I 
identify presents a rather “deteriorated” situation. For these economies either move from 
countercyclical policies to more acyclical or even towards procyclical policies (Table 
Figures 4.3). The most radical change among these countries concerns Lesotho and 
Sudan. For Lesotho the data shows that from 1971 up to 2000 the policies were 
insensitive to  
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Table of Figures 4.2: Improvement: from procyclical to acyclical policies 
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Table of Figures 4.3: fiscal policy’s degradation: counter to acyclical 
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fluctuations in the business cycle (Table of Figure 4.4). But the year 2001 inaugurates a 
new era where policies were strongly procyclical. Sudan presents a similar situation where 
things changed deeply. At this point one cannot help but wonder if a procyclical fiscal 
policy is absolutely and everywhere always negative? Indeed in the Sudanese case (or 
Lesotho) would it not be possible for these governments to run procyclical policies in 
periods of economic prosperity to strengthen economic growth? This question of 
whether procyclical fiscal policies are harmful or not to growth will be addressed in the 
second stage of analysis of this paper.  
 
Table of Figures4.4: fiscal policy’s degradation: counter to acyclical 
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Presented are some of the results from our dataset of 45 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Now I will be investigating the procyclicality of other fiscal variables such as government 
investment and government consumption. This will allow us to see in detail which part of 
government expenses is more pro or countercyclical.  
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4.4.4 The Government Investment 
Public investments variable used here is the general government GDFI in constant 
USD. The first set of diagrams shows some countries which initially began with 
countercyclical public investments but ended with strong procyclical policies. For instance 
in Algeria, Morocco and Burundi where public investment ends up being positively 
related to business cycles. A possible explanation for this behaviour could be that the 
period immediately after 1960 was characterized by “compulsory” investments whatever 
the economic cycle (good or bad), since countries needed to build up. Thereafter, and 
when the “necessary” public goods were provided, public authorities started purchasing 
investment goods only when a financial windfall occurred.  
For other economies (Tables of Figures 4.5) also, the situation changes toward more 
procyclical investment policies. For Central Africa, Egypt, Gambia and Togo the data 
shows insensitivity at the beginning and strong procyclical investments in recent years. 
Other governments (Tanzania, Gabon, Ghana and Kenya) have almost constantly 
pursued procyclical investment policies.  
In Table of Figures 4.6, the results presented show countries with better policies, in other 
words, strong countercyclical behaviour for public investments. Indeed, in Benin, Guinea-
Bissau and South Africa, investment seems to be used by authorities very “wisely”. But if 
one looks more closely, the data shows that for Guinea Bissau (mainly) and Benin, during 
relative long periods, the output gap was negative (GDP growth under its potential level) 
and public authorities, in order to avoid the collapse of the economy, tried to keep a 
certain level of basic spending in capital formation. For South-Africa, an emerging 
country, this behaviour does not seem very surprising since from the data one can argue 
that investment has been a stabilizing tool used to bail out the economy in bad times and 
reduced during booms.  
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Table of Figures4.5: Procyclicality of Government Investment 
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Table of Figures4.5: Procyclicality of Government Investment 
-.0
25
-.0
2
-.0
15
-.0
1
-.0
05
0
Co
eff
ici
en
t o
f P
ro
cy
cli
ca
lity
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Madagascar
-.0
05
0
.00
5
Co
eff
ici
en
t o
f P
ro
cy
cli
ca
lity
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Mauritius
 
0
.0
00
2
.0
00
4
.0
00
6
.0
00
8
C
o
ef
fic
ie
n
t o
f P
ro
cy
cl
ic
al
ity
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Gabon
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
C
o
ef
fic
ie
n
t o
f P
ro
cy
cl
ic
al
ity
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Ghana
.0
04
.0
06
.0
08
.0
1
.0
12
.0
14
C
o
ef
fic
ie
n
t o
f P
ro
cy
cl
ic
al
ity
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Kenya
.0
02
.0
04
.0
06
.0
08
C
o
ef
fic
ie
n
t o
f P
ro
cy
cl
ic
al
ity
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Tanzania
 
 
 
Chap4: Fiscal Policy for Stabilization in Developing Countries: A Comparative Approach 
180 
 
Table of Figures6: Procyclicality of Government Investment (usual countercyclical 
countries). 
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Next I will investigate the cyclical behaviour of general government final expenses 
including purchases of goods and services, and compensation of employees. 
 
 
4.4.5 The Government Consumption and Social Spending 
As said above, here I will focus on government (non capital) spending cyclical 
characteristics and run a comparison with results from public investment. However I 
expect a higher countercyclicality from government non capital spending to investment. 
Government consumption variables include purchases of goods and services, 
compensation of public servants. Additional to that and based on IMF (2010), this 
variable is called “pro-poor spending” because it incorporates expenses on health and 
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education. Therefore any reduction in pro-poor spending would undermine decades of 
the poverty reduction battle and the attainment of the millennium development goals. 
Consequently it seems rational for African countries that any budgetary arbitrage should 
be done in favour of “pro-poor” spending. The results are presented in Table of Figures 
4.7. This table shows that public consumption and social spending have been highly 
countercyclical in Tunisia, Côte d‟Ivoire, Niger and Togo in recent period (just before and 
during the 2009 economic downturn). For Gabon, for instance, the situation is slightly 
different since one observes an acyclical behaviour in our data, while IMF 2010 argues 
that policies were efficiently conducted in that country during the crisis.  
 
Table of Figures 4.7: Procyclicality of Government Consumption 
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More than half the total sample of countries previously pursuing procyclical public 
consumption policies started in early 2000 implementing a new regime where 
consumptions were at least disconnected from the business cycle (Table Figure A.4.1).  
Table A.4.1 presents a comparison between public investment and consumption cyclical 
walk for some countries. As IMF 2010 underlines, government expenditures have been 
more countercyclical than public investment in the sample as a whole, but this picture 
hides an important heterogeneity. The trend in recent years (from 2000) has shown that 
the majority of middle income countries have run countercyclical public consumption or 
at least things have been acyclical. Except for Algeria, all other middle-income economies 
steadily evolve toward more acyclical then countercyclical public spending policies as in 
the case of Botswana, Mauritius Egypt and South-Africa. On the investment side the 
situation does not change for Algeria which still keeps a procyclical stance, and Egypt also 
running the same policy. Apart from these two countries, South-Africa, Botswana and 
Tunisia improved their investment policies. The picture is neither clear cut in low income 
and fragile African states. However as a whole, the sample shows that public expenditures 
(pro-poor spending) has been the main tool for African countries to fight recessions 
during the 2000s. Only four countries (Algeria, Burundi, Guinea Bissau and Morocco) out 
of twenty three have left spending moving in same direction as changes in output gap.  
These results underline two important facts. First, the one “size fits all” from previous 
studies is no longer relevant since substantial disparities exist among African economies. 
Second, the general tendency is to run “wise” fiscal policies among African countries 
(mainly for Sub-Saharan economies), therefore the situation described by Thornton 
(2008) (where fiscal policies in developing countries were strongly procyclical and 
inefficient to stabilize the economy) seems to have come to an end. International 
Organizations such as IMF also share the same analysis arguing that, based on the latest 
data available, fiscal policies during the crisis (in 2009) have indeed been countercyclical 
and pro-poor spending has been protected. To a large extent, this reflects the stronger 
fiscal positions in most countries heading into the crisis, and the availability of additional 
external financing. The rising trend in health and education expenditures especially has 
not been interrupted during the recent economic downturns. A growing number of 
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countries have put in place cash transfers, which have good targeting mechanisms and 
typically offer high impact at low cost. And an increasing number of countries are taking a 
more developmental approach to social protection, focusing on public works, and food 
security, especially through agricultural input subsidies (IMF 2010).  
The second part in this first stage analysis will focus on Latin American countries. Even if 
their structures are quite different, this analysis will give a benchmark on the relative 
performance between the groups of developing economies.  
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Table 4.1: Comparison for Sample Countries 
Country Government Investment Public Consumption 
Algeria Procyclical Procyclical 
Botswana (previously procyclical) Acyclical Acyclical 
Benin Countercyclical Acyclical 
Burundi (previously countercyclical) procyclical Procyclical 
Cameroon  Acyclical Acyclical 
Central African Republic Procyclical  
Côte d‟Ivoire (previously countercyclical) procyclical Countercyclical 
Egypt Procyclical Acyclical  
Gabon Procyclical Countercyclical 
Gambia Procyclical Procyclical then Acyclical 
Ghana Procyclical Procyclical then Acyclical  
Guinea Bissau Countercyclical Procyclical  
Kenya Procyclical Procyclical then Acyclical  
Madagascar Countercyclical then Acyclical Acyclical 
Mali Acyclical Acyclical  
Mauritius Countercyclical then Acyclical Acyclical 
Morocco Procyclical, Countercyclical then Procyclical Procyclical 
Niger Acyclical Countercyclical 
Senegal Procyclical then Acyclical Acyclical 
South Africa Countercyclical Acyclical  
Swaziland Acyclical Procyclical then Acyclical  
Tanzania Procyclical Acyclical  
Togo Procyclical Countercyclical 
Tunisia Procyclical then Acyclical Countercyclical 
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STUDY CASE 1: Procyclicality of  Fiscal Policy in Senegal 
The diagram below show that Senegalese budget balance have been quite countercyclical in 
recent years, compared to the situation in the early 1960s until mid-1990s (if one considers 
budget deficit, countercyclical policies appear more evidently during early 2000s) where public 
spending (and the budget balance itself) simply followed the business cycle. This means that 
policy makers are getting “fiscally wiser” Beyond the political economy arguments explaining 
this change other possible reasons are more related to the change in international economic 
orientations. Some details are given in flowing lines.  
1 Senegalese government has learnt from the past: the late 1980s and mid-1990 (especially 
in 1988 and 1994) have seen violent social unrests in the country. Of course there were 
other causes than economic but the situation in the real economy played an important 
role. For instance while the country was running poor economic performance in 1993, 
with a negative output growth (around -2%), general government final consumption 
expenditures declined. Therefore the procyclical public policies exacerbate the economic 
downturn and feeded violent riots in the capital Dakar in February 1994.   
 
2 Improved situation for public finance: had given enough room for Senegalese 
government to steadily run less procyclical policies. Indeed with a lighter debt burden 
(thanks to poverty relief programs) and favorable global economic environment, 
government was able to improve its fiscal stance.  
 
3 During 1980s policies implemented to sort out the country‟s debt crisis did give a little 
attention to social sectors. Indeed while improving macroeconomic aggregates, structural 
adjustment programs ended up with important negative social effects. That is what 
poverty reduction programs are aimed at amending. Therefore, more recently, during 
economic downturn (idiosyncratic or global crisis) the country receives financial as well 
as “political” support from partners to keep at least social spending unchanged. That was 
the situation during the last global crisis in 2008 when IMF & WB encouraged (and give 
support) low income countries to keep unchanged “sensitive” spending.  
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Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
General 
government 
final 
consumption 
expenditure 
(constant 
USD, billions) 
0,54657173 0,53854874 0,5398254 0,53259239 0,51301194 0,51712061 0,52805213 
GDP per 
capita growth 
(annual %) 
3,4896325 -0,3100542 1,55171584 -
1,46561308 
2,72595116 2,5265245 -
0,71984006 
 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
External 
Debt, total 
(FCFA, 
Billions) 
2171,7 2418,9 2540,1 2294,9 2024,7 1864,6 1944,1 864,4 968,5 
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4.5 The Results from first step regressions: Latin 
American Countries 
 
For sub-American economies the same method will be used, as in equation (1). 
The adjusted primary deficit is also computed as in equation (2), and identical control 
variables are introduced. The results are presented below.  
Countries present in Set of Figures 4.8 (and 4.9) have undertaken good fiscal policy 
responses during recessions. Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica and El Salvador have indeed 
steadily implemented countercyclical fiscal policies since discretionary fiscal actions go up 
when actual output is significantly lower than its potential level. The greatest achievement 
was performed by Honduras which pursued procyclical policies from 1971 to 1995 and 
changed it all in 2000. Up to this point one important and trivial stylized fact is observed: 
any change in the fiscal regime is preceded by a period where fiscal variables are 
disconnected from output variations. Therefore one can reasonably imagine that 
Argentina, Chile and Ecuador in coming years will have better fiscal policies, since they 
seem to have given up procyclical responses to short term negative shocks on real 
economy.  
More interesting and more challenging results are shown in Set of Figures 4.10. Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela have all been keeping strong procyclical fiscal policies 
since the early 1990s (except for Peru). This situation is difficult to interpret because most 
Latin American countries had very good fiscal positions from 2000 up to 2009. The 
commodity prices boom in 2006-2007 contributed to improve the Latin American fiscal 
balance (as much as economic cycles according to Daude & al. 2010). So that in 2008, at 
the onset of the crisis, adjusted primary balances were in equilibrium or surplus in a 
majority of countries; for instance there were surpluses in Peru, Brazil, Colombia, 
Uruguay, and Costa-Rica. Despite this excellent fiscal shape, why do some of them run 
procyclical policies? Several answers have been given in the literature. The first reason is 
historical, indeed since early 1990s fiscal policy has been procyclical in many Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa-Rica, Mexico etc.). The procyclicality during 
this period was mainly driven by the deep crises, but these practices continued throughout 
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the 2000s (De Mello & al. 2006), though countries like Costa-Rica, Honduras, El Salvador 
and Uruguay ended this dynamic in the early 2000s.  
 
 
Set of Figures 4.8: Adjusted fiscal deficit procyclicality 
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Set of Figures 4.9: Adjusted fiscal deficit procyclicality 
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Set of figures 4.10: Adjusted fiscal deficit procyclicality 
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Another explanation for such fiscal stance is the size of automatic stabilizers in Sub-
American economies. It is well known that with significant automatic stabilizers, 
discretionary measures needed to stabilize the economy will be less important than in the 
situation where one has weak automatic responses74. Therefore, important discretionary 
measures are unnecessary since the automatic response of fiscal primary deficit is enough 
to curb the recession. Additional to these facts, EMEs and especially Sub-American ones 
were among the first to start recovering from recession, owing to current surplus, low 
debt levels, strong monetary policies (inflation targeting), and important capital inflows 
that helped prompt recovery.  
As it was done for African countries, similar benchmark estimations for government 
investment and government consumption will be made.  
 
4.5.1 The Government Investment 
Due to the nature of our database, the gross fixed capital formation will be used as 
a proxy for public investments (in real US dollars).  
On the investment side, Bolivia and Peru are characterized by a change, at the end of 
1990s, in their investment policies, spending more in periods of economic downturn. 
However in Brazil the investment policy after a long period of acyclicality has recently (in 
2003) become quite countercyclical. In the remaining countries for which data on public 
investment is available, the situation is split in two. In the Set of Figures 4.11, capital 
spending is strongly procyclical especially for Uruguay and Costa-Rica. Venezuela, if one 
refers to the stylized fact presented earlier, is engaging a new dynamic and I expect in the 
medium term that this country will be using capital expenditures as a stabilizing tool. For 
the remaining countries, presented in Table Figure A.4.2, investment is just not 
responding to any change in output gap.  
                                                          
74 Primary budget balances have an automatic response of 0.21 percentage points of GDP for each output 
gap in the region (Daude & al. 2010).  
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The next analysis will focus on the cyclical nature of government final consumption 
expenditure.  
 
Set of Figures 4.11: Procyclicality of government investment (strong 
countercyclical) 
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Set of Figures 4.11: Procyclicality of government investment (strong procyclical) 
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4.5.2 The Government consumption and social spending 
General government final consumption expenditure (from WDI database) is used 
here as a proxy for government. It includes all government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes 
most expenditure on national defence and security, but excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of government capital formation.  
Some Latin American countries are characterized by relatively strong countercyclical 
public consumption. Indeed Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Costa-Rica, Panama and Venezuela 
governments use their consumption as a stabilizing tool (Set of Figures 4.12). Further 
analysis is necessary in order to explain why there seems to be a contradiction between 
public consumption and the procyclical nature of fiscal deficit. But as said earlier, 
automatic stabilizers are very effective in these economies. Moreover, and according to 
Daude & al. 2010, personal income taxes, without any discretionary action, are highly 
responsive to change in output gap. Therefore, despite a countercyclical use of 
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government spending in some countries, the automatic stabilizers effects seem to have 
higher effects on real economy than discretionary measures. 
Other countries, in Table Figure A.4.3, present acyclical or procyclical public 
consumption policies in recent periods (late 1990s).  
A brief comparison between Latin American and African countries shows that the latter 
are increasingly implementing countercyclical fiscal policies while budget deficit is more 
procyclical in developing Latin America. The two different behaviours can be easily 
explained by the tax bases. Indeed Sub-American countries (e.g. Brazil) have a relative 
wider personal income tax base compared to African countries (especially Sub-Saharan 
ones) where tax collection is more challenging and relies on fewer contributors. Therefore 
the only way to significantly stabilize the economic activity would be through 
discretionary fiscal actions. Inversely for small recessions, Latin American countries might 
only let automatic movements of taxes regulate the economic activity. 
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Set of Figures 4.12: Procyclicality of government investment (countercyclical) 
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4.6 Second Stage Regression: Is Procyclicality of  Fiscal 
Policy always and everywhere bad? 
 
In this section I cover an area that has not been dealt with for developing countries and 
in which the question is raised as to whether procyclical fiscal policies are bad for economic 
activity, always and everywhere. It is imaginable that a government decides to run procyclical 
fiscal policies in periods of economic bonanza in order to support and strengthen GDP 
growth. On the other hand, as fully explained in the literature, procyclical fiscal policy 
increases the vulnerability toward shocks since public authorities will not have enough 
financial resources to cover loss of tax revenues or even increase its spending to support 
inactivity during recessions. To shed light on such possible effects, I regress a measure for 
GDP volatility on output gap coefficients from earlier time series estimations (called 
“coefficients of procyclicality). If there is a clear positive effect of coefficients of 
procyclicality on output volatility, one could be able to conclude at least that procyclical fiscal 
policy induces higher volatility for growth and this could discourage private entrepreneurship 
and investment.  
Aghion & Marinescu (2007) did a similar analysis on OECD countries but they used first 
difference of the log of real GDP per capita. For developing economies, it might be more 
relevant to use output volatility since these countries are more vulnerable to volatility (Loayza 
& al. 2007). As Loayza & al. (2007) underline, “volatility entails a direct welfare cost for risk-
averse individuals, as well as an indirect one through its adverse effect on income growth and 
development”.  
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4.6.1 Empirical Specification and Results 
The empirical specification is as follow:  
2 1 3( ) varit it it itVariance Y control         
The dependent variable is the variance of real output. 1it  is the coefficients obtained from 
first stage estimation and they are compiled to form a panel dataset. varitcontrol  is a set of 
control variables that are introduced. Current account balance is still here to control for 
possible current account targeting, inflation, lagged GDP and investment over GDP are also 
considered.  
 
4.6.1.1 The results from African countries database 
Table 4.13 column-1 presents the results from a simple OLS estimation with a set of 
control variables representing the most widely used in similar analysis (e.g. Aghion & 
Marinescu 2007). Also I use country-year fixed effects in order to control for specific 
characteristics for each country even if they share similar levels of development or are in the 
same region. One observes here that the positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the coefficients of procyclicality and output volatility suggests that countercyclical 
fiscal deficit is an efficient stabilizing tool. Indeed countercyclical fiscal deficit impacts 
positively on growth (here it reduces its volatility) in that it can help reduce the negative 
effect that negative liquidity shocks impose on credit-constrained firms that invest in R&D 
and innovation (Aghion & Marinescu 2007). 
The sign of other control variables are as expected. For instance, better current account 
balance is growth enhancing and reduces volatility. Inflation and the lagged output also are as 
expected. However this first estimation might suffer from an endogeneity bias with output 
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growth that could affect the cyclical coefficient and vice-versa. Furthermore, the lagged value 
for real GDP per capita might be endogenous and correlated to the error term.  
To address such possible source of bias I will use the GMM system method which allows us 
to control for possible endogeneity bias by using lagged values as instruments. Results are 
presented in Table 4.13 column-2. Despite our concerns about possible endogeneity the 
results are quite trustworthy compared to those of OLS.  
 
 
Table 4.13: Effects of Fiscal policy procyclicality on Growth volatility 
 FE GMM System 
VARIABLES variance variance 
   
cdeficit_acycygap 0.145** 0.168** 
 (0.0634) (0.0752) 
curr_acc_real -2.06e-06 -1.10e-06** 
 (8.89e-06) (4.33e-07) 
inflation 0.00133** 0.00169*** 
 (0.000615) (0.000398) 
lag_gdp 0.000855*** -0.000284*** 
 (9.45e-05) (1.59e-05) 
invest -1.75e-06 -1.97e-06*** 
 (1.15e-05) (4.10e-07) 
gdp_cap_real  0.00120*** 
  (3.17e-05) 
Constant 37.56*** 37.36*** 
 (0.131) (0.0952) 
   
Observations 740 740 
R-squared 0.112  
Number of fixed_id_year 33  
Number of id  37 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Procyclical fiscal policy still negatively and statistically significantly affects growth through 
higher volatility. This shows that the endogeneity issue did not affect our results that much.  
The second step of estimation is also done for Latin American countries to see whether the 
impact is the same as for African economies.  
 
4.6.1.2 Effects of Fiscal Procyclicality for Latin American Countries 
Results from OLS estimations on Table 4.14 column1 denote that more procyclical fiscal 
policy induces higher output volatility in developing South-American countries. When 
discretionary fiscal measures are considered alone, it is quite logical to obtain such negative 
impact on growth, but if linked to previous analysis the impact might not be that large. 
Indeed, automatic stabilizers are said to be relatively important in Latin American countries, 
therefore the real effect of procyclical discretionary measures on output volatility will be less 
important. When we move from column-1 to column-2 (from an OLS to a GMM estimation 
where I check for possible endogeneity of the coefficient of procyclicality), the variable of 
interest becomes statistically significant only at 10%, where it was at 5% in the OLS 
estimations. Also one has to notice that, despite a very small coefficient, current account 
balance positively impacts on output volatility. Compared to results for African economies 
this is a bit remarkable. Improvement of current account balance should mean that the 
economy becomes more competitive and production should increase and remain stable. But 
for Latin American countries, this result might be explained by the repetitive crises caused by 
unsustainable current account balance and speculative capital inflows (refer to chapter 2). 
Therefore, an increase in current account balance is “always” perceived by our data as a 
possible sign for potential future crisis especially for developing countries running a non-
flexible exchange rate policy75.  
                                                          
75 Recently, during the autumn of 2009, Brazil decided to control capital inflows since it was running a higher 
current account balance and faced important capital inflows. Therefore to avoid real appreciation of the 
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Table 4.14: Effects of Fiscal policy procyclicality on Growth volatility 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES variance variance 
   
L.variance  0.971*** 
  (0.0158) 
Coefficient of Procyclicality 1.914** 1.393* 
 (0.807) (0.655) 
curr_acc_real 1.24e-07 1.91e-07*** 
 (4.92e-07) (3.78e-08) 
lag_gdp 0*** -0*** 
 (0) (0) 
invest -2.21e-07 -2.69e-07*** 
 (1.44e-07) (6.75e-08) 
gdp_cap  0*** 
  (0) 
inflation 0.000221 -6.30e-06 
 (0.000192) (5.63e-05) 
durable -8.56e-05  
 (0.000259)  
Constant 42.11*** 1.306* 
 (0.138) (0.673) 
   
Observations 447 447 
R-squared 0.073  
Number of fixed_id_year 38  
Number of id  15 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Brazilian Real and reduce vulnerability toward external shocks, public authorities introduced a tax of around 
10% on portfolio investments.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
A new preference in developing countries for less procyclical fiscal policies and more 
active and countercyclical budget measures is becoming apparent. For instance, most African 
countries have generally been using the budget deficit to stabilize their economies. Except for 
a few “outliers” (Rwanda, Sudan), countries are moving toward more countercyclical policies 
from either initially procyclical policies (Algeria, Central African Republic, Egypt etc.) or 
acyclical budget deficits (Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, Tunisia, Senegal etc.). The comparison 
between investment and public consumption shows that pro-poor spending has been more 
countercyclical. Indeed African economies, especially during the last global economic 
downturn, made all possible efforts to keep social expenditures unchanged or even increase 
them, as IMF (2010) reported it. This indicates a growing trend where developing African 
countries learn from previous painful experience when they were obliged to run restrictive 
fiscal policies in periods of negative output gap. The situation in other developing countries 
is quite similar but some differences remain. 
Indeed large countries such as Brazil (as well as Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) were 
surprisingly running procyclical budget deficits. With responsive and large automatic 
stabilizers in these economies, lesser discretionary measures needed during recessions (or 
even procyclical fiscal policies can be run without any danger if automatic stabilizers are large 
enough). Other countries have been running (since the late 1990s) strong countercyclical 
fiscal policies (Bolivia, Costa-Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Uruguay).  
Developing countries should deploy all possible efforts to implement rigorous policies with 
their budget since it appears to be a strong factor for output stability. For developing African 
countries, procyclical fiscal policies have been associated with strong volatility of output 
while for Latin America this is still true but with a weaker significance.  
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Overall the paper demonstrates that for middle income and low income countries there is a 
trend toward countercyclical policies since the results show that it is an efficient tool to 
stabilize the real economy.  
Despite such outcomes, fiscal policy alone is not enough to stabilize a whole economy. In 
addition, discretionary fiscal measures should be consistent with monetary policy stance. For 
instance, if in periods of recession government needs to borrow in order to support the 
economy, authorities should run loose monetary policy to make funds available for 
entrepreneurs and increase external competitiveness.  
For a better efficiency, discretionary fiscal measures could be institutionalized similar to what 
is being done in the monetary policy area. Similar to inflation targeting rules, implementing a 
law regarding discretionary fiscal measures could strengthen the credibility of public 
authorities and increase budget efficiency. Even for countries with fiscal rules, discretionary 
measures still need to be clearly agreed upstream to avoid any rigidities. As the Ter-
Minassian (2010) survey points out, “half of countries operating under fiscal rules did not 
modify or temporarily suspend them during the global crisis in 2008”. This discretionary 
fiscal policy rule could also be a rampart against any deficit bias if it allows the measure to be 
implemented as soon as the output gap reaches a certain negative value. 
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Table Figure A.4.1 : Procyclicality of Government consumption (sample of African 
Economies) 
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Table Figure A.4.2: Latin American procyclicality of public investment (acyclical 
policies) 
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Table Figure A.4.3: Latin American procyclicality of public investment (acyclical 
policies) 
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List of variables 
Variable  Definition & Source 
Government investment   General government gross domestic 
investment (GDFI): i.e. gross fixed 
capital formation including all 
additions to the stocks of fixed 
assets (purchases and own-account 
capital formation), less any sales of 
second-hand and scrapped fixed 
assets, by central government.  
Source: World Bank 
Government consumption 
and social spending 
 General government consumption 
including all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods 
and services (including 
compensation of employees). It also 
includes most expenditures on 
national defense and security, but 
excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation. 
Source: World  
General Government debt  External debt: consists of the 
outstanding stock or recognized, 
direct liabilities of the government 
to the rest of the world, generated in 
the past and scheduled to be 
extinguished by government 
operations in the future or to 
continue as perpetual debt.  
Source: World Bank 
Inflation  Annual percentage change of the 
consumer price index  
Source: IFS-IMF  
GDP_growth  Annual percentage growth rate of 
GDP per capita.  
Source: World Bank national 
accounts data. 
Current account balance  The sum of net exports of goods, 
services, net income, and net current 
transfers.   
Source: BOP-Stats, IMF 
& World Bank. 
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List of countries 
AFRICA 
 
LATIN AMERICA 
Algeria Malawi Argentina 
Angola Mali Belize 
Benin Mauritania Bolivia 
Botswana Mauritius Brazil 
Burkina Faso Morocco Chile 
Burundi Mozambique Colombia 
Cameroon Namibia Costa Rica 
Cape Verde Niger Ecuador 
Central Africa Nigeria El Salvador 
Chad RDC Guatemala 
Comoros Rwanda Honduras 
Congo Sao tome and principe Nicaragua 
Cote d'Ivoire Senegal Panama 
Djibouti South Africa Peru 
Egypt Sudan Suriname 
Equatorial Guinea Swaziland Uruguay 
Eritrea Tanzania Venezuela 
Ethiopia Togo 
 Gabon Tunisia 
 Gambia Zambia 
 Ghana Zimbabwe 
 Guinea 
  Guinea Bissau 
  Kenya 
  Lesotho 
  Madagascar 
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General Conclusion  
 
In a global context of instability and scarcity of external financial resources tax 
revenues and public spending strategies needs to be highly efficient and effective in order 
to keep a sustained path of economic development. This dissertation discussed the effects 
of fiscal policies through three issues among the most important elements one has to 
understand in order to improve this political economy tool. The literature on fiscal 
policies in developing countries, for both emerging and low income economies, have 
often neglected several essential specificities while identifying some phenomenon and/or 
even considered that developing countries did not adapt their policies from past (crises) 
experiences. The current dissertation tried to shed light on fiscal policies effects by 
answering three questions and providing with policy recommendations: can developing 
countries reasonably use surprise policies to improve economic activity? In a globalized 
world, are the fiscal policies of developing economies‟ partners a real threat to the access 
to private funds? Finally can fiscal policy be an efficient economic stabilizing tool? 
The second chapter relies on a recent econometric technique to clearly identify the 
outcome from a new policy that agents in the economy did not know about. The results 
have shown that spending shocks have Keynesian effects, meaning that it has influenced 
positively private consumption and output growth. On the other hand sudden change in 
government revenues implies non-Keynesian effects since both consumption (and 
imports) and growth increase. The results of spending shock are common to major 
studies but those concerning public revenues shocks are quite surprising and deserve 
deeper analysis. Several factors contribute to the non-Keynesian effects of public 
revenues shocks. First, these results regarding public revenues, simply confirm that the 
public sector is the main economic agent and also private sector is under-developed. The 
lack of a strong private sector partially explains the fact whenever public revenues 
increase absorption follows an identical path; the general state being the main employer in 
the formal sector. The second factor identified is the weakness of automatic stabilizers in 
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developing countries. This weakness is reflected through the fact that impulse responses 
of revenue shocks last quite long (compare to what is observed in industrial countries). 
This duration demonstrates that revenues are not flexible indicating the incapacity for 
government to re-adapt its fiscal policy to changes in the real economy. The final factor is 
related to the lack of credibility of public authorities. This causes behavioural strategies 
such as “voracity effects” obliging government to spend any revenue “windfall”. All these 
effects teach us that developing countries have reached “equilibrium state” where agents 
do not trust their public authorities and these policy makers being aware of that adapt 
their behaviour in order to appear less suspicious. The overall outcome being the fact that 
fiscal policy in developing countries remains “unconventional”. 
Chapter 3 had analyzed the relation between fiscal policies in both industrial and 
emerging economies and the access to international private capital for these fast growing 
emerging countries. The early stages of the recent global economic crisis in 2008 have 
seen capital outflow from emerging economies. Indeed a “global crowding out” 
consisting in capital flows being attracted by industrial countries‟ governments in huge 
need of capital. Developing countries‟ fiscal imbalances also plays negatively against 
capital inflows. This chapter‟s results confirm and also complete previous findings stating 
that “push factors” (see supra) are the most important determinants for capital flows. 
Henceforth among the “push factors” one will need to include the fiscal stance in 
advanced countries as a key determinant of investment flows toward the developing 
world. The non-linear relationship discovered between capital flows and fiscal imbalances 
in industrial countries shows up that above a certain level of debt and deficit investment 
flows to developing countries enter into a new paradigm. A country, whatever its level of 
development, cannot indefinitely keeps large fiscal deficits (and debt) without raising 
investors‟ concern. The recent situation in several European member countries (Greece, 
Spain, Ireland and recently Portugal) constitutes an important evidence proving that fiscal 
sustainability is not a unique matter for non-industrialized economies.  
As extensively stated in previous analysis, fiscal policy in developing countries (African 
and Latin American countries) have remained procyclical across decades (Chapter 4). It 
has been true that fiscal policies were imprudent and even in some situation (especially 
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during the late 1980s where strict restrictive fiscal policies were advocated) these policies 
exacerbate the cyclical crises. However since early 2000 several developing countries 
(African and Latin-American) learnt from past and “painful” experience. Progressively 
many of them started shifting toward more prudent fiscal policies. This change will 
provide them with enough “budget space” in terms of resources to support the real 
economy in case their countries face severe economic downturn. Nonetheless developing 
countries are at the early stages of this transition, since only a limited number of them 
actually start implementing countercyclical policies. The other group of countries is still 
on the medium stage where fiscal policy is rather acyclical. Another aspect of this 
transition period is that countries running countercyclical policies use spending on social 
sector (and not that much on investment) as the main stabilizing tool. These new 
“disciplined policies” have to be encouraged and backed, otherwise a return toward 
procyclical strategies might be a serious threat on the poverty alleviation objective and on 
the whole economic development process (as the result suggest that procyclical policies 
increase output volatility).  
This dissertation has shown that fiscal policies in developing countries suffer from a lack 
of credibility and a weak trust relationship between policy makers and tax payers, these 
situations ending with severe inefficiencies. Deep reforms on institutional framework and 
implementation of clear rules will help to mitigate these adverse effects. For instance and 
like India did recently in 2003, that implemented a fiscal rule policy, is a possible way 
other countries could explore. However while implementing fiscal rules one should care 
about flexibility in order to avoid situations where the economy needs a stimulus and the 
law prevents authorities to do so. Recent initiatives like PEMFA and MTEF are part of 
this framework that aims at strengthening fiscal institution; and future research may 
evaluate their real impact in developing countries‟ policies.  
Another aspect of this dissertation has proved that despite the low efficiency of 
government budgetary interventions things are changing and getting better in the 
developing world. Even if industrial countries are their main competitors for the access to 
capital, the results show a new tendency and a birth of a new paradigm. Developing 
countries (EMEs) running sounder fiscal policies and growing at the faster rate seems to 
General Conclusion 
212 
 
reverse the traditional situation and to be perceived as safer shelter by international 
investors. On the same vein, and contrary to the common view, developing countries 
have learnt a lot from the past. Fiscal policies are getting more disciplined and flexible 
across countries. 
To be sustainable all these great achievement alone are not enough to the ultimate 
development objectives. Private sector and private savings strengthening are some of the 
key element essential to lighten the fiscal efforts necessary to stabilize the macroeconomic 
environment. 
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Résumé : 
La réflexion sur l‟utilisation de la politique budgétaire comme outil de stabilisation et de relance 
connaît un net regain d‟intérêt ces dernières années. Après près de trois décennies qui ont vu la 
dominance des idées néo-classique, la récente crise financière des années 2008 a consacré le retour 
aux idées keynésiennes sur l‟efficacité de l‟outil budgétaire. Cette thèse s‟intéresse à ce thème et essaie 
de caractériser la politique budgétaire dans le contexte des pays en développement et son objectif final 
est de préciser dans quelle mesure cet outil de politique économique serait efficace pour ces pays. Le 
chapitre 2 traite de la question des effets des politiques budgétaires surprises. Autrement dit, et à 
partir d‟une modélisation en VAR structurels, cette partie se pose la question de savoir si le budget 
peut être utilisé de façon surprise pour relancer une économie et quels sont les défis que pose une 
telle mesure dans le contexte d‟une économie en développement. Le troisième chapitre à partir d‟un 
modèle de gravité analyse les relations entre la situation budgétaire dans les économies avancées ainsi 
que celle des pays émergents et les flux d‟investissement vers les économies à revenu intermédiaire. 
Cette étude montre qu‟un effet d‟éviction entre pays (développés et émergents) existe mais aussi que 
l‟économie mondiale tend vers un nouveau paradigme. Le dernier chapitre quant à lui étudie la 
cyclicité des politiques budgétaires pour un échantillon de pays d‟Afrique subsaharienne et 
d‟Amérique latine. La méthode choisie a permis de suivre l‟évolution de la procyclicité des politiques 
budgétaires d‟année en année et de montrer que les pays en développement surtout africains 
progressivement adoptent des politiques de plus en plus disciplinées et prudentes.  
 
Abstract: 
The use of fiscal policy as a stabilization and stimulus tool face a renewed interest from analyst and 
policy makers. After almost three decades where neo-classical ideas were dominant, the recent 
financial crisis (late 2007) marked the reborn of Keynesian ideas on the importance of the State 
budget during economic downturns. This dissertation focuses on this issue and provides with stylized 
facts of fiscal policies in developing economies, and the main aim being to be able to say whether 
fiscal policy is an efficient political economy tool. Chapter 2 focuses on the issue of unanticipated 
fiscal measures on the economy. Using a structural VAR approach it investigates whether 
unanticipated budget measures can be used to stimulate a declining economy and what kind of 
challenges and threats this strategy imposes to public authorities. Chapter 3, relying on a gravity 
model, analyses the relationship between emerging and advanced economies fiscal aggregates and 
capital flows. It shows that there exists a “global” crowding out effect of investment towards 
emerging markets and, most important is that world economy is entering into a new paradigm. The 
last chapter from a panel of Sub-Saharan African and Latin American economies studies the issue of 
fiscal procyclicality. The empirical strategy has allowed us on a yearly basis to characterise the cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policies in both set of countries. It has been shown that developing countries 
especially African ones are adopting progressively more prudent and disciplined policies.  
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Developing countries, Shocks, Procyclicality, panel Structural VAR models, 
Gravity models, Local Gaussian-weighted ordinary Least squares estimates. 
